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

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Issued in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter, POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (ISSN 0032-3195, E-ISSN 1538-165X) is published by the Academy of Political Science, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 1274, New York, NY 10115-1274; (212) 870-2500; fax: (212) 870-2202; aps@psqonline.org. Subscriptions are obtained through membership in the Academy.

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Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7-36315.

Printed by The Sheridan Press, Hanover, Pennsylvania.

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CONTENTS

PSQ • Volume 121 • Number 1 • Spring 2006

Russia, China, and the Immigration Security Dilemma
MIKHAIL A. ALEXSEEV
C. RICHARD HOFSTETTER 1

An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms before September 11
AMY B. ZEGART 33

Performing the Northern Ireland Peace Process on the World Stage
PAUL DIXON 61

Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002
GARY R. HESS 93

Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America
MARK ERIC WILLIAMS 119

Book Reviews 141

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BOOK REVIEWS

Richard Davis, **Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process** — Donald Grier Stephenson — 141

Diego Gambetta, ed., **Making Sense of Suicide Missions** — Assaf Moghadam — 142

James A. Morone and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds., **Healthy, Wealthy, & Fair: Health Care and the Good Society** — Mary Ruggie — 144

Louis Fisher, **Military Tribunals and Presidential Power: American Revolution to the War on Terrorism** — Joseph M. Bessette — 145

Andrew H. Kydd, **Trust and Mistrust in International Relations** — Aaron M. Hoffman — 147

Charles Tilly, **Trust and Rule** — Omar G. Encarnación — 148

Susan Rose-Ackerman, **From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland** — Anna Grzymala-Busse — 150

Mia Bloom, **Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror** — Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca — 151

Dale R. Herspring, **The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush** — Jay M. Parker — 153

Scott Kennedy, **The Business of Lobbying in China** — Andrew C. Mertha — 154

Brian C. Rathbun, **Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans** — Susan L. Woodward — 155

Kitty Calavita, **Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe** — Terri E. Givens — 157

Tom Gallagher, **Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation** — Katia Papagianni — 158

Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, eds., **Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente** — Nikolaos Zahariadis — 160

Simon Serfaty, **The Vital Partnership: Power and Order, America and Europe Beyond Iraq** — Werner D. Lippert — 161

David Schoenbrod, **Saving Our Environment from Washington: How Congress Grabs Power, Shirks Responsibility, and Shortchanges the People** — Denise Scheberle — 162

Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia I. Lane, **Moving Up or Moving On: Who Advances in the Low-Wage Labor Market** — Helen C. Connolly — 164

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Susan Gluck Mezey, **Disabling Interpretations: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Federal Court** BRADLEY D. HAYS 165

Michael W. Flamm, **Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s** EDWARD P. MORGAN 167

Martin H. Redish, **The Logic of Persecution: Free Expression and the McCarthy Era** LUCAS A. POWE 168

Laura R. Olson, Sue E.S. Crawford, and Melissa M. Deckman, **Women with a Mission: Religion, Gender, and the Politics of Women Clergy** ELIZABETH A. OLDMIXON 170

Paul Lichterman, **Elusive Togetherness: Church Groups Trying to Bridge America's Divisions** KATHERINE CRAMER WALSH 171

Richard J. Ellis, **To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance** DAVID GREENBERG 172

Melvin Small, **At the Water's Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War** ROBERT BUZZANCO 174

Beth A. Rosenson, **The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Politics** FRANK ANECHIARICO 175

Herfried Münkler, **The New Wars** JACK S. LEVY 177

Sergei Khrushchev, ed., **Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar (1918-1945)** WILLIAM TOMPSON 178

John Norris, **Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo** JAMES M. GOLDGEIER 179

Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, **The Russian Military: Power and Policy** DEBORAH YARSIKE BALL 181

Arie M. Kacowicz, **The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881-2000** CAMERON G. THIES 182

Charles D. Brockett, **Political Movements and Violence in Central America** JOHN A. BOOTH 183

Peter Isard, **Globalization and the International Financial System: What's Wrong and What Can Be Done** ANASTASIA XENIAS 185

Nicolas Guilhot, **The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order** SUZANNE OGDEN 187

Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams, **Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies** STEVEN MAJSTOROVIC 188

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

MIKHAIL A. ALEXSEEV and C. RICHARD HOFSTETTER assess anti-Chinese hostility in the Russian Far East. They find that local Russians exaggerated the scale and negative effects of Chinese migration, supporting extreme exclusionist policies.

AMY B. ZEGART examines the failures to reform U.S. intelligence agencies before the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. She finds that during the 1990s, intelligence officials and policy makers understood the rising terrorist threat and the urgent need for reform, but failed to address critical organizational deficiencies.

PAUL DIXON explores the impact of the international dimension of the Northern Ireland peace process. He uses a theatrical metaphor to show how the role of international actors has been exaggerated, but he argues that the performance of some of those actors, such as President Bill Clinton, did have an effect.

GARY R. HESS compares the leadership of Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush in dealing with the issue of congressional war authorization resolutions in 1991 and 2002. He finds that Bush II operated from a much stronger political position reminiscent of the "imperial presidency"—partially the result of a weakened Democratic Party in Congress.

MARK ERIC WILLIAMS analyzes the tensions between technocratic market reform projects and fundamental democratic principles in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. He argues that the political dynamics that surround these market-friendly programs and the market pressures they unleash can bolster democratic governance by enhancing accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Russia, China, and the Immigration Security Dilemma

MIKHAIL A. ALEXSEEV
C. RICHARD HOFSTETTER

The "yellow peril" is rising.... We see the overpopulation of the neighboring nation. They will come here, give birth to multitudes of slit-eyed people and then claim political autonomy.... Even if we shoot and kill a million Chinese a year, this problem won't go away.

—Vitalii Poluyanov, Chieftain, the Ussuri Cossack Army, interview with the first author, Vladivostok, June 1, 1999

Since the opening of the Sino–Soviet border in 1988, governors of Siberian and Russian Far Eastern territories, Russian federal government officials, and the media have been warning the Kremlin and the Russian public about "peaceful Chinese infiltration" and "Sinification" of the Russian Far East (RFE).[1] In national polls conducted by the Levada Analytical Center, Russia's leading survey agency, the number of respondents who wanted to restrict the settlement of ethnic Chinese in Russia rose from 39 percent to

[1] Typical headlines read, "The Chinese in the Far East: Guests or Masters?," "Will Vladivostok Become a Suburb of Kharbin?," and "The Chinese Are Unarmed, But Very Dangerous." See Viktor Larin, *Kitai I Dal'nii Vostok Rossii v pervoi polovine 90-kh: problemy regional'nogo vzaimodeystviia* [China and the Russian Far East in the First Half of the 1990s: Problems of Regional Interaction] (Vladivostok: Dal'nauka, 1998), 72. For recent reactions, see Mikhail A. Alexseev, "Socioeconomic and Security Implications of Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 42 (March 2001): 95–114; Dmitrii Chernov, "Kitatiskaia bolezn' Dal'nego Vostoka. Diaspora zhivet po svoim zakonam" [The Chinese Disease of the Russian Far East. The Diaspora Lives According to Its Own Laws], *Vremia novostei*, 19 February 2003, accessed on the website of EastView at http://dlib.eastview.com, 30 May 2003.

MIKHAIL A. ALEXSEEV is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at San Diego State University and director of a research project on ethnoreligious hostility and violence in Russia funded by the National Science Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation. His latest book is *Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe, and the United States*. C. RICHARD HOFSTETTER is a professor in the Department of Political Science and adjunct professor in the Graduate School of Public Health at San Diego State University.

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46 percent from 2004 to 2005.[2] Resembling responses to migration in host societies from California to the suburbs of Paris—and nurturing premonitions that the French urban riots of late 2005 may repeat themselves at the juncture of Eurasia's two most powerful states—these dire warnings and exclusionist sentiments have been counterintuitive in several important respects. Migrants have been associated with threats to group and national security precisely where they are much needed to offset the decline of the working-age population and to revitalize local economies. Moreover, hostility emerged despite the widely recognized willingness of migrants to work harder and for longer hours in lower-paid jobs than host populations do and to move where workers are scarcest.[3] Alarmist reactions have also persisted regardless of the decline in illegal migration rates from the early 1990s to the present, and regardless of the fact that for over more than a decade, migration has not produced any sizeable Chinese ethnic enclaves in the RFE.[4] Finally, the tenacity of anti-Chinese sentiments in the region has been impervious to the improvement of Sino–Russian relations in the 1990s—as marked by the settlement of border disputes, regular summit meetings, substantial arms trade, and a friendship treaty.[5] These puzzles about the persistence of "yellow peril" alarmism in the RFE relate to a broader theoretical problem identified in a recent review of research on migration and conflict: "Whether migration heightens tensions ...

[2] Accessed on the Levada Center website at http://www.levada.ru/press/2005111101.html, 22 November 2005.

[3] For the argument about the economic necessity of Chinese migration into the Russian Far East and a review of alarmist responses, see Galina Vitkovskaya, Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, and Kathleen Newland, "Chinese Migration into Russia" in Sherman W. Garnett, ed., *Rapprochement or Rivalry: Russia-China Relations in a Changing Asia* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 348, 353, 364. In the European and American contexts, the rise of antimigrant sentiments regardless of net economic benefits from migration has been noted in *The Economist,* "The Longest Journey: A Survey of Migration," 2 November 2002, 14; Michael S. Teitelbaum and Jay Winter, *A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility, and the Politics of National Identity* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998); Warren Zimmermann, "Migrants and Refugees? A Threat to Security?" in Michael S. Teitelbaum and Myron Weiner, eds., *Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders: World Migration and U.S. Policy* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, 88–116); Wayne A. Cornelius, "Ambivalent Reception: Mass Public Responses to the 'New' Latino Immigration to the United States" in Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, ed., *Latinos in the 21st Century: Mapping the Research Agenda* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002), 165–189.

[4] For example, according to the Primorskii Krai Visa and Registration Service (OVIR), 34 percent (or 27,530) of the total number of PRC visitors to Primorskii in 1994 and 1995 failed to return to China. In 1999, less than 1 percent of Chinese visitors failed to return. See Alexseev, "Socioeconomic and Security Implications," Table 1. According to Vladimir Protiven, deputy head of Russia's migration service for Primorskii Krai, in 2004 only 12 out of 100,000 Chinese tourists failed to return to China; interview with the first author, Vladivostok, 21 June 2005.

[5] See Gilbert Rozman, "Sino-Russian Relations: Mutual Assessments and Predictions" in Garnett, ed., *Rapprochement or Rivalry,* 148.

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often depends on whether it is viewed as undermining national security or domestic harmony, but the process by which threats are constructed and by which boon is transformed into bane remains poorly understood and undertheorized."[6] In this article, we develop a theoretical explanation of antimigrant alarmism and hostility by drawing on the security dilemma perspective, especially as it applies to relations among ethnic groups.[7]

At the heart of the security dilemma is a desire for self-preservation strongly associated with the absence or decline of central government authority.[8] According to John Herz's original definition: "Whenever such anarchic society has existed—and it has existed in most periods of known history on some level—there has arisen what may be called the 'security dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated or annihilated by other groups and individuals."[9] Thus, threats blown out of seemingly rational proportion would nevertheless have solid bases in social reality and human psychology. Regarding ethnic relations, the security dilemma refers to obsession with relative power "when proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security."[10] Emphasizing the critical role of perception and misperception during periods of uncertainty, the security dilemma provides an internally consistent and parsimonious explanation for precisely why fears may arise and become endemic, pervasive, irrational, symbolic, exaggerated, and potentially uncontrollable, even in the face of a stated commitment to peace and cooperation by all groups or states. In this sense, the security dilemma directly addresses the central theoretical puzzle of the present study—the emergence and persistence of what may be called "migration phobia," even when migration yields net economic benefits, when most migrants are temporary, and when intergovernmental relations between migrant-sending and -receiving states improve. And because the security dilemma logic has to do with competing interpretations of the nature, scale, and outcomes of migration, we define

[6] Ronald R. Krebs and Jack S. Levy, "Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict" in Myron Weiner and Sharon Stanton Russell, eds., *Demography and National Security* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 88.

[7] Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" in Michael E. Brown, ed., *Ethnic Conflict in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103–125; Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma" in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 15–37; Stephen Van Evera, "Nationalism and the Causes of War" in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 146–174.

[8] Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214.

[9] John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* (January 1950): 157.

[10] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 103.

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migration broadly as the movement of people—permanent or temporary—from one country or locality to another.[11]

As cross-border movement of ethnically heterogeneous groups, migration is one process that would make various groups proximate and potentially insecure. First, the very fact of migration could be perceived as a symptom of "borderlessness" and, hence, of declining state sovereignty and government authority. And by raising uncertainty about the future ethnic makeup of states (regardless of actual migration scale), migration would make incumbent ethnic groups more likely to view competition for power as key to their security. Second, ethnic incumbents could rarely be certain that temporary migrants would return home and would not settle down, bring in their relatives and friends, and claim jobs, resources, or territory (that is, "offense" is indistinguishable from "defense"). Histories of territorial claims and records of violent conflict between the migrants and the host populations would also decrease credibility of the migrants' intent. Third, migration often brings together ethnic populations who have a sense of distinct "groupness" and entrenched negative stereotypes—giving xenophobic politicians opportunities to manipulate ethnic mythologies in the struggle for power. Fourth, migration may engender economic rivalries and competition, activating the sense of economic vulnerability in host societies. The more intense these perceptions—the "security dilemma complex"—the more would one expect migration to engender fear and hostility despite efforts of all groups to assert their good will.

However, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis caution that the security dilemma is "a social situation with social and perceptual causes, not simply a fact of nature. None of the elements that fuel the security dilemma—neither anarchy, nor offensive advantages, nor expectations that others will defect—can be taken for granted as unproblematic givens."[12] Actual or anticipated shifts in ethnic balance would not automatically harden into security dilemma situations, even in near-anarchical environments. Individual fears of ethnic "other" newcomers may differ widely in the same fear-producing environments. In two areas of the world in which interethnic security dilemma conditions have been most apparent—Africa and the former Soviet Union—violent conflict occurred in only a fraction of interethnic dyads.[13]

Whereas previous research on the interethnic security dilemma has offered us increasingly sophisticated theoretical refinements, empirical studies have

[11] A study of immigration attitudes in California showed that respondents made little distinction between permanent and temporary migrants. See Brian Loveman and C. Richard Hofstetter, "American Perceptions of Undocumented Immigrants: Political Implications," *New Scholar* 9 (Spring 1984): 111–118. In the same study, the perceived impact of migration on crime and welfare spending far exceeded the actual crime rates and welfare expenditures associated with illegal migrants.

[12] Snyder and Jervis, "Civil War and the Security Dilemma," 24.

[13] James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review* 90 (December 1996): 715–735.

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relied on descriptive case studies—in which mass violence had already occurred.[14] However, such methodology is insufficient to address critical questions about the long-term social and psychological dynamics of ethnic conflict that concern us in this study: How do perceived shifts in ethnic population balances translate into fear and hostility toward ethnic "others" long before incendiary speeches are written and guns are fired? Do threat perceptions actually emerge among living, breathing human beings under structural conditions and leaders' behavior that one associates with the security dilemma as specified by theory? Under these same conditions, do some individuals find their futures more threatening than do others, and why? Which perceptions may mitigate fears? To address these questions—in a way previous studies could not do by design—we focus on the RFE as a case where no mass interethnic violence had occurred as a result of migration, yet where antimigrant alarmism and hostility have been palpable. We analyze migration phobia with a hope to advance our understanding of the security dilemma logic, before governments actually break down and violence erupts, by systematically testing its claims with large-*N*, individual-level data for the first time.[15]

Our focus is on individual perceptions plausibly associated with migration phobia and interethnic hostility through Russian views of Chinese migration in Primorskii Krai (Maritime Territory), located in the southeastern part of the RFE and representative of Chinese migration issues in Russia's regions along the border with China.[16] These perceptions were measured in a survey conducted in September 2000, of 1,010 local Russian respondents comprising a probability sample of the Primorskii Krai population. Although our tests of diverse theoretical explanations of migration phobia have been designed to probe their plausibility in one setting rather than to provide conclusive proof of any specific claim's validity, the location of the study in Primorskii Krai, as we

[14] For example, see contributions to Walter and Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, especially Susan Woodward, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: How Not to End Civil War," 73–115; B.D. Jones, "Military Intervention in Rwanda's 'Two Wars': Partisanship and Indifference," 116–145; David D. Laitin, "Somalia: Civil War and International Intervention," 146–180; Michael W. Doyle, "War and Peace in Cambodia," 181–220; Chaim D. Kaufmann,"When All Else Fails: Evaluating Population Transfers and Partition as Solutions to Ethnic Conflict," 221–260; Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. and Barry B. Weingast, "The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict," 261–302.

[15] Our unit of analysis, in other words, is the individual. The goal is to explain individual variation in antimigrant hostility and threat perception. Variations in the broader demographic, political, and socioeconomic context of migration would matter to the extent that individuals are likely to associate them with threat and hostility. Although we believe that threat and hostility are antecedents and therefore important signposts of interethnic violence, we do not assume a firm link between mass opinion and violent conflict.

[16] Primorskii Krai, Khabarovskii Krai, and the Amur oblast all experienced natural population decline, out-migration of ethnic Slavs to Central Russia, and approximately the same levels of Chinese migration since the early 1990s. All of these regions experienced economic decline and problems with law enforcement. See, for example, Vitkovskaya, Zayonchkovskaya, and Newland, "Chinese Migration into Russia," 350–353, 355–357.

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show later, offers an ideal demographic, political, and socioeconomic context for this study.

Migration and the Interethnic Security Dilemma: Theory and the Chinese in Russia

Although not necessarily resulting in mass violence, the arrival of a new ethnic group in any society explicitly or implicitly triggers the fundamental security dilemma question formulated by Barry Posen: "Is it a threat? How much of a threat? Will the threat grow or diminish over time?"[17] The security dilemma specifies conditions under which individuals in host societies would view migration as increasingly threatening.

The Problem of "Emerging Anarchy"

The very fact that ethnic "others" are capable of crossing state borders and are hard to control once inside the host state sets the stage for increasing concerns on the part of the host populations about security. The weakening of central government authority—while most evident in failing states after the demise of colonial and communist rule—has also been associated with the rise of transnational governance and, more broadly, with globalization.[18] One recent study of immigration and ethnic relations in the European Union linked the rise in "explosive public conflicts and deep rifts among political elites" over migration and state identity with simultaneous "threats of globalization from without and pluralization from within."[19] Myron Weiner notes that with the proportion of noncitizens now ranging from 5 to 25 percent in most industrialized countries and reaching more than 50 percent in the oil-producing countries of the Persian Gulf, at the global level, migration creates "nations without borders."[20]

If a nation-state's capacity to control migrant flows weakens, fears of status quo groups in host societies that ethnic balance may change in favor of the newcomers would parallel concerns of statesmen on the international stage about the military balance changing in favor of others. This logic could induce some members of the host societies to seek windows of opportunity for preemptive aggressive and violent responses to migration: "If those with greater

[17] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 103.

[18] Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Pamela T. Surko, Alan N. Unger, and Robert S. Chen, "The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for US Foreign Policy Planning" in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 27–38; James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[19] R. Koopmans and P. Statham, eds., *Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1.

[20] Myron Weiner, "Nations Without Borders," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (March/April 1996): 128.

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advantages expect to remain in that position in superior numbers, then they may see no window of opportunity. However, if they expect their advantage to wane or disappear, then they will have an incentive to solve outstanding issues while they are much stronger than the opposition."[21] Anarchy-related concerns over security and competition for political power (as the key to security) will thus be higher when: migrant-sending states or regions have larger and/or faster-growing populations than do host states or regions; the capacity of host governments and nongovernmental actors to resolve or prevent conflicts with migrants or to protect local populations from adverse effects of migration declines; and migrants come from states that have a preponderance (current or projected) of military power over host states.

In the Russian Far East, widespread fears of "Sinification" (*kitaizatsiia*) emerged in the 1990s in a demographic and political context consistent with these conditions. First, migrants arrived from a vastly more populated state, with migration, by its very occurrence, symbolizing the population disparity between Russia and China. In Primorskii Krai, 2.2 million Russians faced 38 million Chinese in one neighboring Heilongjiang province alone, with Russian scholars commonly estimating Heilongjiang's population at 70 million.[22] Only about 7 million Russians in the late 1990s populated the entire Russian Far East—about 37 percent of Russia's territory, stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific Ocean and bordering China with over 1.2 billion people. Moreover, the Russian Far East population in the 1990s declined by almost 9 percent due to the prevalence of deaths over births and out-migration to European Russia.[23]

Implying the threatening nature of these population disparities, Russian academics and policy analysts see them as resulting in China's "demographic pressure" on Russia. By one estimate, this pressure amounts to 63,000 Chinese nationals per one Russian, per one kilometer of the Russian–Chinese border. Population density pressure was estimated at 380,000 Chinese per one Russian per one kilometer inside a one-kilometer band of the same border.[24] The former Vice-Governor of Primorskii Krai, Vladimir Stegnii, also said he feared that by 2050, China's population growth would overextend that country's carrying capacity, necessitating territorial expansion to satisfy the need for water, air,

[21] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 110–111.

[22] Alexseev, "Socioeconomic and Security Implications of Chinese Migration, 134. For exaggerated estimates of Chinese population, see M. Nosov, "Rossiiskii Dal'nii Vostok I Kitai: problemy segodniashnego dnia I perspektivy sotrudnichestva" [The Russian Far East and China: Present-Day Problems and Prospects for Cooperation], Report (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1996), 8.

[23] Vladimir Kontorovich, "Can Russia Resettle the Far East?" *Post-Communist Economies* 12 (September 2000): 365–384.

[24] Petr Ia. Baklanov, *Geograficheskie, sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie i geopoliticheskie faktory migratsii kitaiiskogo naseleniia v raiony rossiiskogo Dal'nego vostoka* [Geographic, Socioeconomic and Geopolitical Factors of Chinese Migration in the Regions of the Russian Far East] (paper presented at the Roundtable, "Prospects for the Far East Region: The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, 28 June 1999), 3.

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and land.[25] Assessing the effects of migration on Sino–Russian relations, Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center argued that "even a relatively small number of Chinese immigrants would be enough to completely upset the current ethnopolitical balance.... In those circumstances, the absence of clear and consistent immigration policy practically guarantees the rise of interethnic tensions that could relatively easily escalate into an interstate conflict between Russia and China."[26]

What Trenin describes as a "demographic overhang" (*demograficheskii naves*) of China over the RFE casts a long and threatening shadow over perceptions of Chinese migration.[27] It is understandable in this context that even a small number of short-term Chinese migrants such as "shuttle traders" (*chelnoki*) would serve as a powerful reminder of this demographic overhang to RFE residents and engender exaggerated estimates of migration scale among the latter. Indeed, perceptions that Chinese migrants would keep coming like a flood tide were widespread among respondents of the Primorskii 2000 survey. When asked what proportion of the Primorskii Krai population was Chinese, 46 percent of respondents (excluding the "don't knows") said that this proportion amounted to 10 to 20 percent (modal response). Looking five to ten years ahead, 41 percent of respondents said that the proportion of ethnic Chinese in Primorskii would grow to 20 to 40 percent, and another 20 percent said that it would reach 40 to 60 percent. (The actual number of Chinese migrants in Primorskii did not exceed 1 to 1.5 percent of the predominantly Slavic local population at the time).

Exaggerated assessments of migration scale would plausibly give rise to prospective fears that cross-border migration of an ethnically distinct group—however small and transient—would gradually increase demographic intermingling and create a de facto nation-bisecting interstate border. Once given to suspicion that migration might bring home the demographic overhang, residents in host communities may also find it plausible that, over time, migration would, as Stephen Van Evera put it, "entrap parts of nations within the boundaries of states dominated by other ethnic groups."[28] Even in the absence of large permanent settlements, the security dilemma logic suggests that incumbent residents would become concerned that the prospective "truncated nation" or a "nested minority" (that is, the Chinese in Russia) would have incentive for expansionism. And to minimize the risk of "nested minorities" emerging in their territory, members of the "entrapping nation" (the Russians in the Far East), would then favor preemptive coercive and hostile action against cross-border migrants.

Second, mass Chinese migration into the Russian Far East started in the early 1990s, when the sovereign power in Russia weakened. The collapse of the

[25] Interview with the first author, Vladivostok, 15 August 2000.

[26] Dmitry Trenin, *Kitaiskaia Problema Rossii* [The Chinese Problem of Russia] (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 1998), 38.

[27] Ibid., 37.

[28] Van Evera, "Nationalism and the Causes of War," 146–147.

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communist government was followed by the "parade of sovereignties" by constituent regions of the Russian Federation, triggering fears of "federal collapse" throughout the 1990s.[29] Hyperinflation, corruption, and dollarization of the economy drained and devalued government funding for the military, security, and law enforcement agencies. Starvation of Russian sailors on Russkii Island near Vladivostok, massive explosions of ammunition depots, and violent crime rates in excess of soaring Russian averages established a context in which the sense of anarchy was palpable. The remoteness of Primorskii from Russia's political center (eight time zones) encouraged neo-feudal or "frontier" sentiments epitomized in the sobriquet, "the Wild East."[30] In the Primorskii 2000 survey, over 20 percent of respondents said that the Russian government would be unable to prevent ethnic conflicts in their region, with 17 percent saying "maybe, maybe not" and another 17 percent expressing uncertainty ("don't knows").

Moreover, the absence of international security institutions in Northeast Asia, a history of Sino–Russian territorial disputes, with armed clashes in 1969, and perceptions that the 1991 border demarcation treaty favored China enhanced a sense of anarchy on the outside. Proclamation of a strategic partnership and intergovernmental agreements by Russia and China in the 1990s, by their very nature, did not seek to establish a central authority that could make treaty commitments mutually credible. In this sense, the improvement of Russia–China bilateral relations did not qualitatively change the predominantly bilateral and anarchical nature of Northeast Asian security relations that rested on "skillful diplomacy, Machiavellianism, and pragmatism."[31]

Vladimir Petrovskii of the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Far Eastern Studies argued that "the tenets of political realism and balance of power in international relations are at the heart of Chinese analysts' assessments of the international environment after the Cold War." According to Gilbert Rozman, "Discourse on the [Russia–China] partnership has remained noticeably silent on how to advance from the current limitations in bilateral relations to the vision of a mature partnership."[32] In the fundamentally anarchic context of predominant bilateralism in Sino–Russian relations, both sides, in Rozman's words, hesitate to commit to the proclaimed partnership. In Russia, "rather than to anticipate how China and Russia can cooperate to the benefit of both, officials and the media warn repeatedly of China gaining an advantage." In China, "sources eventually reveal[ed]... that they still perceived Russia as leaning to the West."[33]

[29] Graeme Herd, "Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal Collapse?" *Journal of Peace Research* 36 (May 1999): 259–269.

[30] For a multidisciplinary assessment of these conditions, see Judith Thornton and Charles Ziegler, eds. *Russia's Far East: A Region at Risk?* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002).

[31] See Mette Skak, "Post-Soviet Foreign Policy: The Emerging Relationship Between Russia and Northeast Asia," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs* 7 (Winter 1993): 141.

[32] Rozman, "Sino–Russian Relations," 167.

[33] Ibid., 164.

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Uncertainty in Primorskii over Russia's military capabilities and the military balances in Northeastern Eurasia have been consistent with this strategic context. Vladimir Stegnii, while serving as Vice-Governor of Primorskii Krai said: "At present our military capabilities are such that, according to one estimate, we can destroy China 33 times. But the future of the military balance is uncertain. In the future, the military balance will worsen for us. China has a lot of money that it can spend on the military. We cannot invest at the same rate."[34] The Primorskii public echoed his views. Although 57.5 percent of respondents in the Primorskii 2000 survey said that Russia was stronger militarily than China was in 2000, only 25.6 percent of respondents saw Russia retaining military superiority by 2020. Sensing Russia's growing weakness in East Asia, 25 percent of respondents said that Moscow would cede parts of Primorskii Krai to China under diplomatic pressure.

In fact, Sherman Garnett suggested in 2000 that uncertainties in Russia's center–periphery relations and in Russia–China relations have had mutually reinforcing effects on the sense of insecurity about the Chinese presence in the RFE: "The likelihood that this internal struggle between Moscow and the Far Eastern regions will continue for some years to come undoubtedly has geopolitical consequences, especially in Russia–Chinese relations. At a minimum, Russia's Far Eastern regions continue to show Russia's weakest face to the world's most dynamic area."[35]

By the time of the Primorskii 2000 survey, some of these conditions had started to change in Russia. The national economy grew in 1999 and, following a renewed massive military crackdown in Chechnya, the newly elected President, Vladimir Putin, launched sweeping reforms to strengthen the central authority in Russia. Putin also proceeded to develop Moscow's strategic partnership with Beijing, signing a friendship treaty in 2001. However, the outcome of reforms in remote Far Eastern regions was still uncertain in the fall of 2000, and maverick Primorskii Governor Yevgenii Nazdratenko continued fighting for political survival. The population of the RFE continued to decline, and economic growth was at best tentative. In 2000, although industrial production in Primorskii Krai increased 2 percent in 1999, inflation surged by 19 percent.[36]

Summarizing discussions that took place at the meeting of Russia's Security Council in late November 2002—convened after a year-long study of the situation in the RFE by top federal security and defense officials—the Kremlin's envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, General Konstantin Pulikovskii, said that Moscow was gravely concerned about the geographic and "informational" isolation of this resource-rich region and about its exposure to rising China. And

[34] Interview with the first author, Vladivostok, 15 August 2000.

[35] Sherman W. Garnett, "Limited Partnership" in Garrnett, ed., *Rapprochement or Rivalry*, 20.

[36] Goskomstat Rossii, *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Dal'nevostochnogo Federal'nogo okruga v 2000 godu* [Socio-economic Situation in the Far Eastern Federal District in 2000] (Moscow, 2001) 7, 64. Notably, after Putin forced Nazdratenko to resign in February 2001, the Kremlin's envoy, General Pulikovskii, failed to get his protégé (Apanasenko) elected in place of Nazdratenko.

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the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Potapov, indicated after the session that Moscow's enduring sense of vulnerability in the RFE arose from the region's remoteness, vastness, threadbare infrastructure, large distances between army and naval bases, and low and decreasing population density. "Meanwhile," said Potapov, "the region is rich in very diverse resources and... has as its neighbors countries which are densely populated and... which evidently need access to new resources to sustain their populations. It is understandable that from the viewpoint of national security this region arouses more concern than many others do."[37]

Failure to Signal "Defensive" Intent and "Offensive" Advantage of Migrants

"The security dilemma is particularly intense," according to Posen, under "conditions that make offensive and defensive capabilities indistinguishable."[38] Just as most weapons can be viewed as both defensive and offensive, so most everyday activities of migrants may be construed as either defensive (legal temporary work) or offensive (illegal permanent settlement, territorial and autonomy claims). The meaning and long-term implications of migrant activities are shrouded in fear-producing doubts. What if migrants, once inside the country, never leave, bring over their families—setting an example to other co-ethnics—and later claim greater political privileges, if not outright ethnic autonomy? The very willingness of migrants to seek their fortunes outside of their own country implies acceptance of risk and uncertainty. In the words of one Russian proverb, trusting the transient nature of migrant presence is irrational: "Nothing is more permanent than what you think is temporary."

Host populations feel as vulnerable in this sense as a prisoner in a classic prisoner's dilemma game. The host population is akin to one of the two jailed co-conspirators who had already "cooperated" (refused to testify) and thus was exposed to the risk that the co-conspirator would defect (agree to testify against her). This is because the host state had already allowed migrants to enter and do business and had exposed itself to exploitation by migrants who might decide to stay over illegally and/or engage in activities harmful to host populations. This fear of ending up with a "sucker's payoff" discourages cooperation and would logically raise xenophobic sentiments in migrant-receiving societies. Moreover, the powerful incentive for cooperation—repeated interactions over an indefinite time horizon[39]—is often absent or arguably hard to discern. Even if any given migrant had repeatedly cooperated in the past by entering legally and returning on time, there would be no

[37] Anatoly Kstyukov, "The Security Council Has Reached the Pacific Ocean," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta,* 27 November 2002, accessed on the website of LexisNexis at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe, 12 July 2003.

[38] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 104–105.

[39] Robert Axelrod, *Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

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guarantee that on any given trip the migrant would do the same. Although interactions are repeated, the slate is clean before each new "game." In this sense, migration is more like a sum of discrete single games than an iterated game. The same applies to migrant-sending states—especially if decision making in the latter is not transparent. Host populations have few means and little time to find out whether migration is not, in fact, being encouraged by the sending state in the hope of establishing an ethnic "fifth column" to weaken the receiving state, if not to challenge the receiving state's sovereignty. In other words, host populations have good reasons to believe that migrants hold an "offensive" advantage and that, in general, offense is more effective than defense. In his classic treatment of the security dilemma, Robert Jervis identifies situations in which an offensive posture is not distinguishable from a defensive one and, simultaneously, offense has the advantage over defense as "doubly dangerous."[40]

Under the shadow of the security dilemma, therefore, histories of border disputes, of territorial claims, and of violent conflict between the migrant-sending and -receiving states are likely to key alarmist perceptions regardless of the actual state of bilateral relations and regardless of the character and scale of migration. By associating even short-term migrants such as shuttle traders with demographic overhang and with histories of territorial disputes, host populations would find it plausible to believe that migrants might not only set up ethnic enclaves, but, in doing so, reclaim territories lost to the receiving state in the past. With uncertainty about future migration scale and migrant intent, *prospective* security dilemma logic would make host populations feel as though migrants were already competing with them for the same living space, even when migrants are only coming for a week or a month and do not intend to settle down. This implies that association of the shuttle trade with a competitive threat is contingent on the demographic and political context in which migration takes place. Predictably, for example, the specter of an "Asian Balkans" was not raised by leaders of Chinese provinces who faced massive Russian shuttle trade migration in the 1990s or by Turkish leaders confronting thousands of Russian shuttle traders in Istanbul. Although Russia's population is more than three times larger than that of Turkey, the Soviet collapse meant that Russia no longer had either land borders or disputed territories with Turkey. Besides, Russia's population and economic performance declined substantially in the 1990s, and Russia experienced multiple and serious domestic challenges.

In the Russian Far East, however, predominantly short-term Chinese migration raised concerns over the "true" intentions of both the migrants and the Chinese government. Alexei Kazannik, Deputy Governor of the Omsk region in Siberia, once explained how shuttle trade is linked to the threat of a Chinese takeover of Siberia in the minds of local residents: "From Chinese

[40] See Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 211.

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migrant to Chinese cultural center to Chinese company to Chinese worker and to Chinese soldier."[41] In Vladivostok, at around the time of the Primorskii 2000 survey, the first author heard persistent stories of temporary Chinese construction workers saying: "Eventually, all those things we build will be ours [that is, Chinese]." In this way, the intent to reclaim control over a host state's real estate (and, hence, territory) was ascribed to temporary migrants, few of whom, at the time, intended to seek permanent residency in the RFE.[42]

Intent to encourage migration and to claim RFE territories is similarly read into Chinese government statements. Local Russian residents often talk about official Chinese maps allegedly showing swaths of Siberia and the Russian Far East as belonging to China. In an interview with the first author (15 August 2000), Vladimir Stegnii, then Primorskii Vice Governor, confided that he could not trust the political intent of Chinese leaders: "In China, no one has dismantled Mao's political prescriptions—Mao's portraits have not been taken down in public places. And these prescriptions include Mao's view that 1.5 million hectares of territory stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific are China's 'Great Northern Virgin Lands' waiting to be developed some day by and for the Chinese people." During the gubernatorial elections in Primorskii Krai in May 2001, the first author heard one of the two leading candidates interpret a Chinese Communist Party resolution on employment problems as a sign that Beijing had a secret policy of pushing its surplus population out to Russia.

At the level of elite politics in Moscow, Chinese migration at the time of the Primorskii 2000 survey was similarly linked with a threat to Russia's sovereignty. At the Security Council meeting in February 2003, the Governor of Khabarovskii Krai, Viktor Ishaev, once again told Putin that Chinese migration amounted to "a quiet conquest of Russian territory." As "principal evidence confirming China's intentions," Ishaev cited "Chinese maps on which parts of Russia were marked by the same color as the territory of China."[43]

The Primorskii 2000 survey registered deep-seated suspicions among local Russians about Chinese intentions to advance territorial claims on the RFE. Approximately 63 percent of those polled said that the Chinese saw Primorskii Krai as historically belonging to China. Of the 74 percent of respondents (other than "don't knows") who saw Chinese takeover as imminent, 56 percent said the main threat came from routine activities of Chinese nationals such as work, trade, tourism, and marriages—or, from "peaceful infiltration." Knowing that once in Primorskii, ethnic Chinese could settle down, start families, and bring over friends and relatives, local Russians developed fears that the real

[41] I. Lotkin, "Omsk: O vneshnei trudovoi migratsii" [On External Labor Migration], in *Set' etnologicheskogo monitoringa I rannego preduprezhdeniia konfliktov, Bulleten'* 3 (August 1997): 16.

[42] Even in economically prosperous Moscow, only 2.1 percent of Chinese migrants in 1999 sought permanent residency. Vil'ia Gel'bras, "Kitaiskoe zemliachestvo v Moskve" [The Chinese Community in Moscow], *Aziia I Afrika Segodnia* 11 (December 1999): 34–39.

[43] Chernov, "Kitatiskaia bolezn'."

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intentions of Chinese migrants were "offensive," in the sense that the emergence of Chinese ethnic enclaves would trigger loss of control, if not sovereignty, by Russia over parts of the RFE. Previous polls had also shown consistent opposition among the Russians in the Far Eastern regions to Chinese settlement in the area. The 1997–1998 Carnegie survey of about 1,086 residents in three RFE and three East Siberian regions found overwhelming support only for temporary Chinese migration, "under no circumstances allowing the Chinese to stay for long periods of time, much less to become permanent residents."[44]

Offensive "Groupness"

Another implication of the security dilemma is that the more migrants are cohesive and distinct from the host population as a group, the more threatening they may appear. "Groupness" in itself is offensive, if only by signaling that the opponent (or ethnic "other") may develop an "offensive" advantage. As Posen put it, "A group identity helps the individual members cooperate to achieve their purposes. When humans can readily cooperate, the whole exceeds the sum of its parts, creating a unit stronger relative to those groups with a weaker identity."[45] The perceived "offensive power" of migrants (that is, their capacity to violate local laws) would thus be a function of perceived "'groupness' of the ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic collectivities." Moreover, the degree of groupness and, hence, the offensiveness of ethnic others is systematically misperceived. Experimental tests of social categorization theory have established that individuals consistently perceive out-groups as more homogenous than in-groups regardless of actual group homogeneity levels.[46] As a consequence, "ingroup–outgroup divisiveness elicits competitive tendencies: not merely through the need for positive distinctiveness, but more basically because social categorization directly influences individuals' perceptions of their goals."[47] Once in- and out-group boundaries of any kind are established, individuals are prone to "inter-group bias." They are more likely to interpret an action as a threat if the action is attributed to out-group rather than in-group actors. The greater the perceived difference between typical characteristics of one's ethnic group in contrast to another group, the more entrenched the ethnic markers and the greater the potential for hostility.[48] Donald Horowitz summarizes studies in social psychology and psychoanalysis

[44] Vitkovskaya, Zayonchkovskaya, and Newland, "Chinese Migration into Russia," 364.

[45] Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," 106.

[46] John C. Turner, "The Experimental Social Psychology of Intergroup Behaviour" in John C. Turner and H. Giles, eds., *Intergroup Behavior* (Oxford: Blackwell, and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 97, 98.

[47] Ibid.

[48] J.F. Dovidio and S.L. Gaertner, "Intergroup Bias: Status, Differentiation, and a Common In-Group Identity," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 75 (January 1998): 109–120; J.L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, "Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages Within the South African Mass Public," *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (April 2000): 278–292.

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to trace interethnic hostility to "dichotomization as a result of juxtaposition and comparison."[49] An analysis of survey data from the European Union suggests that "a notion of 'our' race or nationality and the 'other' race or nationality" is crucial in the formation of ethnic prejudice.[50]

Just as in armed conflicts national groupness is a military power multiplier, in cases of migration, ethnic groupness is a prospective economic and political power multiplier. Looking at the origins of anti-immigrant movements around the world, Myron Weiner wrote: "In many countries, citizens have become fearful that they are now being invaded not by armies and tanks but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures."[51] These vulnerabilities tempt political entrepreneurs to exploit xenophobic ideologies. They also increase the popular appeal of genuine xenophobes and racists. In Primorskii Krai, xenophobic rhetoric has been deployed extensively in gubernatorial and Russian parliamentary elections since 1993, including far-fetched yet politically potent warnings that Chinese migration may transform the Russian Far East into an "Asian Balkans."[52]

In the Primorskii 2000 survey, Russian respondents viewed Chinese migrants as distant and fiercely protective of their cultural values.[53] Asked to compare Chinese migrants with Russians, the respondents claimed that the Chinese were twice as hardworking, almost twice as entrepreneurial, three times as sly, twice as greedy, and almost twenty times less generous. Moreover, 56 percent of respondents disapproved of their relatives marrying Chinese citizens (only 4 percent approved of such marriages). Close to 50 percent of respondents said that Chinese migrants in Primorskii Krai would not assimilate into Russian society. One sees in these numbers widespread fears that if Chinese migrants settled down in Primorskii, they would not abide by Russian laws and social norms but would promulgate Chinese culture and social norms. With their strong and distinct groupness, Chinese migrants would be more

[49] Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 182. The literature review is in Ibid., 141–186.

[50] Lincoln Quillian, "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe," *American Sociological Review* 60 (August 1995): 592 and citations therein.

[51] Myron Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 2.

[52] Yevgenii Nazdratenko, *I vsya Rossiya za spinoy...* [And All of Russia Is behind Our Back...] (Vladivostok: Ussuri, 1999), 20–24. Nazdratenko was the Governor of Primorskii Krai from 1993 to 2001.

[53] According to estimates by Russian scholars, ethnic Koreans migrated into Primorskii in approximately the same numbers as the ethnic Chinese in the 1990s. Some ethnic Koreans came from the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where they had been deported from the RFE in the late 1930s; others were North Korean labor migrants; still others were ethnic Koreans, but Chinese nationals from the Yonbian autonomous district. For more details on North Korean labor migration, see A.S. Vashchuk, Ye. N. Chernolutskaia, V.A. Koroleva, G.B. Dudchenko, and L.A. Gerasimova, *Etnomigratsionnye protsessy v Primorskom krae v 20m veke* [Ethnic and Migration Processes in Primorskii Krai in the 20th Century] (Vladivostok: DVO RAN, 2002), 198–199.

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likely over time to seek autonomy within Russia and protection from across the border.[54]

Economic Competition and Vulnerability

Among "fear-producing environments" spawning the interethnic security dilemma, Barbara Walter identifies situations in which "economic resources rapidly change hands."[55] Antimigrant hostility would therefore arise out of uncertainty about the distribution of economic gains among host and migrant populations. As Weiner observed, host populations naturally fear that the newcomers will "take their jobs, occupy their land, live off the welfare system, and threaten their way of life, their environment, and even their polity...."[56] The perceptual logic of uncertainty about distribution of economic gains, however, is by no means straightforward. At least two principal dimensions underlying economic threat perception need to be considered.

Comparison of gains between groups (*inter-group gains*). A distinguished line of sociological research in North America links interethnic prejudice and violence with economic discrimination and labor market competition (for example, racial or ethnic "job queues") in specific sectors.[57] Moreover, students of ethnic conflict have presented evidence that interethnic antipathy and hostility may arise not necessarily from zero-sum competition in one sector, but from perceptions that members of a different ethnic group are, on the whole, doing better than members of one's own group, given generally poor conditions. Groups may then plausibly "conclude that they can improve their welfare only at the expense of others," and opt for nationalism—even in the absence of direct economic competition.[58] Fears may also arise that members of a more eco-

[54] Sergei Pushkarev, Head of the Russian Federal Migration Service for Primorskii Krai, in an interview with the first author, Vladivostok, 15 August 2000.

[55] Barbara F. Walter, "Introduction" in Walter and Snyder, eds., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, 4.

[56] Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis,* 2.

[57] Herbert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967); Graham Kinloch, *The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis* (New York: Vintage Books, 1974); Nancy Tienhaara, *Canadian Views on Immigration and Population: An Analysis of Post-War Gallup Polls* (Ottawa, Canada: Information Canada, 1974); Susan Olzak, "Labor Unrest, Immigration and Ethnic Conflict in Urban America, 1880–1914," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (May 1989): 1303–1333. Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). J.R. Kluegel and Eliot R. Smith, "Affirmative Action Attitudes: Effects of Self-Interest, Racial Affect, and Stratification Beliefs on Whites' Views," *Social Forces* 61 (March 1983): 797–824.

[58] David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds. *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 10; M.Z. Bookman, *Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). For earlier work, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); Edward L. Azar and John W. Burton, *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice* (Boulder,

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nomically successful group (whether or not this success has been gained at the expense of one's own group) would gain superior economic resources for lobbying their interests in local government institutions, procure favorable executive appointments, and influence the political process through graft. The added value of the security dilemma logic in this regard is that at the early stages, interethnic hostility may relate not necessarily to actual economic competition (and, hence, not to the scale of labor migration), but to suspicions that other groups (migrants) gain more from inter-group exchanges—or simply to perceptions that migrants gain too much.

We hypothesized, therefore, that perceptions among Primorskii residents as to who gained more from cross-border trade should be linked to anti-Chinese alarmism and hostility. In the Primorskii 2000 survey, perceptions that Chinese migrants gained economically on the local Russians were palpable. One survey question asked: "How much income does cross-border trade generate for Russian and Chinese shuttle traders (*chelnoki*), private companies, governments, and smugglers?" Summing up scores of 3 and 4 on a 0 to 4 scale, as a percentage of the total, gives a measure of respondents' assessment of how much local Russians gain from cross-border migration by comparison with the Chinese. For shuttle traders (private citizens), 59 percent (with 15 percent "don't knows") of respondents said that the Russians benefited a great deal versus 74 percent (15 percent) who said that the Chinese gained a lot. Similarly, the score was 50 percent (26 percent "don't knows") for Russian businesses versus 56 percent (31 percent) for Chinese business; 24 percent (27 percent) for the Russian government versus 45 percent (35 percent) for the Chinese government; and 73 percent (19 percent) for Russian smugglers versus 73 percent (22 percent) for Chinese smugglers (N = 1,010). In other words, most Russian respondents—even though the intensity of these perceptions varied widely among them—felt that the benefits of economic exchanges with China disproportionately benefited Chinese citizens and the Chinese government plus a small group of smugglers on both sides. The majority of the local Russian public had good reasons to feel shortchanged by the Chinese and therefore to feel more hostile toward them.

Other studies have produced evidence suggesting that the sense of vulnerability to economic competition relates to individual economic circumstances, such as personal income. Studying immigration attitudes in Europe, Lincoln Quillian noted: "When dominant ethnic group members perceive their economic circumstances as precarious, they fear they will lose their economic advantages over the subordinate group; when economic circumstances improve, the corresponding reduction in perceived competition decreases group feelings

CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986). For a cogent critique of the relative deprivation theory with respect to interethnic conflict, see Walker Connor, "From a Theory of Relative Economic Deprivation towards a Theory of Relative Political Deprivation" in Michael Keating and John McGarry, eds. *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 114–136.

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of threat."[59] In Africa and Asia, Horowitz found that "severe anxiety about threats emanating from other groups" was especially acute among economically "backward groups."[60] In this study, we hypothesized that low-income respondents would reveal stronger anti-Chinese sentiments than would respondents in the middle- and high-income groups.[61]

Socioeconomic impact on one's own group (*in-group gains*). The sense of economic vulnerability may arise not only from comparison of inter-group gains (that is, migrants' gains relative to those of host populations), but also from concerns about the overall impact of migration on the economy and society in host states (impact on in-group gains). In fact, a comprehensive statistical analysis of the 1992 American National Election Survey (ANES) data found a significant association between preferences for immigration levels and economic impact of migration on national economic outlook in the United States. The latter was a stronger correlate of exclusionist attitudes than sensitivity to direct labor-market competition in specific sectors, such as those associated with blue-collar labor.[62]

Three theoretical perspectives would suggest why assessment of in-group gains would relate strongly to threat and hostility. First, the commercial liberal theory emphasizes that economic issues differ fundamentally from security issues by allowing for a wider range of positive-sum outcomes. Economic interactions allegedly create interdependence on a daily basis and cue individuals to care more about absolute gains to them and their group than about gains of others.[63] Second, prospect theory[64] emphasizes the importance of assessing changes in one's economic circumstances over time—in a manner more consistent with in-group gains valuations than with inter-group comparisons. "The central analytical assumption of prospect theory is that people define value relative to a reference point (*reference dependence*) rather than in terms of net assets...." In doing so, "People give more weight to losses from that reference

[59] Quillian, "Prejudice," 590.

[60] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* 175. For psychological experiments substantiating the logic of relative gains' valuations, see Henri Tajfel, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination," *Scientific American* 223 (November 1970): 96–102; Turner and Giles, *Intergroup Behavior*, and, for a summary of the early work, Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* 143–149.

[61] Income valuations were derived from responses to "Do you consider yourself to be in the low, middle, or high income group?" and coded on a scale from 1 to 3, with a mean of 1.53 and standard deviation of 0.53, putting most respondents in low- and middle-income groups.

[62] Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong, "Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations," *Journal of Politics* 59 (August 1997): 858–881. The survey had 2,428 respondents.

[63] Robert Gilpin, "Three Ideologies of Political Economy" in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Witkopf, eds., *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives* (Boston: McGrawHill, 1998), 281.

[64] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," *Econometrica* 47 (March 1979): 263–291.

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point than to comparable gains (*loss aversion*)...."[65] In our case, the arrival of migrants serves as a reference point from which changes in in-group gains would be estimated and/or projected into the future. Third, experiments in social psychology suggest that perceptions of interdependence—reflected in assessments of the socioeconomic impact of migration—may induce even threatened individuals to discount negative inter-group stereotypes. Conversely, lack of positive interdependence may open the gates to hostile proclivities, even among individuals who perceive less group threat.[66] Moreover, from the security dilemma standpoint, concerns about in-group losses and blocked opportunities would not necessarily relate to migration size and its actual economic effects. Rather, they would reflect individual perceptions of the socioeconomic implications of migration.

A predominantly economic Chinese migration into Primorskii happened precisely in the political and socioeconomic context in which speculative concerns about the effects of migration on the region were widespread. Since the early 1990s, most Chinese migrants in the RFE have been shuttle traders—using visa-free tourism as a "cover" to enter Russia and then staying until a shipment of goods had been sold. They would then either convert the proceeds into dollars and take the money home, or purchase commodities in Russia for resale in China. Nevertheless, concerns arose among officials and the public that this trade was inequitable and that Chinese "tourist-businessmen" weakened the RFE's security. According to the Pacific Border Service chief, General Pavel Tarasenko:

> [Chinese] tourists pose another threat—while on the territory of the Russian Federation, they are investing the proceeds of their commercial activities into real property, securities, and contraband (smuggling out sea cucumbers, ginseng roots, rare-earth metals, and classified weapon samples). As you realize, such activities of Chinese nationals affect the demographic, economic, military, and other aspects of Russia's national interest in this region. These activities are explicitly aimed at undermining Russia's security.[67]

[65] Jack S. Levy, "Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35 (June 2002): 272.

[66] See John C. Turner and Richard Y. Bourhis, "Social Identity, Interdependence and the Social Group: A Reply to Rabbie et al." in W. Peter Robinson, ed., *Social Groups and Identities: Developing the Legacy of Henri Tajfel* (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1996), 25–64; Jacob M. Rabbie and Murray Horwitz, "Categories versus Groups as Explanatory Concepts in Intergroup Relations," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 19 (January 1988): 117–123.

[67] Pavel Tarasenko, "Migratsionnye protsessy, ikh vliianie na kriminogennuiu obstanovku v krae i o dopolnitel'nykh merakh po uporiadocheniiu prebyvaniia i osedaniia inostrannykh grazhdan na territorii Primorskogo kraia." [Migration Processes, Their Impact on the Criminal Situation in the *Krai*, and Additional Measures for Regulating the Visits and Settlement of Foreign Nationals in Primorskii Krai] (paper presented at the conference, "Prospects for the Far East Region: The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch, Russia Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok, 28 June 1999), 5.

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In Tarasenko's memorandum, threat assessment is not linked so much to resentment that the Chinese were swapping low-quality consumer items for strategic natural resources such as timber and copper, but rather to concerns about the negative consequences of these economic exchanges on the demographic, economic, and military situation in Primorskii Krai and the RFE as a whole. Moreover, while speculating about migration's effects on the regional economy, Tarasenko actually ascribed "offensive" intentions to Chinese migrants.

The distinction between inter-group comparison and valuation of in-group gains came out in the Primorskii 2000 survey. On the one hand, as we noted earlier, most respondents viewed Chinese migrants as gaining more than the Russians from cross-border trade. On the other hand, nearly 60 percent of respondents believed that Chinese migration positively affected cross-border trade as a whole.

In this study, we used comprehensive measures of the perceived socioeconomic impact of Chinese migrants in Primorskii Krai. Our first measure (*income opportunities and crime*) reflected valuation by local Russian residents of Chinese migrants' impact on job availability, moneymaking opportunities, government revenues, and crime in Primorskii. The majority of respondents believed that Chinese migration restricted job and moneymaking opportunities for local Russians (55 and 47 percent, respectively) and increased crime levels (60 percent)—and factor analysis revealed significant commonality among these three valuations. Our second "in-group gains" measure was respondents' estimate of the proportion of the Primorskii population that benefited from Chinese migration (*scale of benefits to local population*). Respondents, on average, felt that approximately one-quarter of Primorskii residents benefited from cross-border exchanges with China. Both measures emphasize group impact assessments (the effects of the Chinese migrants as a group on Primorskii Krai's economy and society)—found in a study of immigration attitudes with the ANES data to be "more influential than self-interest narrowly construed."[68]

It is crucial to point out, however, that we consider these valuations because we view them as part of the speculative logic of the security dilemma rather than because de facto economic competition between the Chinese and the Russians was widespread in Primorskii around 2000. The scale of Chinese economic migration in the Russian Far East since the early 1990s—despite the political visibility of the issue—had been too small to engender racial job queues or to force Russian companies out of business in significant numbers. The number of Chinese guest workers in Primorskii Krai from the mid-1990s to 2001 fluctuated between 7,000 and 10,000—not a significant proportion, given Primorskii's population of over 2 million. (Even counting tourists, the average number of all Chinese

[68] See Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, "Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 115 (Summer 2000): 201–225. Bernard Schissel, Richard Wanner, and James S. Friederes, "Social and Economic Context and Attitudes Toward Immigrants in Canadian Cities," *International Migration Review* 23 (Summer 1989): 289–308. The latter found that unemployment rates were only weakly related to immigration attitudes in Canada.

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nationals in Primorskii on any given day in 2000 was no more than about 1.5 percent of the *krai* population.)[69]

Migration Phobia: The Security Dilemma Model for Survey Data

Alarmist and hostile anti-Chinese sentiments persisted in Primorskii Krai in 2000 despite failure of "creeping Sinification" to materialize after the Sino–Russian border was opened in 1988. In 2000, Russian President Putin's well-publicised warning that Russians in the RFE would speak Japanese, Chinese, and Korean was just one notable reflection of "migration phobia."

In the Primorskii 2000 poll, these sentiments were expressed in response to three sets of questions that we used as measures of threat perception and hostility in this study. We called the first measure *general threat perception*, based on responses to the question: "Do ethnic Chinese in the Russian Far East pose a threat to (a) Russia as a whole and (b) Primorskii Krai?"[70] Over 50 percent of respondents said that ethnic Chinese migrants threatened the security of Russia, and 78 percent believed that the Chinese were a threat to Primorskii Krai. Our second measure was *threat of violent interstate conflict*, based on respondents' assessments of the possibility of Sino–Russian armed border clashes—similar to the one over Damanskii Island in 1969—erupting by 2010. In the context of the Russian Far East, policy analysts have identified scenarios in which large-scale Chinese migration makes a threat of Chinese military intervention credible.[71] Respondents in the survey were asked to give the likelihood of border clashes on a scale of 0 (improbable) to 4 (inevitable). The modal response was close to 2, with the majority of responses falling between 1 and 3, suggesting widespread levels of concern about military conflict breaking out between Russia and China.

Our third measure, *militant hostility*,[72] reflected survey participants' preferences for specific policy responses to Chinese migration—support for paramilitary antimigrant groups such as the Ussuri Cossacks and support for anti-immigrant politicians and parties.[73] In fact, one of the strongest anti-

[69] Alexseev, "Socioeconomic and Security Implications of Chinese Migration," 126.

[70] Principal components analysis of these two items revealed one principal component accounting for 88.3 percent of total variance in perceptions of threat to Russia and Primorskii.

[71] Daniel Yergin and Thane Gusthafson, *Russia 2010: And What It Means for the World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

[72] Previous studies found a significant connection between levels of threat perception and preference for hostile or incendiary policies. Meredith W. Watts, "Political Xenophobia in the Transition from Socialism: Threat, Racism, and Ideology Among East German Youth," *Political Psychology* 17 (March 1996): 97–126; Mark Schafer, "Cooperative and Conflictual Policy Preferences: The Effect of Identity, Security, and Image of the Other," *Political Psychology* 20 (December 1999): 829–844; C. Gordon and A. Arian, "Threat and Decision Making," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (April 2001): 196–215.

[73] We obtained this variable from principal components analysis explaining close to 70 percent of variance in these two items.

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Chinese statements ever expressed to the first author during six visits to the RFE from 1999 to 2001 came from the Chieftain of the Ussuri Cossack Army, quoted at the beginning of this article. In the Primorskii 2000 survey, about 57 percent of respondents were supportive and 21 percent were strongly supportive of groups such as the Ussuri Cossacks. Support for all or any of the "politicians and political parties campaigning against Chinese presence in Primorskii Krai" was expressed by about 50 percent of respondents. Nearly 80 percent of respondents supported a ban on Russian residency rights (*vid na zhitel'stvo*) for Chinese nationals, 60 percent wanted to ban Chinese migrant labor, and 76 percent wanted to prohibit Chinatowns. Other polls in Primorskii Krai, conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center of the Vladivostok Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography from 1991 to 1998, registered not only a distinct increase in anti-Chinese sentiments, but also a two-fold increase in support for one of the most brutal forms of ethnic exclusionism—wholesale deportation of ethnic minorities such as the Chechens and the Koreans from their historic homelands in Stalin's USSR.[74]

Using Primorskii 2000 survey data, we ran hierarchical ordinary least squares regression with SPSS 6.1.3 software to estimate whether our three dependent variables (general threat perception, threat of violent interstate conflict, and militant hostility) related nonrandomly to perceptions of emerging anarchy, migrant intent, migrant groupness, and economic vulnerability (relative and in-group gains)—the principal dimensions of the security dilemma complex. To assess the effects and significance of each of these dimensions separately, we entered our independent variables in five blocks representing survey items in the following order: first, proportion of the Chinese population in Primorskii by 2010, Russian government capacity to prevent inter-group conflict, isolation of Primorskii Krai, and Russia–China military balance by 2010; second, Chinese intent to peacefully infiltrate and settle in Russia, and Chinese intent to claim Russian territories; third, Russian–Chinese intermarriage, capacity of Chinese migrants to assimilate culturally in Russia, and typical characteristics of Chinese migrants; fourth, personal income and Chinese gains from migration relative to those of Russians; and fifth, income opportunities from migration and the proportion of the local population benefiting from migration.

In addition, we applied three control variables in a separate block. The first control variable was political ideology that has been shown to affect attitudes toward ethnically distinct immigrants independently of negative ethnic stereotypes, economic assessments, or social background.[75] The item we used was *trust in xenophobic parties*—hypothesizing that respondents supporting the

[74] Mikhail A. Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East: Security Threats and Incentives for Cooperation in Primorskii Krai" in Thornton and Ziegler, eds., *Russia's Far East: A Region at Risk?*, 319–348.

[75] Jack Citrin, Beth Reingold, and Donald Green, "American Identity and the Politics of Ethnic Change," *Journal of Politics* 52 (November 1990): 1124–1153.

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Communists (14.7 percent) and especially the far-right anti-immigrant Zhirinovsky Block (5.3 percent) would be more hostile to the Chinese than others would. The second control variable was *sensitivity to territorial losses* of post-Soviet Russia, reflecting respondents' preferences for Russia's identity as a state. Those content with Russia's current borders as the Russian Federation (34 percent) were expected to be less prone to migration phobia than those who associated Russia's territorial identity with the Soviet Union (36 percent) or the Russian Empire (6 percent). Given border symbolism, we expected these valuations to capture respondents' susceptibility to symbolic politics—something that has been shown to serve as a powerful driver of the interethnic security dilemma.[76] We also controlled for education. In study after study in the United States, education has been associated with pro-immigration attitudes and with racial tolerance.[77] We controlled for whether respondents had a college education; this item has proven to be a more robust predictor of immigrant attitudes in previous studies than have overall education levels.[78] We used standard multiple regression equations to estimate how strongly each survey item reflecting the "security dilemma complex" related to our three indicators of threat perception and hostility when all other independent and control variables were held constant.[79]

The survey providing these measures was designed by the first author and conducted in September 2000 in Primorskii Krai (Russia's Maritime Territory) by the Center for Public Opinion Research at the Vladivostok Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. We stratified the sample by location (border vs.

[76] Stuart J. Kaufman, "Ethnic Violence, Symbolic Politics, and the Security Dilemma" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001).

[77] Mary Jackman, "General and Applied Tolerance: Does Education Increase Commitment to Racial Education?" *American Journal of Political Science* 22 (May 1978): 302–324. Mary Jackman, "Education and Policy Commitment to Racial Education," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (May 1981): 256–269; Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Licari, "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (Fall 1989): 285–308; Charles R. Chandler and Yung-mei Tsai, "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: An Analysis of Data from the General Social Survey," *Social Science Journal* 38 (Summer 2001): 177–188; C.E. Case, A.M. Greeley, and M. Fuchs, "Social Determinants of Racial Prejudice," *Sociological Perspectives* 32 (Winter 1989): 469–483. For a counter-argument, see Mary Jackman and Michael J. Muha, "Education and Intergroup Attitudes: Moral Enlightenment, Superficial Democratic Commitment or Ideological Refinement?" *American Sociological Review* 49 (December 1984): 751–769.

[78] Chandler and Tsai, "Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes, 186–187." Our regression pre-tests were consistent with these findings. In a separate test, we found that age, gender, occupation, and religion were not significantly related to our dependent variables.

[79] The regression formula, methodological notes with descriptive statistics for all variables, factor analysis summaries, and tables showing regression results were reviewed by anonymous referees and PSQ editors prior to publication and may be accessed at http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/~alexseev and at the Publications Related-Archive of the Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research (ICPSR).

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non-border), population change and population density, rural–urban location, and socioeconomic indicators such as wages and trade volume with China. The survey was conducted in the cities of Vladivostok and Artem and the counties of Ussuriisk (including the city of Ussuriisk), Dalnerechensk, Khasan, and Lazo, with 1,010 respondents distributed across these locations in equal proportion. Within these six geographical strata, respondents were sampled randomly in multiple stages, with electoral precincts (*uchastki*) serving as primary sampling units. Responses were obtained through face-to-face interviews given by seven experienced interviewers. Approximately 4.2 percent of 1,054 respondents approached by interviewers refused to participate in the survey. The estimated margin of error was less than +/− 4 percent.[80]

The distribution of respondents by age, gender, occupation, income, education, ethnicity, and location that was obtained at random in the survey closely approximated that of the population data provided by the Russian Federation Statistics Committee for Primorskii Krai. The discrepancy between the survey sample and demographic statistics was 0.6 percent for gender distribution, 0.1 percent for the 18 to 30 age group, 0.3 percent for the 31 to 45 age group, 1.0 percent for the 45 to 59 age group, 0.1 percent for the over 60 age group, and 0.6 percent for the urban–rural split. Local statistics on education, income, and ethnic composition did not allow for straightforward valuation, but indirect measures suggested that income discrepancies were within 0.3 percent to 4.4 percent, those of education were within 1.8 percent to 5.6 percent, and those of ethnicity were within 5 percent.[81] Discrepancies of this order did not significantly affect our findings.

Results and Discussion

Support for the Security Dilemma

The analysis validates the perceptual logic of the security dilemma, with a number of important—and sometime counterintuitive—provisos. First, the tests ruled out the null hypotheses: that perception of a general threat to Russia and Primorskii Krai, that fear of armed conflict with China by 2010, and that support for militant hostility toward migrants would be unrelated to the security dilemma complex. Regression coefficients for independent variables representing the security dilemma complex were statistically significant for all

[80] Survey documentation is available from the first author upon request.

[81] Goskomstat Rossii, *Sbornik. Sostav naseleniia Primorskogo kraia po polu I vozrastu na 1 ianvaria 1999 g.* [Data Collection: Population of Primorskii Krai by Gender and Age as of 1 January 1999] (Vladivostok: Rosstatagenstvo, 1999), 8; Goskomstat Rossii, Primorskii Krai *v 2000 godu (statisticheskii yezhegodnik)* [Primorskii Krai in 2000, a Statistical Yearbook] (Vladivostok: Rosstatagenstvo, 2001), 50, 68–69. The discrepancy between "Ukrainians by passport" (6 percent of Primorskii population in 1994) and Ukrainians by self-identification in the survey (11 percent) most likely reflected the tendency among ethnic Ukrainians in the former USSR to chose "Russian" as their "passport nationality" so as to minimize the risk of economic and/or political discrimination.

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three dependent variables. These variables explained 19.4 percent of variation in both the perceived level of security threat the Chinese posed to Primorskii Krai and the perceived probability of Sino–Russian armed conflict. They also explained 13 percent of variation in levels of antimigrant hostility. These are strong findings, given a large number of cases (1,010) and a routinely high volume of "noise" in the survey data. The probability that the security dilemma effects were due exclusively to chance was 0.1 percent for threat perception and 1 percent for hostility.[82]

Second, we found that, on aggregate, the security dilemma variables accounted for a substantially larger amount of variance in general threat perception, threat of armed conflict, and militant hostility than did control measures. The control variables in our model explained only 1 to 2 percent of variation in the two threat measures and about 3 percent in hostility levels. An examination of correlation coefficients showed that inclusion of other control variables such as age, gender, occupation, and religion of respondents would not significantly affect these findings. Third, for general threat perception and threat of armed conflict, we found a significant relationship with measures representing the core concepts of the interethnic security dilemma—emerging anarchy, offensive versus defensive intentions, and group distinctiveness. Threat perception was consistently related to speculative assessment of ethnic balance trends and belief that the Chinese harbor territorial claims on Russia. Fourth, we found that our measures of economic vulnerability had consistently strong effects on both threat and hostility.

These results suggest that individual perceptions of capabilities and intentions of out-groups have a nonrandom relationship with perceived threat levels—long before animosities spiral out of control and give rise to violence.[83] Moreover, in a context in which local residents could only guess whether and by how much the population balance would change in favor of ethnic others, the magnitude of uncertainty about putative population shifts related significantly to threat perception—precisely in line with the security dilemma predictions. These findings validate the role of uncertainty in emergent fears and suspicion of out-groups. The results challenge claims that "attempts to base a theory of ethnic conflict on theories of international conflict seem likely to end by resting one unknown upon another."[84] This study shows that one of the cornerstone theories of international conflict provides an elegant explanatory framework of threat perception arising from interethnic migration.

[82] In statistical notation, $R^2 = .13$ ($p < .01$) for militant hostility, $R^2 = .194$ ($p < .001$) for probability of armed conflict, and $R^2 = .194$ ($p < .001$) for threat to Russia and Primorskii. Relationships with $p > .05$ were considered insignificant. Because all of our hypotheses were directional, we used one-tailed significance tests. The amount of variance explained by the complete model for all three dependent variables is, respectively, 16, 20, and 21 percent.

[83] Valuations of ethnic balance and territorial claims correlated significantly ($r = .132$, $p < .001$).

[84] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict,* 95.

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Assessment of Threat, Intent, Hostility, and Gains: Nuances, Anomalies, and Limitations

Interstate versus interethnic threat. Our tests reveal a meaningful distinction between the perceptual logic of threat assessment with respect to armed interstate conflict, and of threat assessment dealing with domestic security challenges that involve inter-group relations. In our tests, valuations of ethnic balance trends and of migrants' offensive intent related significantly to both types of threat assessment. However, survey respondents nonrandomly associated only the probability of armed border clashes between Russia and China with government capacity to resolve conflict and with Primorskii Krai's isolation from central Russia. Isolation, in turn, implied perceived vulnerability with respect to governance, economic ties with the rest of Russia, and military reinforcement in case of conflict with China. These results suggest that the sense of emerging anarchy associated with interstate conflict is likely to be predominantly grounded in perceptions of government weakness. In contrast, the sense of emerging anarchy in domestic, interethnic conflicts is likely to be predominantly grounded in perceived (or, rather, misperceived) ethnic balance trends.

Another potent illustration of this dual unity of the security dilemma with respect to migration came out in a statistically significant *reverse* relationship between threat of armed conflict and perception that migrants intend to settle permanently ("peaceful infiltration"). Put simply, respondents told us that border clashes could happen regardless of the scale of Chinese migrant "infiltration" of Primorskii and vice versa. Russian respondents appeared to draw a sharper distinction than we did in our initial hypothesis between interstate challenges and domestic challenges arising from Chinese migration in the same security dilemma context.

The assimilation paradox. Respondents who viewed the Chinese as capable of assimilating in Russia were likely to be more—rather than less—threatened by migration. The first intuitively plausible explanation of this unexpected result is that the survey question on assimilation captured not only perceptions of group distinctiveness, but also perceptions of Chinese intentions and of the scale of migration. After all, for migrants to start assimilating in Russia, they have to have already arrived in the country, either legally or illegally, with intent to settle permanently. The intent component could be particularly strong in the Russian Far East because Chinese in-migration coincided with a sharp population decline within Russia. However, even though this explanation is plausible, the logic of threat assessment in this case is hardly straightforward. In a separate correlation test, perceived capacity of the Chinese to assimilate was not significantly correlated with perceived Chinese intentions to advance territorial claims against Russia.[85]

[85] Zero-order correlation, $r = .016$, $p < .342$ (insignificant).

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There is another dimension of Chinese assimilation that local Russians would find threatening and that appears to us to be more plausible. In the first author's interviews in the Russian Far East from 1999 to 2001, one persistent view was that the Chinese migrants were quick to learn the Russian language and customs—but only to the extent needed to advance their own interests. For respondents who held similar views, Chinese assimilation could easily represent the worst of both worlds—increasing size of migration and increasing capacity of migrants to "work the system" in Russia to their unilateral advantage. In the Primorskii 2000 survey, nearly 65 percent of respondents said that Chinese migrants could very easily bribe Russian officials, suggesting that this type of perception was widespread. Moreover, respondents who believed that Chinese migrants could easily bribe Russian officials were systematically more likely than others to believe that the Chinese harbored claims on Russian territory, and to feel that Chinese migrants posed a security threat to Russia and Primorskii Krai.[86]

One tentative conclusion is that the sense of group distinctiveness was moderated by perceptions of intent originating independently of group comparison and having more to do with the security dilemma complex—with perceived corruption serving as a proxy for the sense of government weakness and Primorskii's exposure to uncontrolled influx of the Chinese.

Threat versus hostility. Contrary to expectations, none of our hypothesized elements of the security dilemma complex, except for economic vulnerability, came out as significantly associated with militant hostility. Two predictors—anticipation of territorial claims and the sense of Primorskii's isolation—were significant until we controlled for ideological preferences and socioeconomic impact valuations. As it turned out, anticipation of territorial claims was significantly intercorrelated with trust in xenophobic parties.[87] Yet trust in xenophobic parties was also likely to arise from suspicions about migrant intentions. The latter, in this case, would remain an important correlate of support for hostile antimigrant responses, even though trust in xenophobic parties may be a better survey indicator of militant hostility. It may also suggest that for intent perceptions to cue both threat and hostility, respondents need to be ideologically primed. This priming effect would typically result from a combination of respondents' socialization and media exposure. As for the perceived geopolitical isolation of Primorskii Krai, this survey item remained a significant predictor of militant antimigrant hostility only until we controlled for valuations of in-group (economic) gains. This suggests that positive valuations of the socioeconomic impact of migrants on host societies are likely to mitigate uncertainties grounded in the sense of geopolitical isolation and, possibly, the sense of "emerging anarchy" in general.

[86] $r = .236$ ($p < .001$) and $r = .089$ ($p < .01$), respectively.
[87] $r = .180$, $p < .001$.

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Inter-group comparison and in-group gains. In our tests, respondents' income and assessment of relative economic gains from cross-border migration between Russia and China had no statistically significant effect on any of the three measures of threat and hostility. At first glance, this may be regarded as counterintuitive, especially given that most Russians interviewed by the first author in Primorskii Krai from 1999 to 2001 argued that trade inequity posed a long-term security threat to the RFE. A plausible contextual explanation of this finding is that in the climate of economic decline following the collapse of the centrally planned Soviet economy, it was clear to most Primorskii residents that factories closed down and wages and pensions were unpaid not because Chinese migrants had arrived, but because Russia's own political and economic leaders and institutions had failed.[88] In other words, there is a possibility that comparison of gains across groups may not be a potent predictor of threat under conditions of general economic decline that are clearly attributable to other factors—even when officials may be seeking to scapegoat economic migrants. In our tests, only agricultural workers were somewhat more likely than others to have anti-Chinese sentiments, whereas self-identification of respondents as unemployed did not significantly relate to either threat or hostility.

Rather, the findings indicate that comparison of economic fortunes across groups is likely to translate into hostility not simply when other groups may allegedly be doing better than one's own, but when concerns arise about economic opportunities for the latter. In our tests, fear of blocked economic opportunities among local Russians—expressed in terms of both the nature and the scale of these opportunities—was one of the strongest and most significant predictors of threat perception and anti-Chinese hostility. Our "in-group gains" measures explained more variation in general threat perception and militant hostility than did any other block of variables. These results suggest that emphasis on relative gains under the security dilemma may discount valuations by individuals of changes in absolute gains of their in-group over time. Individuals in migrant-receiving societies—in addition to or instead of asking which group gains more from migration—may also ask: Are more of us better off or worse off since migration began? Similar results in the United States and Europe suggest that our findings are likely to apply beyond the specific political, socioeconomic, cultural, and historical context of the Russian Far East.[89]

[88] For the description of economic climate, see Mikhail A. Alexseev, "Desecuritizing Sovereignty: Economic Interest and Responses to Political Challenges of Chinese Migration in the Russian Far East" in John D. Montgomery and Nathan Glazer, eds., *Sovereignty under Challenge: How Governments Respond* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 271–273.

[89] Thomas J. Espenhade and Katherine Hempstead, "Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration," *International Migration Review* 30 (Summer 1996): 535–570; Eva Thalhammer, Vlasta Zucha, Edith Enzenhofer, Brigitte Salfinger, and Gunther Ogris, "Attitudes Toward Minority Groups in the European Union: A Special Analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 Opinion Poll on Behalf of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Technical Report," (Vienna, Austria, 2001), accessed on the Center website at http://www.sora.at, 10 August 2002.

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Conclusion

Because our sample was large, we were able to control for multiple explanations of migration phobia that have consistently confounded students of migration.[90] A context-sensitive application of the security dilemma theory in the case of Chinese migration into the Russian Far East isolates the three most significant perceptual factors of threat and antimigrant hostility. The first two—perceptions of the long-term ethnic balance trend and of migrants' intent to pose territorial claims—reflect the classic security dilemma emphasis on interactive valuations of capabilities and intentions in threat assessment. The third factor—valuation of the impact of migration on in-group economic gains—adds a new dimension to the logic of economic perceptions under the security dilemma. The persistent significance of socioeconomic impact valuations in our tests and in immigration studies in the United States and Europe suggests that such valuations are likely to be a good unobtrusive measure of antimigrant sentiments. Applying this measure in a context-sensitive manner in other cases of interethnic migration is likely to generate not only academic insights but also valuable policy recommendations for diffusing antimigrant hostility.

By design, this study did not focus on the dynamic aspect of the security dilemma, that is, on how attempts by one group to improve its security are likely to make other groups less secure, with retaliatory actions spiraling out of control as a consequence. The migrants could react to perceived hostility in ways that they view as self-defense, but which may aggravate the host population's fears and trigger antimigrant responses. The fateful police chase that resulted in the accidental electrocution over high-voltage wires of two teenagers from the Parisian suburb of Clichy sous Bois in October 2005 and that sparked off three weeks of violent riots from Strasbourg to Bordeaux was a potent illustration of this action–reaction spiral. The teenagers had a disproportionately strong fear of detention, because one of them had forgotten his identification card. In turn, the police were on edge, fearing that the teenagers were evading them because they were criminals or terrorists.[91] Future research can explore this aspect of the security dilemma, possibly through comparisons of opinion data representative of both host societies and migrants. In our study, however, we focused on how latent hostility may arise among host populations before temptations to retaliate spiral out of control. Importantly, the perceptual logic of the security dilemma was a significant driver of interethnic fears even in the absence of the "spiral" dynamic.

These findings suggest that the security dilemma has policy implications beyond traditional recommendations for ethnic separation or partition.

[90] Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis,* 91.

[91] For an account of the crucial role of restrictionist policies in generating the massive resentment that sparked French urban riots, see "An Underclass Rebellion," *The Economist,* 12 November 2005: 24–26.

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Although ethnic partition can be unavoidable in stopping ongoing violent conflicts between ethnic groups and giving them an opportunity to cool off, exclusionism is hardly a viable policy solution with respect to international migration and interethnic migration within states. And yet in the United States, Europe, and Russia, politicians have responded in recent decades to alarmist public sentiments by increasing reliance on exclusionist measures and by framing migration as a national security issue. In the United States and the European Union, national opinion polls regularly ask the question of whether respondents would prefer immigration levels to decrease, increase, or remain the same. From the security dilemma standpoint, satisfying these public preferences is likely to lead to excessive and counterproductive "securitizing" of migration policy. In 2003, in fact, governments in the United States and the EU proposed to increase the use of spy satellites, surveillance drones, and armies and navies to prevent migrants from crossing borders. And it was a year earlier that the French government had responded to rising public expressions of insecurity by stepping up raids against illegal immigrants, banning gatherings in the entrance halls of apartment buildings, and arming the police with rubber pellets that can kill if fired within five meters of a target.[92] This study recommends that a broader range of opinion measures be used, so that policy makers can discount factors leading to threat exaggeration and avoid the unintended, counterproductive consequences of preemptive overreaction to migration.

In Russia, concerns about the security implications of population decline were behind the adoption of increasingly restrictive migration policy (2001) and citizenship law (2002). As the Russian daily, *Novye Izvestiia* (25 April 2002), commented, "The [internal affairs] minister has some strange ideas about how to improve [the demographic situation in Russia]; by this logic, Russia should be enclosed behind an Iron Curtain to protect itself from anyone ostensibly willing to stop at nothing to get Russian citizenship. In other words, better we should die out slowly and quietly in isolation than replenish our stock with the foreign-born. Our Skinheads, Nazis, and other fascist-leaning citizens may now relax—the Ministry for Internal Affairs is itself adopting their slogan, 'Russia for the Russians.'"[93]

This study suggests, however, that tough exclusionist policies would likely backfire by discouraging return migration, and by encouraging the secretiveness and sophistication of immigrant smuggling networks, as well as "black" migrant labor markets and corruption in migrant-receiving states.[94] In

[92] Ibid.

[93] Quoted in Graeme Herd and Rosaria Puglisi, "Natsional' naia bezopasnost' i migratsionnaia politika vremen V. Putina: vzgliad izvne" [National Security and Migration Policy in the Times of V. Putin: A View from the Outside] in V.A. Iontsev, *Migratsiia i natsional' naia bezopasnost'* [Migration and National Security] (Moscow: MAKS Press, 2003), 56.

[94] Such unintended consequences have been documented in the case of U.S. policy on Mexican immigration. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy," *Population & Development Review* 27 (December, 2001): 661–685.

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Primorskii, for example, Chinese shuttle traders, traveling on tourist visas, adapted to the massive police sweeps aimed at identifying and deporting them by purchasing "protection" from precinct police chiefs (*uchastkovyi militsioner*). In the words of Andrei Kopaev, of Primorskii's Prosecutor's Office, "If only these police captains knew for how little they sold out" (interview with the first author, Vladivostok, 25 May 1999). An enlightened reading of the security dilemma implications would warn against unilateral antimigrant exclusionism. The alternative policy recommendation is reliance on multilateral institutions and market incentives for managing migration. Although economists estimate that free movement of labor stands to generate higher gains for the global economy than the free flow of trade and capital has done so far, there is no equivalent of the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods System to set the rules for international migration.[95] From the security dilemma standpoint, developing such global institutions is imperative, not only for economic reasons but also for the purpose of reducing antimigrant alarmism and interethnic hostility. By their very existence, such institutions would signal to host societies that migrant-sending and -receiving states are investing resources to regulate the global movement of people, to make it less chaotic and more predictable. These measures would go a long way toward reducing uncertainty, mistrust, and fear of migrants.

In Primorskii Krai, one recent policy on Chinese migration combined transnational cooperation, domestic government regulation, and market-based incentives. It envisions the construction of five trade and industrial complexes along the Russia–China border in the next decade. The first such complex was launched at the juncture of the Russian town of Pogranichnyi and the Chinese city of Suifenhe. Spanning over 1,100 acres, with the interstate border running right through the area, the complex will be accessed visa-free by the Chinese and the Russians for trade, business, recreation, and education. By September 2005, a diesel power plant, a perimeter fence, water pipes, lines of communication, and a wooden Orthodox church had been built on the Russian side of the complex. A multi-story business center and a five-star hotel were near completion on the Chinese side. Showing the first author futuristic drawings and 3D maps of the complex in his Vladivostok office on 3 October 2005, former Primorskii Vice Governor and project director Vladimir Stegnii said that beyond generating multi-billion-dollar trade, the complex would play a vital strategic role in reducing the security threats associated with Chinese migration: "The number of Chinese trading in street markets across Primorskii cities will go down; joint business operations will go up; more people will be learning the laws, customs and languages of each country; mutual trust will increase; and uncontrolled migration will decline." To Stegnii, joint business activities and learning centers within the complex were paramount. As long as Chinese migrants learned to abide by Russian laws, rules, and customs he said,

[95] "The Longest Journey," *The Economist,* 2 November 2002.

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they would not be a threat, "no matter how many of them come." Then, Stegnii implied, the specter of the "Asian Balkans" would give way to an optimistic vision of Primorskii Krai as a Hong Kong on the North Pacific: "Remember, the majority there are Chinese, but how many years they lived—and, to a great extent, still live by the British rules. So, it's entirely possible they can come and live by Russian rules."*

* We thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the John W. Kluge Center of the Library of Congress, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, the Pacific Basin Research Center at Harvard University, the Soka University of America, and the International Research and Exchanges Board for their support. We also appreciate the help of Yevgenii Plaksen, Tamara Troyakova and Viktor Larin, Robert Jervis, Wenran Jiang, Ted Gerber, Phil Roeder, Yoshiko Hererra, Bear Braumoeller, and the anonymous reviewers.

The opinion survey Codebook in MS Word, data in SPSS, and original documentation are available from the first author upon request.

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An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11

AMY B. ZEGART

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies have faced a firestorm of criticism. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the 9/11 Commission, and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Silberman-Robb Commission) all exposed grave shortcomings in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the thirteen other agencies that comprise the U.S. intelligence community. Although such faultfinding is not new, the stakes have rarely been higher.[1] As many observers have noted, the Cold War's end marked the beginning of a new era in international relations, one in which great power does not bring security. Today, the principal threat to U.S. security arises not from superpower conflicts waged under the shadow of nuclear missiles, but from bands of transnational terrorists driven by fanaticism, hidden from view, and armed with internet connections, cell phones, and deadly weapons that can fit into a suitcase or vial. The ability of the United States to defend itself depends on whether U.S. intelligence agencies built for a different enemy at a different time can adapt.

Unfortunately, the public debate since the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has substituted assumption for analysis, taking intelligence failure as a given rather than something to be determined and explained.

[1] As early as 1948, the *New York Times* castigated a newly created Central Intelligence Agency as "one of the weakest links in our national security," and since then, forty separate reports have investigated and examined the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies. Hanson W. Baldwin, "Intelligence," *New York Times*, 20 July 1948.

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Did U.S. intelligence agencies fail to adapt to the rising terrorist threat during the 1990s? The honest answer is that nobody really knows yet. In the glare of tragedy and the distortion of hindsight, most accounts of the attacks have jumped to the conclusion that the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies should have performed better than they did.[2] This conclusion is understandable but unsubstantiated: to date, no government agency, journalist, or academic has attempted to examine systematically the evidence of intelligence adaptation failure before September 11.

Developing a better understanding of the past is both intrinsically important and crucial for improving the performance of U.S. intelligence agencies in the future. Indeed, closer examination suggests that assuming that the CIA, FBI, and other agencies should have performed better than they did conflates three different possibilities, each of which suggests different diagnoses of intelligence problems, different remedies, and different prospects for future success.

The first possibility is that some incidence of failure is inevitable in any endeavor. As Richard Betts wrote soon after September 11, "The awful truth is that even the best intelligence systems will have big failures."[3] The second possibility is that September 11 stemmed not from human error, but from the natural limits of human cognition. As theories of bounded rationality suggest, humans operating under conditions of great uncertainty and poor information can understand only so much, in this case about the nature of new threats in a post-Cold War world and how best to meet them.[4] Only the third possibility—that intelligence officials and policy makers understood the danger and how to meet it but failed somehow to take the steps required for success—supports the conclusion that more could have been done.

These alternatives matter. If the first is correct, then intelligence reform may be costly and worthless. If the second is correct, then greater success, if it is to be achieved, lies in the realm of knowledge—improving how agencies learn about emerging threats and harnessing technology to compensate for human cognitive weaknesses. If the third is correct, the problem lies in politics, and improving U.S. intelligence requires learning how to overcome the political barriers that block change.

This article seeks to lay the foundations for a more productive examination of intelligence failure by analyzing intelligence adaptation efforts between the

[2] See for example Bill Gertz, *Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to 9/11* (New York: Regnery, 2002); John Miller, Chris Mitchell, and Michael Stone, *The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It* (New York: Hyperion, 2003); Gerald L. Posner, *Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11* (New York: Random House, 2003).

[3] Richard Betts, "Fixing Intelligence," *Foreign Affairs* 81 (January/February 2002): 44. See also Charles Perrow, *Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[4] James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations*, 2nd ed. (London: Blackwell, 1993); Herbert A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*, 4th ed. (New York: Free Press, 1993).

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Cold War's end and the September 11 attacks. I begin by defining adaptation, so that the reader is in a position to recognize successful or failed adaptation when he sees it. Next, I consider whether the U.S. intelligence community adapted as well as could be expected after the Cold War, given the challenges and constraints that it faced. The heart of the article is an analysis of all the major studies of the U.S. intelligence community and counterterrorism efforts between 1991 and 2001. Examining what these studies found, and what happened to their recommendations, provides a window into what intelligence officials and policy makers knew before the September 11 attacks and what they did with that knowledge. It turns out that there were many canaries in the coal mine: twelve different blue-ribbon commissions, think tank task forces, and governmental initiatives during the decade recommended 340 reforms for U.S. intelligence agencies. The vast majority of these recommendations focused on just a few key organizational deficiencies that hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts—the same weaknesses that the 9/11 Commission and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees identified in their investigations after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. Yet almost none of these recommendations were implemented beforehand. In short, evidence strongly suggests that U.S. intelligence agencies failed to prevent the September 11 attacks not because failure was inevitable or because individuals could not conceive of the threat or how to combat it, but because of politics. At the end of this article, I examine the roots of failed reform and suggest implications for the future.

Defining Adaptation

What exactly does it mean to say that an organization adapts or fails to adapt? Organization theorists do not have a clear answer, referring to organizational change, transformation, evolution, and adaptation in various and inconsistent ways.[5]

For the purposes of this article, the term "adaptation" carries three important ideas. The first is *change*. To say that a business or a government agency has adapted is to suggest that it has changed. But change alone is an incomplete measure; in some sense, organizations are always changing.[6] Last month, my department changed its mailing labels. Every quarter I teach different students.

This suggests a second element of adaptation: *magnitude of change*. It is one thing to say that an organization changes, quite another to say that it adapts. More specifically: adaptation involves large changes, or the accumulation of many smaller ones, that lead to a transformation in what an organization does or how it does it. When basic organizational boundaries

[5] Howard Aldrich, *Organizations Evolving* (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 164.

[6] James G. March, "Footnotes on Organizational Change," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 26 (December 1981): 563.

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shift, when organizations assume major, new, nonroutine tasks, or when they go about their old tasks with substantially different structures, processes, or beliefs, adaptation has occurred. Using different mailing labels is a change. Launching an entirely new graduate degree program is an adaptation.

Finally, for adaptation to occur, these major changes must result in an *improved fit* between the organization and its external environment.[7] Organizations are not hanging in suspended animation in some fixed market or government universe. They exist in an external environment filled with all sorts of moving parts—competitors, technologies, regulations, cultures, customs, politics, and individuals, to name a few. Often, shifts in an organization's external environment are incremental and slow to develop. At times, however, shifts can be large and sudden.[8] An organization seeking to improve or merely sustain its performance over time must do more than change. It must change in ways that keep pace with environmental demands, whatever those might be and however fast they might develop.

This definition has two implications for research on U.S. intelligence agencies. The first is to beware of embattled agency heads toting long lists of new initiatives. Organizational changes, however monumental, do not by themselves make a strong case for adaptation. Instead, adaptation must be judged relative to environmental demands.

The second implication is the importance of avoiding 20/20 hindsight. Organizational deficiencies often become widely known only after major disasters. To make a strong case for adaptation failure, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that intelligence officials and policy makers were aware of organizational deficiencies *before* the September 11 terrorist attacks but failed to fix them.

The (Mistaken) Case for Adaptation

At first glance, it is not evident that U.S. intelligence agencies adapted poorly to the rise of terrorism after the Cold War ended. Some foreign policy leaders and intelligence officials argue that the dangers of the post-Cold War world were too opaque, too numerous, and too fluid for U.S. intelligence agencies to assess the terrorist threat more effectively than they did. According to this view, the danger posed by al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations is obvious only in hindsight. As Clinton National Security Advisor Samuel Berger put it, "History is written through a rear view mirror, but it unfolds through a foggy windshield."[9]

[7] Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, "Structural Inertia and Organizational Change," *American Sociological Review* 49 (April 1984): 151.

[8] March, "Footnotes," 563.

[9] Samuel L. Berger, "Counterterrorism Policy," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, eighth public hearing, 24 March 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing8/berger_statement.pdf, 16 April 2005.

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Others point to evidence that intelligence agencies did, in fact, zero in on terrorism early on, allocating resources and launching new programs to combat it well before 11 September 2001. According to former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Robert Gates, the U.S. intelligence community began to shift resources away from Soviet-related missions and targets soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. In 1980, 58 percent of all intelligence resources were devoted to studying Soviet-related issues. By 1993, the figure had dropped to just 13 percent.[10] Although specific budget figures are classified, resources appear to have been redirected to combat terrorism. Despite tight intelligence budgets during the 1990s,[11] direct spending on counterterrorism roughly quintupled.[12] Cofer Black, former Director of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center, noted that the center was "the first among equals, the entity not to be cut."[13]

In addition, the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies launched a number of new counterterrorism initiatives. These included the creation of a special intelligence unit to track the activities of Osama bin Laden and his network,[14] dramatic increases in the number of FBI legal attaché offices overseas, with a focus on countries critical to fighting terrorism,[15] and an initiative to forge closer relationships with foreign intelligence services, which resulted in the disruption of terrorist cells in roughly twenty countries after 1997.[16] As former DCI George Tenet concluded in February 2002, "This community has worked diligently over the last five years, and the American people need to understand that with the resources and authorities and priorities, the men and women of the FBI and the CIA performed heroically." Tenet strongly objected to the idea that the September 11 terrorist attacks signified an intelligence failure, adding, "When people use the word 'failure'—'failure' means no focus, no attention, no discipline—and those were not present in what either

[10] Robert Gates, quoted in John H. Hedley, "The Intelligence Community: Is it Broken? How to Fix It?" *Studies in Intelligence* 39 (1996), accessed at http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/hedley.htm, 16 April 2005.

[11] According to The 9/11 Commission, national foreign intelligence program budgets declined every year between 1990 and 1996, and, with the exception of one large 1999 supplemental, remained basically flat between 1996 and 2000. *The 9/11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2004), 93.

[12] U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and U.S. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence (hereafter, Joint Inquiry), *Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001* (hereafter, *Joint Inquiry Report*), S. Rep. 107–351, H. Rep. 107–792, 107th Cong., 2d sess., December 2002: 254, 257.

[13] J. Cofer Black, testimony before the Joint Inquiry, "9/11 Intelligence Investigation," 107th Cong., 2d sess., 26 September 2002.

[14] Ibid., 4.

[15] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 76.

[16] This information was provided to the Joint Inquiry by former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger. See ibid., 12.

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we or the FBI did here and around the world."[17] Tenet was not alone.[18] When asked how well the intelligence community had adapted to meet the terrorist threat, for example, another intelligence official answered, "I think before September 11th, I would have said exceptionally well.... [Now] I think we've done very very well."[19]

Indeed, since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, CIA and FBI officials have defended their agencies by cataloging in great detail the many wide-ranging changes they instituted during the 1990s to better combat terrorism. Tenet's first public appearance before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees' Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks is revealing. The DCI politely but firmly refused to curtail his remarks. "I'm not going to be able to get this done in 10 minutes," he flatly declared to the committees. "What I want to do this morning, as explicitly as I can, is to describe the war we have waged for years against al Qaeda, the level of effort, the planning, the focus...." When Senator Bob Graham interrupted Tenet twenty-one minutes into his remarks, the DCI shot back, "Well, Sir, I just have to say I have been waiting a year.... It's important. It's contextual, it's factual, and I would like to proceed." Tenet went on to provide an exhaustive description of counterterrorism initiatives. These included: a 1998 memo in which Tenet declared war with Osama bin Laden and ordered that "no effort or resource be spared in prosecuting this war"; a 1999 new comprehensive strategy against al Qaeda called "The Plan"; the creation of a nationwide program to identify and hire qualified personnel for counterterrorism assignments in hostile environments; the creation of an eight-week advanced counterterrorism operations course; and measures taken to improve cooperation with the FBI, such as the exchange of CIA and FBI senior officials.[20]

Former FBI Director Louis Freeh provided a similarly comprehensive account of the counterterrorism efforts he led in the 1990s when he testified before the 9/11 Commission. Freeh told the commission that the FBI "effectively and relentlessly did its job pursuing terrorists, always with the goal of preventing their attacks."[21] In 1998, the Bureau's strategic plan placed counterterrorism in its top tier of priorities. In 1999, Freeh reorganized the FBI, creating a new FBI Counterterrorism Division and an Investigative

[17] George Tenet, "Worldwide Threat—Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 February 2002.

[18] See in particular Thomas Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA" in *The New York Review of Books*, 17 January 2002, accessed at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15109, 16 April 2005.

[19] In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, April 2002.

[20] George Tenet, "Activities of the Intelligence Community in Connection with the Attacks of September 11, 2001," testimony before a joint hearing of the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 17 October 2002.

[21] Louis J. Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing10/freeh_statement.pdf, 16 April 2005.

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Services Division to better support counterterrorism efforts. In July 2000, he instituted a program named MAXCAP 05 to upgrade the counterterrorist capabilities of all U.S. field offices. During Freeh's tenure, which lasted from 1993 to 2001, the FBI tripled its counterterrorism budget, dramatically expanded the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces to improve coordination with local law enforcement agencies, doubled the number of agents working counterterrorism cases, and arrested a number of high-level foreign terrorists and disrupted major plots, including a 1993 al Qaeda plan to blow up New York City tunnels, bridges, and landmarks. Freeh testified that he traveled to sixty-eight countries and met with 2,100 foreign leaders during that period, primarily to "pursue and enhance the FBI's counterterrorism program by forging an international network of cooperation."[22]

As these statements and examples indicate, U.S. intelligence agencies did, in fact, change in response to the end of the Cold War and the rise of the terrorist threat, and they achieved some important operational successes.

The Difference between Change and Adaptation

The conceptual flaw in these arguments is their assumption that change and adaptation are the same. They are not. As sociologists have long pointed out, organizations are constantly changing.[23] The key issue is whether those changes matter, or more precisely, whether the rate of change within an organization keeps pace with the rate of change in the external environment.[24]

Manifestation of this concept is more easily observed in the private sector, where responding to shifting market forces, consumer tastes, and competitive pressures can mean life or death for a firm. The concept is less obvious, but no less important, for evaluating public sector organizations. The question is not, Are you doing anything differently today? but Are you doing *enough* differently today to meet the challenges you face? One senior intelligence official put it more colorfully: "There's no point in saying we're going at half the speed of Moore's Law when the world is going at Moore's Law. Not enough people ... ask the right question. It's not how fast we've changed. It's how fast we've changed compared to the world. The good news is that other countries have organizations that are more feckless than we are."[25] In the case of U.S. intelligence agencies, determining adaptation failure requires answering the following three questions:

- Did senior intelligence officials and policy makers recognize the gravity of the threat posed by al Qaeda before September 11, and if so, when?

[22] Ibid., 8.
[23] March, "Footnotes," 563.
[24] Hannan and Freeman, "Structural Inertia," 151.
[25] In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, February 2004.

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- Did they understand the connection between the terrorist threat and the imperative for organizational change in U.S. intelligence agencies?
- To what extent did they achieve the organizational changes they believed were necessary?

The answers appear to be yes, yes, and not very much. Many intelligence officials and policy makers recognized the threat, but were unable to get the intelligence reforms they believed were vital several years before the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

Recognizing the Threat: What Intelligence Officials Knew and Said

In 1994, the DCI began delivering unclassified annual threat assessments to Congress. These assessments provide a useful gauge of how both intelligence officials and policy makers perceived the terrorist danger during the 1990s. Analysis of them reveals that threat priorities were highly stable and, in retrospect, accurate. Terrorism was identified as a significant danger to U.S. national security every year from 1994 to 2001. By 1998, terrorism ranked in the top tier of threats, alongside other transnational dangers such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In February 2001, seven months before September 11, the DCI testified that terrorism was the single greatest threat to U.S. national security.[26]

Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community had become aware of Osama bin Laden in the early 1990s, soon after he founded al Qaeda, and was aggressively collecting intelligence on him by 1996.[27] A number of terrorist attacks and plots from 1991 to 2001 associated with Islamist groups also raised the profile of foreign terrorism within the intelligence community and indicated that targets included the U.S. homeland (see Table 1). Among these were the first World Trade Center attack; a foiled 1993 plot to blow up several New York City

[26] R. James Woolsey, "World Trouble Spots," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 103rd Cong., 2d sess., 25 January 1994; R. James Woolsey, "World Threat Assessment Brief," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 10 January 1995; John Deutch, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2d sess., 22 February 1996; George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 6 February 1997; George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 105th Cong., 2d sess., 28 January 1998; George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2 February 1999; George Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February 2000; George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 2001.

[27] Eleanor Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," testimony before the Joint Inquiry, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 18 September 2002, 18.

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TABLE 1

Islamist Terrorist Attacks and Plots against Americans Known to U.S. Intelligence Officials before 11 September 2001

Date	*Plot/Attack**
December 1992	Bombs explode outside two hotels in Yemen that house U.S. servicemen en route to Somalia, killing 1 Australian tourist and no Americans
February 1993	Truck bomb in World Trade Center parking garage kills 6, wounds 1,000
October 1993	Somali warlords, aided by al Qaeda, shoot down two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters, killing 18 U.S. soldiers
June 1993	New York City landmarks plot to bomb United Nations, Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, etc. is prevented when FBI arrests 8 individuals
January 1995	Bojinka plot to blow up 12 U.S. aircraft in Asia, crash a jet into CIA headquarters, bomb U.S. and Israeli embassies in Manila, and assassinate the Pope is uncovered by Philippine National Police in Manila
November 1995	Car bomb explodes outside Saudi–U.S. joint facilty in Riyadh, killing 5 Americans and 2 Indian officials
June 1996	Truck bomb detonates outside Khobar Towers, a U.S. military residential complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 Americans, wounding 372
August 1998	Truck bombs simultaneously destroy U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 12 Americans, 212 others, and injuring more than 5,000
December 1999	Millennium plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport is disrupted by alert U.S. Customs agent at U.S.–Canadian border who discovers truck filled with explosives
December 1999	Jordanian officials disrupt plot to kill Americans by blowing up hotels and tourist sites in Amman, Jordan
January 2000	Attempt to attack a U.S. warship, *U.S.S. The Sullivans*, by parking an explosive-laden boat beside it fails when the attack boat sinks
October 2000	A second attempt to destroy a U.S. warship in Yemen succeeds: a small boat packed with explosives detonates beside the destroyer *U.S.S. Cole*, killing 17 U.S. sailors, wounding 39

Source: 9/11 Commission final report; Joint Inquiry Staff statement, 8 October 2002; 9/11 Commission Staff Statement #15, "Overview of the Enemy," 16 June 2004; Joint Inquiry final report, pp. 191–196.

*Includes attacks associated with Islamist terrorist organizations, not just those known or believed to have been directed by al Qaeda.

landmarks; the Bojinka plot of 1995, which included plans to crash an airplane into CIA headquarters; and the disrupted Millennium plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport. As former FBI counterterrorism division head Dale Watson told Congress after September 11:

> The perception that we, the FBI, never briefed the administration that al Qaeda could attack us in the United States ... is absolutely incorrect. If you looked just at

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> the fact that we'd been attacked in the World Trade Center in '93, if you looked at ... the Ressam individual who was going to set off a bomb in LAX, you understand clearly that we were vulnerable in the United States. Looking at the pattern before 9/11 ... I was convinced we were going to be attacked.[28]

Watson's view was shared by others within the FBI and the CIA. Louis Freeh told the 9/11 Commission that before the end of 1999, "the FBI and the intelligence community clearly understood the immediacy of the foreign-based al Qaeda threat regarding targets within the United States."[29] During the 1990s, in fact, Freeh had on several occasions presented congressional committees with a chart showing locations around the United States where radical fundamentalist cells were active.[30] Cofer Black echoed Freeh's assessments, telling the 9/11 Commission, "I ... want to emphasize that [the Counterterrorist Center] and the Intelligence Community produced significant strategic analysis that examined the growing threat from international jihadist networks and al-Qa'ida. I believe that the record shows that the U.S. [government] understood the nature of the threat."[31]

Although al Qaeda appeared on the intelligence community's radar screen in the mid-1990s, in 1998, concern for and warnings about an al Qaeda attack reached a heightened level. As Samuel Berger put it, "In 1996 [Osama bin Laden] was on the radar screen; in 1998 he was the radar screen."[32] In February, bin Laden issued a public *fatwa* encouraging attacks on Americans anywhere in the world.[33] In May, he discussed "bringing the war home to America" in a public press conference.[34] And in August, his terrorist network succeeded in carrying out two sophisticated, simultaneous, and devastating truck bomb attacks against the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people and injuring 5,000 more.[35] Over the course of the year, U.S. intelligence agencies also received a number of reports indicating possible al Qaeda terrorist plots inside the United States. Taken together, these events led DCI Tenet in December 1998 to issue a memo declaring war against Osama bin Laden. He wrote, "We must now enter a new phase in our effort against Bin Ladin. ... We are at war. ... I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community."[36]

[28] Dale Watson, "9/11 Intelligence Investigations," testimony before a Joint Hearing of the House Select Intelligence Committee and Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 26 September 2002.

[29] Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," 9.

[30] Ibid.

[31] J. Cofer Black, "Panel: Summer 2001," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004, accessed at http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing10.htm, 30 August 2005, 4.

[32] Samuel Berger, "Events Surrounding the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001," testimony before Panel II of a Joint Hearing of the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 19 September 2002.

[33] For a translated text of the *fatwa*, see www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm, accessed 16 April 2005.

[34] Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," 9.

[35] The *9/11 Commission Report*, 70.

[36] Quotation from memo included in Hill, "Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, Part I," 12.

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The House and Senate Intelligence Committees' joint inquiry into the September 11 attacks, a ten-month investigation that examined nearly 500,000 pages of documents and conducted 300 interviews, concluded that "Bin Ladin's declaration ... and intelligence reports indicating possible terrorist plots inside the United States did not go unnoticed by the Intelligence Community, which, in turn, advised senior officials in the U.S. Government of the serious nature of the threat."[37]

Tenet reiterated his concern in public statements over the next three years. In 1999, he testified in open session before the Senate Armed Services Committee, "Looking out over the next year ... there is not the slightest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us .... I must tell you we are concerned that one or more of Bin Ladin's attacks could occur at any time."[38] In 2000, he told the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, again in open session, "Everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that [Bin Laden] wants to strike further blows against the United States .... [W]e still believe he could strike without additional warning."[39] In 2001, the DCI bluntly warned, "The threat from terrorism is real, immediate, and evolving."[40] As one senior intelligence official lamented after September 11, "You know, we've been saying it forever, [Bin Laden] wants to bring the fight here. He wants to bring the fight here."[41]

Although the FBI apparently never received Tenet's memo declaring war on bin Laden, the Bureau reached similar conclusions at the same time.[42] In a dramatic shift, its May 1998 strategic plan elevated terrorism to the top tier of priorities, while downgrading traditional FBI crime-fighting missions.[43] That year, Osama bin Laden was indicted twice, for murdering U.S. soldiers in Yemen and for his role in the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. In 1999, a public FBI report noted that "the FBI has no higher priority than to combat terrorism."[44] By the end

[37] Ibid.

[38] George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security," testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 2 February 1999.

[39] George Tenet, "Annual Assessment of Security Threats against the United States," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Cong., 2d sess., 2 February 2000.

[40] George Tenet, "Worldwide Threats to National Security," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong., 1st sess., 7 February 2001.

[41] *In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, April 2002.*

[42] The House and Senate Intelligence Committees' Joint Inquiry noted that "knowledge of the DCI's declaration appears to have been limited ... . [M]any in the FBI had not heard of it. For example, the Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division testified to the Joint Inquiry that he 'was not specifically aware of that declaration of war.'" *Joint Inquiry Report*, 232; see also *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 357.

[43] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Draft FBI Strategic Plan: 1998–2003, Keeping Tomorrow Safe* ("FBI Strategic Plan") unclassified version (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998), 8.

[44] Quoted by Louis Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," testimony before The 9/11 Commission, 13 April 2004.

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of the year, the Bureau had created a special bin Laden unit at FBI headquarters and had placed bin Laden on its Ten Most Wanted List.[45]

Public Statements and Actions by Policy Makers

Public statements and actions by elected officials and policy makers during the 1990s suggest that they received and shared the intelligence community's assessment of the growing terrorist threat long before September 11. In 1993, after Islamic terrorists detonated a bomb in the World Trade Center parking garage, killing 6 and wounding more than 1,000, Attorney General Janet Reno noted that terrorism had become a major threat to U.S. national security interests.[46] Beginning in 1994, President Bill Clinton mentioned terrorism in every one of his annual State of the Union addresses. In 1995, Clinton became the first world leader to go before the United Nations and call for a global counterterrorist effort. In 1996, when announcing his new national security team after the presidential election, Clinton listed terrorism first in a list of challenges facing the country.[47] In June 1997, the danger of an Islamist terrorist attack on U.S. soil was so well recognized that the FBI's chief of international terrorism operations warned about it in a public speech.[48] That same year, two different strategic assessments, the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review and the National Defense Panel, included strong warnings about threats to the American homeland.[49] In June 1998, Samuel Berger appeared on ABC News *Nightline* and called Osama bin Laden "the most dangerous non-state terrorist in the world."[50] Three months later, Clinton delivered a major address at the opening session of United Nations General Assembly in which he issued a forceful call to combat terrorism. Referring to terrorism as "a clear and present danger," the President said the issue ranked "at the top of the American agenda and should be at the top of the world's agenda."[51] In 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen wrote

[45] Freeh, "On War and Terrorism," 4–6.

[46] R. James Woolsey, remarks to American Bar Association, Washington DC, 29 April 1994.

[47] President William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing the Second Term National Security Team and an Exchange with Reporters," 5 December 1996, in *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 101.

[48] John P. O'Neill, remarks to National Strategy Forum, Chicago, IL, 11 June 1997, accessed at www.nationalstrategy.com/speakers/oneill.html, 16 April 2005.

[49] National Defense Panel, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century*, 1 December 1997, accessed at http://http://www.fas.org/man/docs/ndp/toc.htm, 16 April 2005; William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review*, May 1997, accessed at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr, 16 April 2005.

[50] John McWethy, John Miller, and Ted Koppel, "One of America's Most Dangerous Enemies," ABC News *Nightline*, 10 June 1998.

[51] President William J. Clinton, "Remarks to the Opening Session of the 53rd United Nations General Assembly, United Nations," New York, N.Y., 21 September 1998, accessed at www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/980921_pres_terror.html, 20 January 2004.

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an op-ed in the *Washington Post* in which he explicitly predicted a terrorist attack on American soil. Cohen summed up, "Welcome to the grave New World of Terrorism."[52]

Evidence suggests that President George W. Bush and his national security team were also aware of the terrorist danger. Bush's two major foreign policy addresses during the 2000 presidential campaign both mentioned terrorism.[53] In one, Bush noted that "even in this time of pride and promise, America has determined enemies, who hate our values and resent our success—terrorists and crime syndicates and drug cartels and unbalanced dictators. The Empire has passed, but evil remains. We must protect our homeland and our allies against missiles and terror and blackmail."[54] The 9/11 Commission noted that intelligence briefings that included a substantial focus on terrorism occurred throughout the presidential campaign and transition. During one four-hour intelligence briefing at Bush's Texas ranch, for example, Ben Bonk, then Deputy Chief of the DCI's Counterterrorist Center, spent one hour on terrorism, bringing a mock suitcase to show how the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo had released sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway in 1995, killing twelve people and injuring thousands. Bonk recalled that he told Bush that Americans would die as a result of terrorism during the next four years.[55] The 9/11 Commission concluded that "both Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush and their top advisers told us they got the picture—they understood Bin Ladin was a danger."[56]

In sum, the U.S. intelligence community's assessments of a growing terrorist threat did not go unnoticed. Senior policy makers across the national security establishment appear to have agreed with them.

Understanding the Need for Organizational Change

The next question is whether intelligence officials and policy makers also understood the need for organizational changes to meet the terrorist threat. It appears that they did. Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 11 September 2001, no fewer than twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. All of their reports urged re-

[52] William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New World," *Washington Post*, 26 July 1999.

[53] President George W. Bush, "Defense: A Period of Consequences," remarks at The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 23 September 1999; George W. Bush, "Foreign Policy: A Distinctly American Internationalism," remarks at the Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, California, 19 November 1999.

[54] President George W. Bush, "Foreign Policy: A Distinctly American Internationalism."

[55] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 198.

[56] Ibid., 342. White House Counterterrorism Chief Richard Clarke and others argued that the Bush administration downgraded the priority given to terrorism. The 9/11 Commission's final report, however, underscored that neither the Clinton nor Bush Administrations gave the issue sufficient attention.

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TABLE 2

Unclassified Studies of U.S. Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 1991–2001*

Date Issued	*Study Name*	*Number of Recommendations***
1993, 1995	National Performance Review (Phases I and II)	35
1996	Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (Aspin-Brown Commission)	39
1996	Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force	29
1996	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study (IC21)	75
1996	20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence	18
1997	National Institute on Public Policy Report on Modernizing Intelligence (Odom Report)	34
1998	FBI Strategic Plan 1998–2003	60
1999	Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Deutch Commission)	57
1999, 2000	Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission), Reports 1 & 2	60
2000	Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement (Webster Commission)	21
2000	National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission)	36
2001	U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), Phase III Report	50
Total		514

Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog, collection of author.

*Includes every major study focusing on the CIA, FBI, or the intelligence community as a whole. Reports about other specific agencies of the U.S. intelligence community, such as reviews of the National Reconnaissance Office, which builds and operates spy satellites, are not included.

**Total excludes twenty recommendations that were omitted because they either suggested no actionable steps or focused narrowly on cost saving, and twenty-five recommendations whose implementation could not be determined.

form within intelligence agencies, across the intelligence community, and between the intelligence community and other parts of the U.S. government (see Table 2).

These were not throwaway reports, but detailed, serious examinations of a variety of intelligence and counterterrorism issues. Six out of the twelve studies were high-profile bipartisan blue-ribbon commissions chaired by well-respected leaders such as former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, Ambassador Paul Bremer, former Defense Secretaries Les Aspin and Harold Brown, and William Webster, the only person ever to head both the CIA and the FBI.[57] Three studies came from leading nonpartisan think tanks: the Council on Foreign Relations, the National Institute for Public Policy, and the

[57] The commission reports are: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, *Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence* ("Aspin-

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20th Century Fund.[58] The remaining three reports were issued by governmental initiatives: President Clinton's interagency National Performance Review (the reinventing government initiative), the FBI's 1998 Strategic Plan, and a House Intelligence Committee staff study that was the most comprehensive congressional review of the intelligence community since the 1970s, when the Church Committee investigated CIA abuses.[59]

All twelve reports offered not only extensive discussion of key problems, but specific recommendations for fixing them. The studies issued a total of 514 recommendations; two-thirds of them, or 340, focused specifically on improving U.S. intelligence capabilities (see Figure 1).

It is worth noting that these studies addressed a wide range of topics and covered vastly different ground; not all of them gave the intelligence community the same level of attention. Six of the twelve—the National Performance Review, the Aspin-Brown Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, the House Intelligence Committee Staff Study, the Council on Foreign Relations Intelligence Task Force, the 20th Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence, and the National Institute of Public Policy—focused exclusively on intelligence issues. The other six did not. The Gilmore and Bremer Commissions examined U.S. counterter-

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Brown Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996); National Commission on Terrorism, *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism* ("Bremer Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000); Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ("Deutch Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999); Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, *First Annual Report to The President and The Congress: Assessing the Threat* ("1999 Gilmore Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999) and *Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress: Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* ("2000 Gilmore Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000); United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change* ("Hart-Rudman Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001); Commission on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement in a New Century and a Changing World: *Improving the Administration of Federal Law Enforcement* ("Webster Commission") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000).

[58] Council on Foreign Relations, *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence* ("CFR Report") (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996); National Institute for Public Policy, *Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century* ("Odom Report") (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002;) Twentieth Century Fund, *In From the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence* ("TCF Report") (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996).

[59] Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Draft FBI Strategic Plan: 1998–2003, Keeping Tomorrow Safe* ("FBI Strategic Plan") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998); National Performance Review, *The Intelligence Community: Accompanying Report of the National Performance Review* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), and National Performance Review Phase II Initiatives: *An Intelligence Community Report* ("National Performance Review 1995") (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office: 1995); House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century* ("IC21") (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

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FIGURE 1
Intelligence Focus of Reform Study Recommendations, 1991–2001.



Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog, collection of author.

rorism efforts and challenges across the board, from local-level emergency response capabilities to U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and other state sponsors of terrorism. The Deutch Commission was charged with assessing organizational problems related to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Webster Commission's mandate was to review and recommend action to Congress about "Federal law enforcement priorities for the 21st century, including ... terrorism," as well as criminal law enforcement operations and coordination across federal law enforcement agencies.[60] The FBI's strategic plan aimed to set priorities for the entire organization. The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission, covered the broadest territory, identifying emerging twenty-first-century threats to U.S. security—including terrorism—and the strategic and organizational changes needed to combat those threats effectively.

As one would expect, the intelligence studies devoted a substantially higher share of their recommendations to fixing intelligence issues compared to the counterterrorism or law enforcement reports (see Table 3). What is surprising, however, is just how much attention these counterterrorism and law enforcement studies—whose mandates directed them to consider a wider range of issues—paid to fixing the U.S. intelligence community, as well. The National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission), for example,

[60] *The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996*, Public Law 104–132, 104th Cong., 2d sess. (24 April 1996).

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TABLE 3

Intelligence Focus of Reform Studies, 1991–2001

Study Name	*Primary Topic*	*Number of Intelligence Recommendations*	*Number of Nonintelligence Recommendations*	*Total*	*Intelligence Percent of Study Total*
Council on Foreign Relations	Intelligence	29	0	29	100%
National Performance Review	Intelligence	35	0	35	100%
Odom Report	Intelligence	34	0	34	100%
House Intelligence Committee Staff	Intelligence	74	1	75	99%
Aspin-Brown Commission	Intelligence	38	1	39	97%
20th Century Fund	Intelligence	17	1	18	94%
FBI Strategic Plan	Law enforcement	54	6	60	90%
Webster Commission	Law enforcement	10	11	21	48%
Bremer Commission	Counterterrorism	12	24	36	33%
Deutch Commission	Counterterrorism (WMD)	17	40	57	30%
Gilmore Commission	Counterterrorism	14	46	60	23%
Hart-Rudman Commission	Counterterrorism (national strategy, organization)	6	44	50	12%
Total all studies		340	174	514	66%

Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog, collection of author.

issued twelve intelligence reform recommendations out of a total of thirty-six. Among them were proposals for reinvigorating human intelligence efforts, clarifying the confusing regulations for FBI terrorist investigations, and dramatically enhancing information sharing within the FBI and between the Bureau and the rest of the intelligence community. The Gilmore Commission found many of the same problems and even suggested some of the same solutions in its fourteen intelligence recommendations.

The Deutch Commission, which sought to remedy organizational problems in nonproliferation policy across the federal government, issued seventeen intelligence recommendations out of fifty-seven, or 30 percent of its total. Here, too, commissioners saw direct links between weaknesses in intelligence organizations and the U.S. government's broader efforts to combat terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Deutch, who served as DCI from 1995 to 1996, and the twelve other commissioners issued specific recommendations to, among other things, improve coordination between the FBI and other intelligence agencies, enhance information sharing, revamp the FBI's computer capabilities, and integrate activities across the community. Even the Hart-Rudman Commission, with its sweeping analysis of 21st-century national security challenges and organizational problems, used six of its fifty recommendations to urge reforms of the U.S. intelligence community, focusing

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particularly on the need to improve prioritization of intelligence efforts, analysis of asymmetric threats, and human intelligence.[61]

Tellingly, every study during the period included discussion of major intelligence deficiencies, and every study issued recommendations for addressing them. Together, the counterterrorism and law enforcement studies contributed one-third of all intelligence reform recommendations (Table 4).

Although the reports addressed a variety of intelligence issues and problems, their common theme was the need for major change. The Council on Foreign Relations noted in 1996 that "the intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed demands of the post-Cold War world for several years ... [but] additional reform is necessary."[62] The report listed nearly forty recommendations that ranged from significant structural reforms to changes in personnel recruiting, training, and assignments. The 1996 House Intelligence Committee staff study found that the intelligence community suffered from a lack of "corporateness," or integration among individual agencies. The report noted, "Only intelligence, of all major government functions, is carried out by a very disparate number of agencies and organizations that are either independent of one another or housed in separate departments by officials whose main concerns are policy, not intelligence."[63] In particular, the report criticized what it saw as "the glaring gap" between the DCI's responsibilities and his authority,[64] the "fundamental and urgent" need to improve the intelligence requirements process that sets agency priorities,[65] and the "internecine competition" between the various intelligence collection disciplines, such as signals intelligence, human intelligence, and open-source intelligence.[66] It issued eighty-two recommendations for reform. Four years later, the Bremer Commission warned that "international terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America" and urged the government to take immediate "steps to reinvigorate the collection of intelligence about terrorists' plans ...."[67] The Commission's recommendations included clarifying existing authority for the FBI to investigate suspected terrorist groups; rescinding CIA guidelines that hindered the recruitment of terrorist informants; giving higher funding priority to counterterrorism efforts in the CIA, FBI, and National Security Agency; and establishing a new cadre of reports officers to distill and disseminate terrorism-related information quickly once it was collected. Indeed, the Commission noted with concern that "U.S. intelligence and law en-

[61] Hart-Rudman Commission, *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report*, 31 January 2001, accessed at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/nssg.pdf, 30 August 2005, 83.

[62] Council on Foreign Relations, *Making Intelligence Smarter*, 1.

[63] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Staff Study, *IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century*, Chapter 1, "Overview and Summary," 5.

[64] Ibid., 7.

[65] Ibid., 26.

[66] Ibid., 28.

[67] National Commission on Terrorism, *Countering the Changing Threat*, iv.

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TABLE 4

Intelligence Focus of Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Studies versus Others, 1991–2001

Study Name	*Primary Topic*	*Number of Intelligence Recommendations*	*Number of Nonintelligence Recommendations*	*Total Number of Recommendations*	*Study Share of Total Intelligence Recommendations*
Bremer Commission	Counterterrorism	12	24	36	3%
Deutch Commission	Counterterrorism (WMD)	17	40	57	5%
FBI Strategic Plan	Law enforcement	54	6	60	16%
Gilmore Commission	Counterterrorism	14	46	60	4%
Hart-Rudman Commission	Counterterrorism (national security strategy, organization)	6	44	50	2%
Webster Commission	Law enforcement	10	11	21	3%
Counterterrorism/ Law enforcement study subtotal		*113*	*171*	*284*	*33%*
Aspin-Brown Commission	Intelligence	38	1	39	11%
Council on Foreign Relations	Intelligence	29	0	29	9%
House Intelligence Committee Staff	Intelligence	74	1	75	22%
National Performance Review	Intelligence	35	0	35	10%
Odom Report	Intelligence	34	0	34	10%
20th Century Fund	Intelligence	17	1	18	5%
Intelligence study subtotal		*227*	*3*	*230*	*67%*
Total		340	174	514	100%

Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog; analysis by author.

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forcement communities lack the ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in a timely fashion all of the information to which they have access."[68] Together, the twelve reports issued 340 recommendations for improving U.S. intelligence capabilities.[69] The need for organizational change was clear.

Failing to Change

To what extent were the recommendations of the studies implemented? Admittedly, gauging adaptation failure by examining the adoption of study recommendations has limitations. Commissions may be created for the sole purpose of deflecting blame or delaying action rather than generating change, although this is far less often the case in national security affairs than most scholars and observers believe.[70] Even genuine reform efforts often take a variety of forms, with some focusing on "the art of the possible," and others proposing more ideal and unlikely solutions. Some suggestions, moreover, appear shortsighted with the benefit of history. Examining the totality of study recommendations and their success, however, has the advantage of providing a macro view of adaptation that does not rely on hindsight or impose ex post personal judgments of which reforms were better ideas than others. Asking only what recommendations were made and whether these were implemented provides a useful and systematic first cut at the problem that goes beyond anecdotal evidence of failure.

The data indicate a widespread inability of U.S. intelligence agencies to adapt to the terrorist threat before the September 11 attacks. Of the 340 recommendations for changes in the intelligence community, only 35—just 10 percent of the total—were fully implemented. These included several recommendations that urged continued study of a problem rather than adoption of a particular solution.[71] Thirty recommendations were partially implemented, and seven were implemented to an unknown extent. The vast majority, 268 recommendations or 79 percent of the total, resulted in no action at all (see Figure 2).

Common Findings

Although the reports covered a variety of issues, they reached a stunning degree of consensus about four major problems afflicting the U.S. intelligence

[68] Ibid., 13.

[69] Gilmore Commission recommendations are from the panel's 1999 and 2000 reports. The Commission issued two reports after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that were not included in this analysis.

[70] Amy Zegart, "Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of Presidential Commissions," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35 (June 2004): 366.

[71] For example, the National Performance Review recommended that the Foreign Broadcast Information Service reexamine its mission for a post-Cold War threat environment, and the FBI's 1998 Strategic Plan suggested that the FBI explore the feasibility of instituting a capability to exchange unclassified investigative material with other law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

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FIGURE 2
The Implementation of Intelligence Reform Recommendations, 1991–2001.



Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog, collection of author.

community. The first was its lack of coherence or "corporateness." Out of 340 intelligence recommendations issued by the reports, 94 of them, or 28 percent of the total, focused on the need to improve coordination across U.S. intelligence agencies and between these agencies and the rest of the U.S. government (see Table 5). As the Council on Foreign Relations study noted, the organization and leadership of the intelligence community was a

TABLE 5

Commonly Identified Organizational Problems in Intelligence, 1991–2001

Organizational Problem	*Number of Recommendations*	*Percent of Total*
Personnel/information sharing	106	31%
Corporateness	94	28%
Strategic mission and priorities	56	16%
Human intelligence	31	9%
Total commonly identified problems	*287*	*84%*
Other recommendations	53	16%
Grand total all intelligence recommendations	340	100%

Source: Intelligence Reform Catalog, collection of author.

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"structural oddity," with fourteen major agencies and no single official in charge of them all.[72] Technically, the DCI was supposed to set broad strategies and coordinate efforts across these agencies (as well as run the CIA). In reality, however, the DCI held direct control over only 15 percent of the intelligence budget (the secretary of defense controlled the rest) and had weak management authority for allocating money, people, and programs to every agency outside the CIA. The reports' specific recommendations varied, but all of them offered ways to enhance intelligence community integration and coordination.

Second, ten out of twelve of these studies found an ineffective system for setting intelligence collection and analysis priorities.[73] In 1993, for example, the president's National Performance Review found the mechanism for establishing intelligence priorities to be a "jumble of loosely connected processes" that did not satisfy the needs of policy makers.[74] In 1996, the House Intelligence Committee's staff study called the prioritization process "one of the most vexing aspects of intelligence management" and the need for fixing it "fundamental and urgent."[75] And in 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission warned that the continued absence of an effective process for setting intelligence priorities was creating "dangerous tradeoffs between coverage of important countries, regions, and functional challenges."[76] In total, 56 out of the 340 intelligence recommendations, or 16 percent, suggested improvements in the prioritization process.

A third finding was the need to revitalize human intelligence capabilities. Nine of the twelve reports called for more aggressive human intelligence efforts to combat terrorism, two did not address the issue,[77] and only one, the 20th Century Fund report, advocated downgrading collection from human sources. Most frequently mentioned was the need to revise the CIA's 1995 guidelines, which required prior approval from CIA headquarters before an individual suspected of human rights violations could be recruited as an asset—guidelines that had come to be known as the "scrub order," because they had led to the removal of hundreds of assets from the CIA's payroll.[78] Many reports also advocated improving the intelligence budgeting process so that resources could be more effectively matched against priorities—improvements which

[72] Council on Foreign Relations *Making Intelligence Smarter*, 25.

[73] The two exceptions were the Webster and Bremer Commissions.

[74] National Performance Review, *The Intelligence Community*, 9.

[75] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21*, "Overview and Summary," 26.

[76] Hart-Rudman Commission, *Road Map for National Security*, 82.

[77] These were the Webster and Deutch Commissions.

[78] The Bremer and Gilmore Commissions recommended abolishing the guidelines. The Council on Foreign Relations task force and the Hart-Rudman Commission urged the CIA to review the guidelines and make recruiting clandestine assets one of the intelligence community's top priorities. For effects of the "scrub order," see Seymour M. Hersh, "Annals of National Security: What Went Wrong," *The New Yorker*, 18 December 2001, accessed at http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?011008fa_FACT, 16 April 2005.

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would have had the likely effect of redistributing some of the vast resources dedicated to technical intelligence systems to human intelligence activities.[79] In addition, the Aspin-Brown Commission and the House Intelligence Committee staff reports recommended revising personnel incentives and restructuring the intelligence community to ensure that human intelligence efforts could be more effectively and efficiently deployed against hard targets such as rogue states and transnational terrorist groups, which are difficult to penetrate by other means.[80] The National Institute for Public Policy report was the most radical. It recommended stripping the CIA's analysis branch so that the agency could focus exclusively on human intelligence collection. In addition, the report raised the possibility of disbanding the CIA's clandestine Directorate of Operations altogether and replacing it with an entirely new clandestine service in order to address the Directorate's long-standing cultural and management problems.[81] In all, the reports from 1991 to 2001 issued thirty-one recommendations for improving human intelligence efforts.

Finally, the reports called for addressing critical personnel issues. More than a hundred recommendations, or nearly a third of all intelligence reforms issued by the reports, addressed personnel and information-sharing issues. As the House Intelligence Committee staff study bluntly declared, "[The intelligence community] continues to face a major personnel crisis that it has, thus far, not addressed in any coherent way."[82] Although the specifics varied widely, two common themes emerged. First, the intelligence community lacked employees with the necessary skills to confront new and rising threats such as foreign terrorism. Despite being technically exempt from a number of Civil Service regulations, intelligence agencies rarely fired poor performers. In addition, the Aspin-Brown Commission noted that even when confronted with mandatory reductions in personnel in the early 1990s, intelligence agencies reached targets through attrition and voluntary retirement rather than through strategically focused cuts to keep the best talent and those with the most-needed areas of expertise for a post-Cold War threat environment.[83] Second, many studies found that intelligence officers too often stayed in their home

[79] National Performance Review, *The Intelligence Community*.

[80] In a 2004 report, the House Intelligence Committee revealed that it had repeatedly criticized the CIA's human intelligence efforts and had recommended corrective action in classified annexes to its annual authorization bills years before September 11. The Committee noted, "After years of trying to convince, suggest, urge, entice, cajole, and pressure CIA to make wide-reaching changes in the way it conducts its HUMINT [human intelligence] mission, ... CIA, in the committee's view, continues down a road leading over a proverbial cliff." House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2005, H. Report 108-558, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 21 June 2004, 24.

[81] National Institute for Public Policy, *Modernizing Intelligence*, 85–98.

[82] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, *IC21*, "Intelligence Community Management," 21.

[83] Aspin-Brown Commission, Chapter 9, "The Need to 'Right-Size' and Rebuild the Community," in *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*," 2–7.

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agencies rather than building institutional bridges to other policy-making and intelligence agencies through temporary rotations, and these practices impeded information sharing. Three studies, the Aspin-Brown Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations task force, and the House Intelligence Committee staff study, recommended that rotations to other agencies be required for intelligence officers to be promoted to the senior ranks. Another three—the 20th Century Fund task force, the National Performance Review, and the FBI's 1998 Strategic Plan—urged the establishment of vigorous rotational assignments without requiring them for promotion. In sum, the need to realign the personnel skill mix and improve coordination through temporary tours of duty in other agencies received major attention in all but two of the reports.[84]

As Table 5 illustrates, these four categories of organizational problems constituted 84 percent of the reports' intelligence recommendations, and 56 percent of the reports' 514 recommendations overall.

Crucial Failings

Almost none of the recommendations to improve the four problems discussed above were successfully implemented before September 11. Investigations since the terrorist attacks, moreover, have revealed that the organizational deficiencies highlighted by reports in the 1990s turned out to be crucial ones. The 9/11 Commission and the House and Senate Intelligence Committees' Joint Inquiry into the September 11 terrorist attacks found that the intelligence community's fragmentation, its inability to set priorities and match resources against them, its poor human intelligence capabilities, and its information-sharing deficiencies created a dysfunctional intelligence apparatus that was incapable of penetrating the al Qaeda plot or capitalizing on opportunities to disrupt it.

The lack of integration across U.S. intelligence agencies topped the list of concerns for both the 9/11 Commission and the Congressional Joint Inquiry. In 2001, the intelligence community was 50 percent bigger than it was when the CIA was created in 1947, but the DCI had only slightly more power to oversee it. As the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks darkly concluded, "The inability to realign Intelligence Community resources to combat the threat posed by Usama Bin Ladin is a relatively direct consequence of the limited authority of the DCI over major portions of the Intelligence Community."[85] The 9/11 Commission agreed, noting that the intelligence community "struggle[d] to collect on and analyze ... transnational terrorism in the mid to late 1990s," in large part because the community was a set of "loosely associated agencies and departmental offices that lacked the incentives to cooperate,

[84] The two exceptions were the Gilmore and Hart-Rudman Commissions.

[85] *Joint Inquiry Report*, 43.

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collaborate, and share information."[86] The intelligence community was so fragmented before September 11 that even Tenet's 1998 declaration of war against bin Laden and al Qaeda did not seem to have gotten much beyond the CIA's walls.[87]

The Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission also found major deficiencies in the intelligence community's system for prioritizing collection and analysis. The Joint Inquiry discovered that intelligence officials found the process "confusing" and "so broad as to be meaningless," with more than 1,500 formal priorities for the National Security Agency alone by September 11.[88] The 9/11 Commission concluded that the setting of clear intelligence collection priorities "did not occur" before the September 11 attacks.[89] Even some of those responsible for setting priorities agreed. Former National Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke noted that the White House "never really gave good systematic, timely guidance to the Intelligence Community about what priorities were at the national level."[90]

Despite calls to vastly upgrade human intelligence efforts, the CIA's clandestine Directorate of Operations continued to languish. In 1995, the low point for recruitment, only twenty-five trainees became clandestine officers.[91] By the late 1990s, the Directorate of Operations had cut by nearly one-third the number of its personnel deployed overseas.[92] Today, the CIA still does not have enough qualified case officers to staff many of its stations around the world.[93] In addition, the 1995 guidelines restricting recruitment of foreign assets remained in place until after September 11. Nor did funding priorities shift from technical intelligence systems to any significant degree. As one senior CIA official put it, "I'm cynical, but I think the reason people wanted to keep the [intelligence] budget secret was not to protect spies in Moscow, but because they didn't want people to know that 99 percent [of the budget] was stuck in some satellite."[94]

Personnel problems also persisted. In 2001, 80 percent of the graduating class of clandestine case officers were fluent only in romance languages.[95] Robert Baer, a veteran CIA clandestine case officer, noted that even after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, the CIA employed not one case officer who spoke Pashto, the dialect of the major ethnic group in Afghanistan, and still

[86] The 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," Staff Statement Number 11, 14 April 2004, 12.[87] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 357; and *Joint Inquiry Report*, 236–237.

[88] *Joint Inquiry Report*, 49.

[89] The 9/11 Commission, "The Performance of the Intelligence Community," 9.

[90] *Joint Inquiry Report*, 49.

[91] *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 90.

[92] *Joint Inquiry Report*, 265.

[93] Hersh, "Annals of National Security: What Went Wrong."

[94] In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, June 2004.

[95] Editors, "Intelligence Gaps: America's Spy Network Needs a Quick Fix," *San Diego Union Tribune*, 22 April 2002.

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had none as of 2002.[96] The Joint Inquiry's findings are consistent with these assessments. The congressional panel concluded that before September 11, the intelligence community "was not prepared to handle the challenge it faced in translating the volumes of foreign language counterterrorism intelligence it collected. Agencies ... experienced backlogs in material awaiting translation ... and a readiness level of only 30% in the most critical terrorism-related languages used by terrorists."[97]

Temporary rotations also were not commonly practiced. Although DCI Tenet declared in the late 1990s that all intelligence officials were required to do a tour of duty in another intelligence agency before being promoted to the senior ranks, every agency, including the CIA, ignored him. Instead, intelligence agencies have usually filled these rotational positions with poor performers rather than rising stars. As one senior intelligence official complained, "I often think of writing a vacancy notice [for temporary detailees to his agency] that says, 'only stupid people doing unimportant work need apply,' or 'send us your tired, your sluggish, your marginally brain dead.'"[98]

Conclusion

Between 1991 and 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies instituted a number of new programs and devoted new resources to counterterrorism. They did not, however, adjust to this emerging threat as fast or as fully as they could have before the 11 September 2001 attacks. Intelligence threat assessments reveal that years before the attacks, intelligence officials recognized the danger that al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations posed to U.S. national security, and warned elected officials. Policy makers, for their part, appear to have shared these assessments, issuing a crescendo of warnings about the grave new threat of terrorism in major public addresses, particularly after the 1998 embassy bombings. Senior foreign policy leaders in both the Clinton and Bush administrations also were aware that combating terrorism required a fundamental transformation of the U.S. intelligence community. A dozen unclassified studies, and a number of classified reports, highlighted a common set of critical deficiencies and suggested an array of potential remedies. Yet as dangers gathered, the U.S. intelligence community remained largely unchanged.

The natural question to ask is why: If so many experts and officials recognized the gravity of the terrorist threat and understood the imperative for organizational reform, why did they fail to achieve the changes they believed were so urgently needed? Although fully answering this question lies beyond the scope of this article, a summary explanation is in order.[99]

[96] Powers, "The Trouble with the CIA."

[97] *Joint Inquiry Report*, xvi.

[98] In a confidential interview with the author, Washington DC, January 2004.

[99] For a more extensive discussion, see Amy B. Zegart, "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies," *International Security* 29 (Spring 2005): 78–111.

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The answer is that the cause of adaptation failure lies in politics—and in three enduring realities of the American political system in particular. The first is the nature of bureaucratic organizations, which makes internal agency reform efforts exceedingly difficult. No organization changes easily from within. Organization theory is filled with examples of how even private firms, which possess considerably more advantages than government agencies, fail to adapt to changing environmental demands. U.S. government agencies face even greater obstacles because they are designed to be reliable and fair, not nimble and innovative.[100]

The second enduring reality is the rational self-interest of political actors. Presidents have good reason to consider organizational effectiveness and press for executive branch reforms, but they are single individuals with little time, limited political capital, few formal powers, and crowded political agendas.[101] In the absence of crisis, they have little incentive to take on the fight. Since the CIA's creation in 1947, dozens of studies have identified major shortcomings in the U.S. intelligence community, but no president undertook intelligence reform prior to the September 11 attacks.

Self-interest leads most legislators to either avoid tackling intelligence reform altogether, or seek to block it. Like presidents, members of Congress have little incentive to delve into the arcane details of intelligence agency design because doing so does not provide electoral benefits.[102] Moreover, legislators tend to care about maintaining the power of the institution, and consequently prefer executive branch arrangements that diffuse rather than centralize authority and capabilities.

Finally, national security agency bureaucrats have their own interests at stake and powerful means to protect them.[103] Viewing reform as a zero-sum battle for agency autonomy and power, these officials will go to great lengths to block change. Congress, in fact, twice attempted to pass sweeping intelligence overhaul before September 11—in 1992 and again in 1996. In both instances, legislation was torpedoed by the Pentagon, which feared losing control over its own intelligence agencies and 85 percent of the intelligence budget.

The third enduring reality is the fragmented structure of the federal government, which erects high barriers to legislative reform. Ironically, some of the cherished features of American democracy are to blame. Separation of powers, the congressional committee system, and majority rule create a system that invites compromise and makes legislation hard to pass. From the

[100] Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman, *In the Web of Politics: Three Decades of the U.S. Federal Executive* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000); James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

[101] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[102] David Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).

[103] Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

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standpoint of agency effectiveness, this is bad news. Political compromise allows opponents to sabotage the creation of new agencies from the start, and the multiple majorities required for successful legislation mean that agency problems are hard to fix.[104]

Together, these enduring realities and the history of intelligence adaptation efforts before September 11 suggest that future prospects for reforming the U.S. intelligence community are not promising. Although there is consensus about what problems need to be fixed and a greater sense of urgency since September 11, intelligence reform has only begun. The road ahead will be long. And it will be filled with the same obstacles—internal resistance, entrenched interests, and institutional barriers—that have blocked reform efforts for years. The crux of the problem lies in the enduring realities of American politics, and success requires finding ways to overcome them.*

[104] Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., *Can the Government Govern?* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1989), 185–237.

* I would like to thank Bruce Berkowitz, Richard Betts, Lynn Eden, Steve Krasner, Eric Patashnik, Charles Perrow, Scott Sagan, and the journal's anonymous reviewers for their feedback on earlier drafts and also the sixty current and former government officials who agreed to be interviewed for this project on the condition that they remain anonymous.

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Performing the Northern Ireland Peace Process on the World Stage

PAUL DIXON

In nationalist and republican, or pan-nationalist scripts, the international dimension plays a key role in explaining the emergence and "success" of the Northern Irish peace process. They argue that the end of the Cold War changed the international climate and precipitated moves to end anti-imperialist conflicts in South Africa and the Middle East. These developments made it far more difficult for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) to continue its anti-imperialist military campaign and facilitated the IRA's 1994 cease-fire. The end of the Cold War, it is argued, also prompted the British government to moderate significantly its attitude toward Northern Ireland, making possible an accommodation with republicans. The end of superpower rivalry allowed the United States to ignore its "Special Relationship" with the UK and interfere in the internal affairs of its closest ally. The United States was able to overcome British intransigence and push the process forward. The acceleration of European integration broke down distrust between the British and Irish governments and provided models for overcoming conflict. Northern Ireland could not escape the "irresistible logic of globalization."[1]

The international dimension has played a significant role in the Northern Ireland conflict, not so much in the way described by the pan-nationalist script, but in the *performance* of that script. The impact of the international on the Northern Ireland peace process has been deliberately exaggerated in the performances of pan-nationalist actors in order to persuade key republican actors and audiences to abandon the armed struggle for the unarmed struggle. A theatrical metaphor is used to show how the charade of a pan-nationalist

[1] Michael Cox, "'Cinderella at the Ball': Explaining the End of the War in Northern Ireland," *Millennium* 27 (Spring 1998): 340. This script is echoed in the accounts of republicans and nationalists and in the U.S. administration.

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front was constructed by leading actors to give these republicans the impression that there was a viable, unarmed strategy for defeating pan-unionism and achieving Irish unity. The pan-nationalist script claimed that the end of the Cold War transformed the international climate and allowed the U.S. President to play an important, if not vital role by pushing the intransigent British government and pan-unionism toward accommodation.[2] President Bill Clinton played his role in this pan-nationalist performance, which involved the "Greening" of the White House and was designed to help Gerry Adams deliver republicans to the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The British government recognized the importance of this script for delivering the IRA into a peace process and, to some extent, it acquiesced and played its role as villain in the pan-nationalist drama. If the British government believed that leading actors in the republican movement wanted to enter a peace process, then it had every interest in encouraging such a favorable development. However, the pan-nationalist performance on the world stage dramatized the apparent weakness of British pan-unionism and the international isolation of unionism, and undermined pro-Agreement unionism. The unionist audience has more favorably received the presidency of George W. Bush, but this has not resulted in the "Oranging" of the White House. In recent years, pan-nationalism, which paid a price for bringing the republican movement in from the cold, has turned on Sinn Féin and demanded that it should now complete decommissioning and disband the IRA.

This article

- First, briefly outlines the pan-nationalist script and the reasons why it deliberately exaggerates the impact of the international. Although the script was flawed, it was the powerful performance of this script on the world stage by leading actors in Britain, Ireland, and the United States that had an important impact on nationalist and unionist audiences and, therefore, affected the course of the peace process.
- Second, explains why the British, to some extent, acquiesced in this pan-nationalist performance because, behind the scenes, they realized the importance of delivering a united republican movement to any political accommodation in Northern Ireland;
- Third, explains why the pan-nationalist script exaggerated the impact of the international because it underestimated the continuities in British policy and developments in the peace process before the end of the Cold War;
- Fourth, describes how U.S. actors took their cue from Irish nationalist actors to intervene and play an important role in the pan-nationalist performance for republican audiences;

[2] Paul Dixon, "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation? The Choreography of the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *Political Studies* 50 (Autumn 2002): 731–732.

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- And finally, considers the impact of this pan-nationalist performance on the unionist audience and whether the "Greening of the White House" has been followed by its "Oranging" under President Bush.

The Nationalist Script: Bringing in International Actors

The pan-nationalist script emphasized that the peace process was a unilateral *Irish* initiative by John Hume and Gerry Adams that embraced Irish America and President Clinton, and that this powerful alliance forced a reluctant British government to gradually change its policy toward Northern Ireland and dismantle artificial barriers, such as decommissioning, that were created to prevent the advance of pan-nationalism toward a united Ireland. The purpose of this script was to give the republican leadership a convincing story to tell republican audiences about the unarmed route to Irish unity in order to persuade them to give up their armed struggle. The formation of a powerful "pan-nationalist front" comprising the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), the Irish government, and the U.S. President (and perhaps pro-nationalist elements in Britain and Europe) would help to give republicans the *appearance* of a powerful alliance that would roll back the British government.[3] In 1994, the republican leadership circulated a document called TUAS. This stood for both "Totally UnArmed Strategy" and "Tactical Use of the Armed Struggle," depending on the audience—"tactical" for the republican grass roots and "unarmed" for external opinion.[4] This included the United States and, in particular, the Irish American lobby in an Irish nationalist consensus that included the SDLP, Sinn Féin, Dublin, and the EU. The document argued, "There is potentially a very powerful Irish-American lobby not in hock to any particular party in Ireland or Britain. Clinton is perhaps the first US President in decades to be substantially influenced by such a lobby." Veteran republican Joe Cahill presented the IRA's cease-fire to republicans in the United States, in part because of President Clinton's willingness to stand up to the British and assure republicans that the British Prime Minister would negotiate in good faith.[5]

The pan-nationalist front was principally a charade—an illusion or pretence—constructed by the Irish government, the SDLP, and the U.S. President to persuade republicans that they could pursue their goals more effectively through unarmed rather than armed struggle. The power of the pan-nationalist front was to be demonstrated by real and *apparent* victories over the British government, such as the granting of Gerry Adams's first visa to

[3] Dixon, "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?"
[4] Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA* (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 423.
[5] Conor O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1996), 157.

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visit the United States. Such victories would demonstrate to skeptical Irish republicans the effectiveness of the unarmed struggle and the benefits of being aligned with the world's remaining superpower. This performance was a charade, because the real differences and tensions in the pan-nationalist front over decommissioning or distaste for the IRA were concealed in order to create an impression of unity and power for the key IRA activist audience.

The international part of the pan-nationalist script has four key elements:

- the entry of liberation movements into peace processes;
- the collapse of communism and the decline of British interest in Northern Ireland;
- the end of the Special Relationship between Britain and the United States;
- and the modernizing impact of the European Union on the conflict.[6]

Nationalists have argued that the Provisional IRA, in declaring its ceasefire in September 1994, was responding to wider changes in the international system. The PIRA built its movement along "traditional and authentically Irish lines," and so "there was no need for republicans to look outside of Ireland for inspiration or guidance." It was only later that the Provisionals built international links, particularly with the Palestine Liberation Organization and the African National Congress (ANC).[7] The end of the Cold War, the receding tide of global radicalism after 1989, and the apparent movement toward the resolution of conflicts in South Africa (the lifting of the ban on the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990) and the Middle East (the Oslo Accord of 1993) created an international climate that made the resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland "far more likely."[8]

In the post-Cold War era, the IRA's campaign could not be so easily justified. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the demise of the USSR in 1991 posed enormous problems for the republican movement's analysis of British interests in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, republicans had argued that Britain had selfish political, strategic, and economic interests in keeping Northern Ireland as part of the Union. Britain had a historic attachment to the Union as part of the British nation, and its economic control over Ireland was facilitated by occupation of the North. This also secured Britain's strategic interests by preventing the emergence of a united and neutral Ireland outside the NATO alliance. The British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, signaled a new departure by declaring in November 1990 that Britain had "no selfish strategic or economic

[6] Michael Cox, "'Bringing in the International': The IRA Ceasefire and the End of the Cold War," *International Affairs* 73 (Winter 1997): 671–693; and Cox, "Cinderella at the Ball," 325–342.

[7] Cox, "Cinderella at the Ball," 329–331.

[8] Ibid., 332.

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interest in Northern Ireland."[9] This underlined the transformation brought about by the end of the Cold War and indicated its possible implications for Northern Ireland.

The end of the Cold War also made it possible for the United States to play a far more decisive role in Northern Irish affairs. This was because the "Special Relationship" between Britain and the United States had been cemented by a common battle against the Soviet Union. The British Conservative government's skepticism of the peace process meant that the U.S. role in facilitating the peace process was crucial. The United States backed Dublin against London on several occasions, and this was vital to the IRA's 1994 cease-fire and the development of the peace process. This was because it demonstrated to nationalists that the world's only superpower was throwing its weight behind nationalism and against its traditional British ally.

Nationalists claim that closer European integration makes a united Ireland inevitable. The changing position of Ireland in Europe and changes in the structure of Europe, nationalists argue, were also important in making the peace process possible. The British and Irish governments joined the EEC (European Economic Community, forerunner of the European Union) in 1973, and this broke down distrust between the two countries. This cooperation led to the Anglo–Irish Agreement of 1985 and the 1993 Downing Street Declaration. The European Union and its institutions provided an example to Northern Ireland of the ways in which conflict could be overcome by peaceful means. The EU resulted in cooperation between former traditional enemies, such as France and Germany, and this provided a model from which the British and Irish could learn (John Hume, the former SDLP leader, employed this theme). Finally, the process of European integration is supposed to have had an impact on identity in Northern Ireland, helping to create an environment in which agreement could be reached.

The British Government and the Pan-Unionist Charade

If the British government believed that leading actors in Gerry Adams's faction in the Sinn Féin leadership were serious about bringing the republican movement into a peace process—and well-placed secret agents at senior levels in the republican movement may have been able to confirm this—then the British had every interest in seeing that these efforts were supported. The British would have to offer Adams an "honorable" way out of conflict so that he could lead a united republican movement—notorious for its splits—from armed to unarmed struggle. The British could not declare front stage that they would help Adams, because this would have broken the illusion that pan-nationalism was trying to create, damage the Sinn Féin leader's reputation with his own audience, and arouse the suspicion and anger of unionists.

[9] Ibid., 334.

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In a famous gaffe, the British Secretary of State, Patrick Mayhew, told what he thought was a private gathering of school students that the British had to help Adams carry the hard men in the republican movement with him. Otherwise he might "be replaced by someone much harder."[10] Significantly, the Ulster Unionist Party leader, James Molyneaux, privately agreed with the British government's strategy of wrapping Adams up in politics so that the republican movement would not go back to "war."[11]

The British government had to play contradictory roles. On the one hand, it had to act as "champion of the Union" to maintain the illusion of a pan-unionist front in order to counter the pan-nationalist front. Simultaneously, it had to act as a neutral arbiter to reassure republicans and nationalists that they would be fairly dealt with in any peace process. This was no easy task; the problem for the British was how to push the process forward and bring republicans to the negotiating table without alienating the unionists. The IRA and Sinn Féin are inextricably linked and were responsible for over 50 per cent of all deaths during "the troubles." Many of those killed by the IRA were unionists, making it difficult for their political representatives to negotiate with Sinn Féin.[12] Unionist audiences could take the British government's public overtures to republicans and nationalists as signs of surrender. The problem was that the pan-nationalist performance might help Adams with his republican audiences but create alarm among unionist audiences, who were terrified by the apparent power of the pan-nationalist front and its plot to bring about Irish unity. Unionists had to be reassured, because for the British (and possibly the Irish government, too), there was little point in finally bringing republicans to the negotiating table if there were no unionists there with whom to reach an accommodation.

The British government also created the illusion of a pan-unionist front to counter the image of pan-nationalism and to reassure unionists that their interests would be protected in any peace process.[13] As a "senior British source" explained, "It is the job of the British government to push the Unionists to a line beyond which they will not go; it is the job of the Irish government to pull the Republicans to a line beyond which they will not come."[14] The Conservative government had played an important, active role in pushing the peace process forward well before U.S. pressure was brought to bear. The British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King, had contacts with the Sinn

[10] *The Irish Times*, 9 January 1995.

[11] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 137; *The Independent*, 20 March 1995.

[12] Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs* (London: Pluto, 1999), 178.

[13] Dixon, "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation," 729.

[14] *The Observer*, 5 February 1995.

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Féin leader dating from 1986.[15] It was Margaret Thatcher who, shortly before her resignation in 1990, authorized back-channel contacts with Sinn Féin and who had tolerated Brooke's overtures to the republican movement. The Brooke speech, the operation of the back channel, and the Downing Street Declaration all pre-date Clinton's granting of a visa to Gerry Adams in 1994 and "the Greening of the White House."[16] Thatcher's successor as British Prime Minister, John Major (1990–1997), developed the peace process, with conciliatory speeches from the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Patrick Mayhew, and the continuation of the back channel. In spite of a diminishing majority in the House of Commons, Major signed the Downing Street Declaration in 1993 and the Joint Framework Document in 1995—the latter more particularly seen as a pro-nationalist document.

The problem for the British was that by publicly claiming a pro-active role in the peace process they could have destabilized the unionist population of Northern Ireland. The British kept their contacts with Sinn Féin secret for fear that if they were revealed, the unionists would feel they were about to betrayed and there would be an upsurge in loyalist violence as a consequence. Loyalist violence appeared to rise when they perceived that Northern Ireland's constitutional position within the UK was threatened. Unionists—who had suffered at the hands of the IRA and other republican paramilitary organizations—tended to be highly skeptical of the peace process. Because unionists had very limited international support, they also opposed external "interference" that usually favored nationalism.

British Policy: Change within Continuity

At the heart of the critique of this nationalist script is an argument that emphasizes the continuity of British policy toward Northern Ireland and the similarities between the second peace process (1994–present) and the first peace process (1972–1974), which produced the Sunningdale Agreement (1973). The Good Friday, or Belfast, Agreement (1998) is a more sophisticated document than Sunningdale, but they are comparable in that at the heart of both lies, first, power sharing and, second, the all-Ireland dimension.[17] It is usually argued that the international dimension—influences outside Britain and Ireland—played little part in bringing about the first peace process and the Sunningdale Agreement.[18] International pressure was not necessary to force

[15] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 246.

[16] Sinn Féin, *Setting the Record Straight* (Belfast: Sinn Féin, 1994).

[17] Paul Dixon, *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 285.

[18] John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2001), 199–201; Joseph E. Thompson, *American Policy and Northern Ireland* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

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the British government to sign the Sunningdale Agreement, because this was the likely ground on which a stable settlement to the conflict was to be found. This was still the case by the time of the second peace process, which suggests that although the role of the international may have been helpful, it was not necessary for reaching the Good Friday Agreement.

British policy toward Northern Ireland since the early 1970s can be seen as exhibiting a considerable degree of continuity in the pursuit of a twin-track (power sharing in Northern Ireland plus an Irish dimension) settlement, but with tactical adjustments.[19] There was no radical departure in British policy in the late 1980s or early 1990s. Peter Brooke's statements in 1989 and 1990 merely reiterated British policy in a stark way: that there was no purely military solution to the conflict and that Britain had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.[20] The British did attempt to make the first peace process inclusive by bringing in loyalist and republican paramilitaries, but at that point, republicans probably believed that they were on the verge of victory over the British and did not need to negotiate a compromise power-sharing settlement. The British had declared that they would accept the consent of the majority in Northern Ireland if they voted for Irish unity and, effectively, that Britain had no selfish strategic or economic interest. The first peace process, like the second, was marked by close cooperation between the British and Irish governments to the extent that unionists were pushed too far in negotiations and, subsequently, were unable to deliver their voters to the Sunningdale Agreement (1973).[21] There was a cooling in British–Irish relations from 1974 to 1979, but the Dublin Summit of 1980 marked a new activism in the relationship, which has produced the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), giving the South a role in the affairs of the North, the Downing Street Declaration (1993), the Joint Framework Document (1995), the Good Friday Agreement (1998), and subsequent negotiations. The continuities in British policy toward Northern Ireland suggest that the impact of the international dimension was not as significant as has been suggested. The international dimension was not as important in its impact on the perceptions of key actors as it was in the way it was used in the performance of leading republican and nationalist actors in order to persuade republican grassroots audiences to shift their tactics from armed to unarmed struggle.

The development of the EU does not appear to have had a profound impact on British or Irish policy toward Northern Ireland. It may well have had an impact on the conflict; the problem is in attempting to assess the extent of

[19] Paul Dixon, "British Policy Towards Northern Ireland 1969–2000: Continuity, Tactical Adjustment and Consistent 'Inconsistencies,'" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 3 (Autumn 2001): 340–368; Michael Cunningham, *British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969–89* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1991).

[20] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, 144–147, 285.

[21] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, 129–157.

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this impact. It is difficult to be precise, but we can cast doubt on some of the excessive claims of the "Euro-enthusiasts."[22] The aspirations of Euro-enthusiasts—attractive as they may be—have clouded their analysis of the problems facing the realization of those aspirations, resulting in an overly optimistic view of the demise of the state and nationalism. In 1988, Adrian Guelke surveyed the impact of Europe on the conflict and concluded that "the [European] Community dimension has failed to transcend sectarianism.... The EEC, far from dissolving the conflict, has internationalized it. This has worked politically to the benefit of constitutional nationalism, though not from the bottom up, but from the top down."[23] It is not argued that the EEC affected the signing of the Sunningdale Agreement, and it is therefore unlikely that it was very important to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The peace process has continued in spite of the rise of the most Euro-skeptical parties in Northern Ireland. In the British general election of June 2001, John Hume and his brand of "post-nationalism" were defeated by the "Euro-skeptical" nationalists of Sinn Féin, one of the few parties in the Republic to oppose the Nice Treaty on further European integration and therefore to be on the winning side in the referendum. Similarly, the extremely Euro-skeptical Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has now replaced the merely Euro-skeptical Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) as the leading party of unionism. The depth of the Republic's Europhilia has been thrown into question by the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001, although that verdict was overturned in 2002. Euro-enthusiasts have exaggerated the impact of the EU on the conflict in Northern Ireland. They have confused prescription with description; they may desire to see a post-nationalist future, but that should not be mistaken for a belief that that future has arrived.

British Policy and the End of the Cold War

The peace process is the result of an unfolding dynamic that cannot be separated from previous developments, and the search for a single point of origin is probably misleading. Nevertheless, there are strong arguments that developments that resulted in the peace process were already under way well before the end of the Cold War. These include:

- Sinn Féin's shift to the "long war" in the late 1970s, setting the republican movement on a more political path;
- The further emphasis on political and electoral struggle during and after the hunger strikes (1981), leading to the "ballot box and armalite" strategy;

[22] See Paul Dixon, "Northern Ireland and the International Dimension: The End of the Cold War, the USA and European Integration," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 13 (Autumn 2002): 105–120, for a critique of nationalist views on the role of the EU in the peace process.

[23] Adrian Guelke, *Northern Ireland: The International Perspective* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1988), 164.

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- That an informed commentator, Ed Moloney, dates Gerry Adams's commitment to the peace process from 1982;[24]
- The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), which gave the Irish government a say in the running of Northern Ireland. The British government's determination to face down unionist resistance to the Agreement suggested to republicans that the British were prepared to act against unionism and that unionists were not simply the dupes and puppets of British imperialism.
- Evidence of British contacts with Sinn Féin since 1986;
- That in terms of republican ideology, Sinn Féin's decision to end abstentionism in 1986 was a major development, provoking a split in the movement and the formation of Republican Sinn Féin;
- Irish government contacts with Sinn Féin (1988);
- That by the mid- to late 1980s, there was evidence that the republican movement had fought itself, both politically and militarily, into a stalemate with the British government;
- The Hume–Adams talks (1988), which initiated a debate within nationalism, with the SDLP arguing that the British had no military or economic interests in Northern Ireland and were effectively neutral. They proposed a "pan-nationalist front" to bring national and international pressure to bear on the British to persuade unionists into a united Ireland.

The impact of the end of the Cold War on republican opinion is exaggerated because there were major developments in republican thinking *before* 1989.

The end of the Cold War does appear to have had some impact on the willingness of the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to make overtures to the republican movement. The "Iron Lady" image, projected front stage, concealed a backstage channel to the IRA that had been used during the Hunger Strikes in 1981; she also gave her personal approval to secret talks with Sinn Féin in October 1990 in order to find out what was happening in the republican movement.[25] In November 1989, Peter Brooke, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, gave an important interview, in which he claimed that although the security forces could contain the IRA, he found it "difficult to envisage" their military defeat. He indicated that the British would negotiate if the IRA stopped its violence. Twelve months later, Brooke declared that Britain "had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland." Margaret Thatcher approved this last speech, whereas before the end of the Cold War, she had reservations because of the Soviet submarine threat and British access to the sea lanes of the North Atlantic—although her views on Britain's strategic interests in Ireland were probably not widely held in the British policy-making elite.

[24] Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, chapter 7.

[25] Anthony Seldon, *John Major* (London: Harper Collins, 1997); *The Guardian*, 16 October 1999.

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The republican movement had, throughout "the troubles," seen itself as part of a wider, international anti-imperialist movement. This was a script that had a powerful international resonance and could be usefully deployed in the propaganda war against the British, who have a well-known association with imperialism.[26] Public knowledge of developing peace processes in South Africa (1990) and the Middle East (1993) came *after* significant moves in the Northern Ireland peace process. The emphasis placed on these fellow national liberation movements in republican ideology—particularly in the more propaganda-friendly case of South Africa—may well have accelerated an ideological rethink, but they have to be seen in the context of developments before 1989. The IRA's anti-imperialist image continues to be cultivated and has been bolstered by its continuing public association with Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, Adams's visit to Cuba, and allegations of IRA links with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) in Colombia. The apparent upsurge of "ethnic" conflict after the end of the Cold War provided an alternative perspective on the conflict in Northern Ireland. This was less flattering to the republican movement, because comparisons with the former Yugoslavia and other ethnic conflicts could suggest that the IRA was engaged in a communal war rather than a movement for national liberation.

The argument that British policy shifted at the end of the Cold War was useful for leading Sinn Féin actors to deploy in trying to convince republican audiences that the way forward was unarmed struggle. They could claim that it was the British who had "blinked first" and made the first important concession to break the political stalemate and that it was only in response to this shift by the British that the leadership could now contemplate a response.[27] This script disguises the fact that British governments and the nationalist SDLP had long claimed that the British had no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland—or at least no *overriding* strategic interest that could not have been accommodated by an Irish government in the event of a united Ireland. This was accepted even by some leading Provisionals in the mid-1970s.[28] Brooke's interventions in 1989–1990 were restatements of British policy rather than major new developments.

The British Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, in his Guildhall Speech on 15 November 1971 stated:

> Many Catholics in Northern Ireland would like to see Northern Ireland unified with the South. That is understandable. It is legitimate that they should seek to further that aim by democratic and constitutional means. If at some future date the majority of the people in Northern Ireland want unification and express that desire in the appropriate constitutional manner, I do not believe any British government would stand in the way.

[26] Dixon, "Northern Ireland and the International Dimension," 110–111.
[27] Quoted in Cox, "Cinderella at the Ball," 334–335.
[28] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, chapters 5 and 6.

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This was underlined in the Green Paper of October 1972, in which the British government stated that:

> No UK Government for many years has had any wish to impede the realization of Irish unity, if it were to come about by genuine and freely given mutual agreement and on conditions acceptable to the distinctive communities.[29]

The interests of Britain seem primarily to have been in the stability of Ireland, and it was prepared to contemplate any settlement likely to achieve that. The British Labor Party had a strong sympathy with Irish nationalism, and in November 1971, the Labor leader and later Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, came out in favor of Irish unity. After Bloody Sunday and again in the mid-1970s, even Conservative politicians were willing to consider a range of options including repartition and Irish unity if they were likely to stabilize Ireland.[30] Implicit in republican expectations that the British were about to withdraw in the mid-70s was the belief that the British did not have an overriding interest in Northern Ireland either. The continuity in British policy during much of the recent conflict arose from what were perceived to be the requirements of stability and conflict management.

The continuity of British policy suggests that the impact of the international has been exaggerated. However, when U.S. actors took to the stage, they did play a significant role in persuading key audiences to take the peace process forward. Although President Clinton undoubtedly played a more active role during the peace process than his predecessors had, this was to some extent with the connivance of the Irish and British governments. Front stage, Bill Clinton played his role in the drama by defying the British government, but this performance was an exaggeration of reality and partly the result of backstage choreography.

The Greening of the White House: U.S. Actors Take to the Stage

President Clinton took his cue to enter the stage from key Irish nationalist actors. During Clinton's bid for the presidency, in April 1992, he pledged to give Gerry Adams a visa to enter the United States and to appoint a peace envoy to Northern Ireland. Once in power, however, Clinton accepted advice from the British and Irish governments and John Hume, as well as his own State Department, and twice refused Adams an entry visa and did not appoint a peace envoy. This was in spite of John Major's intervention on behalf of George Bush senior in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign. The British and Irish governments were working together to push the peace process forward

[29] Northern Ireland Office, *The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion* (Belfast: NIO, 1972), para. 52.

[30] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*: 120, 158–162.

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and warned off any external intervention.[31] According to the Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, on Saint Patrick's Day 1993, Clinton offered him a peace envoy, but Reynolds, who had consulted the British Prime Minister, refused and offered to explain this to Irish America.

> ... He [Clinton] was surprised at that because ... he thought there was always a traditional confrontational approach between British and Irish Prime Ministers ... and I said, yeah, that was true in the past, but not true in relation to John Major and myself because we had become very close, personal friends and a trusting relationship had built up.... I told him I'd be back to him later on in the year with a different set of proposals because, basically, what I had hoped would flow from the Downing Street Declaration ... would be ... general acceptance of the principles laid out, and then we could go to work ... on demonstrating how an alternative strategy to violence—which was what the peace process was all about—could work and could be demonstrated to work. And the first item on that ... turned out to be a visa for Gerry Adams.
>
> He thought that by offering me a peace envoy, that I would go home from Saint Patrick's Day in the White House with a big victory over British Governments and the Americans are with us.... But I didn't see it serving any more useful purpose at all and ... I refused it on that basis.[32]

For President Clinton to have entered the stage without the support of other key actors, particularly the Irish government and John Hume, could have affected his credibility with the audience. John Hume was a pivotal figure. A senior republican source said, "We couldn't get the Dublin government without Hume and we recognize we couldn't get the American government without Dublin."[33] An Irish diplomat described a similar chain reaction: "The equation was relatively simple; Adams talked to Hume, who spoke to Ted Kennedy, who spoke to Bill Clinton."[34] In November 1993, Clinton rejected a request to grant Adams a visa to visit the United States, "because of his involvement in terrorist activity." Adams had been involved "at the highest level" in devising IRA strategy.[35] Following the signing of the Downing Street Declaration, in December 1993, the Irish government, the SDLP leader John Hume, and Senator Ted Kennedy supported Adams's visa application request. This opened up the stage for the U.S. President to make his dramatic entrance. Until

[31] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 40, 50, 70, 71, 124. Reynolds argued that the British Prime Minister had stuck his neck out for peace. Advisers to Ted Kennedy and Bill Clinton emphasized the importance of developments within Britain and Ireland for Clinton's willingness to act; T.J. Lynch, *Turf Wars* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 126–127.

[32] Interview with Albert Reynolds conducted by the Brook Lapping television series *Endgame in Ireland*, BBC 2 television, 8 July 2001.

[33] Brendan O'Brien, *The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin 1985 to Today* (Dublin: The O'Brien Press, 1993), 320.

[34] Eamonn Delaney, *An Accidental Diplomat* (Dublin: New Island, 2001), 341–342.

[35] *The Irish Times*, 30 November 1993.

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the end of 1993, Hume and Kennedy had opposed issuing a visa to Adams because the time was not "ripe." According to Nancy Soderberg, Clinton's Deputy National Security Adviser, John Hume's role was vital:

> [Hume] ... has close ties with the people in the United States and for many years was a lot of our eyes and ears onto what was happening on the ground there [in Northern Ireland].... so when he told me [in] the summer of '93 that it wasn't ripe yet, he said that with a lot of credibility, and having said no, no, no, it's not ripe, when he finally said it's ripe to move forward, people listened.[36]

According to Albert Reynolds, he "could not publicly advocate that Washington should give Adams a visa because of the unfavorable impression this would make with unionists and the British government."[37] Nevertheless, "we had to prove to the republican movement that we could win an argument against Britain on the international stage, and the issue around which this centered was a visa for Gerry Adams." He explained:

> We were trying to put together an unarmed strategy to replace the violence, and we had to demonstrate that it was going to be successful as against twenty-five years of violence, which was futile and hadn't made any progress.... Consequently it was necessary to demonstrate this, so that Adams could make his case to the IRA. And there was a series of initiatives. The visa was one. The abolition of Section 31 [the ban on Sinn Féin interviews on Irish radio and television] was another.[38]

The application was opposed by the British government but also by Attorney General Janet Reno, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the FBI, and the CIA. They argued that "the Adams proposal would undermine the United States' credibility in fighting international terrorism."[39] Some members of the Republican Party attacked Clinton's dealings with terrorists. James Baker III declared that Clinton's record on Northern Ireland would be remembered as "Gullible's Travels."[40] President Clinton faced down the opposition and granted the visa to the leader of the political wing of the IRA. The President believed the United States could not lose; Adams would deliver a cease-fire or show that he was not serious about peace. G.T. Dempsey, a retired U.S. diplomat who had worked at the U.S. embassy in Dublin, argued that Clinton's decision was not a change of policy in Washington but a response to the changing situation on the ground in Northern Ireland.[41] As "honest broker,"

[36] Interview with Nancy Soderberg conducted by the Brook Lapping television series *Endgame in Ireland*.

[37] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 79, 89.

[38] Ibid., 89.

[39] Andrew J. Wilson "From the Beltway to Belfast: The Clinton Administration, Sinn Féin and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *The New Hibernia Review* 1 (Autumn 1997): 31.

[40] *Washington Post*, 11 April 1998.

[41] Wilson agreed; "From the Beltway to Belfast," 25.

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Clinton was able to take risks for peace "which the parties to the conflict, for domestic or other reasons, [could not] take."

> Political coverage is often a domestic necessity. It was no coincidence that it was in Washington that then Northern Ireland Secretary Mayhew finally met with Gerry Adams. There was more than an element of "good cop/bad cop" in all the shadowboxing at that time—more than just a hint of tacit cooperation.
>
> It was, after all, natural that the role of playing good cop with Sinn Féin should fall to us Americans.... If, as many have argued, there is no alternative to dealing with Sinn Féin ... then the key, obviously, is to co-opt Adams and his colleagues into democratic politics and to keep them so co-opted, to embed them so root-and-branch into the democratic peace process, that there can be no turning back to support for violence ....[42]

The granting of a visa to Gerry Adams and the demonstration of the power of pan-nationalism publicly angered the British government and the unionists. Clinton's National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, remarked that the response of the British government "had been less strong than we expected, at least privately ...."[43] Privately, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James Molyneaux, saw the benefit of tying the republicans into a political process; letting Adams into the United States could "do nothing but good." "It didn't seem to be an outrageous thing to do, especially after the Joint Declaration. The more you get Adams implicated in it, wrapped up in it, the more you're removing him from the hands of the gunmen."[44] Nevertheless, the U.S. administration did attempt to publicly recognize unionists in order to bring some "balance" into the process.[45]

Choreographing a Pantomime: The Adams Visa 1995

There is evidence that the British acted out a charade over the decision to grant Gerry Adams a visa for entry to the United States in 1995 to reassure important diverse audiences in Northern Ireland and take the peace process forward. In 1995, six months after the cease-fire, Adams wanted to visit the United States again, this time to raise funds for Sinn Féin. *Front stage*, the British again opposed such a move and wanted the U.S. government to use its leverage with Sinn Féin to make progress on the decommissioning of IRA weapons before all-party talks could take place. In private, however, Mayhew told U.S. officials that he wanted Sinn Féin to "seriously discuss decommissioning" rather than requiring a handover of weapons before they could enter talks. Nancy

[42] G.T. Dempsey, "The American Role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *Irish Political Studies* 14 (1999): 114–115.

[43] Interview with Tony Lake conducted by the Brook Lapping television series *Endgame in Ireland*.

[44] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 137.

[45] Ibid., 137–138.

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Soderberg described "a complete disconnect" between what Mayhew asked of the U.S. government in private (backstage) and his stronger public (front stage) statements for decommissioning later the same day when he announced the "Washington Three."[46]

Patrick Mayhew's failure to emphasize to the Americans the importance of an arms handover could be seen as a complete blunder. Or else the British government may have believed that it had room to push unionists further by taking steps to water down the conditions necessary to bring Sinn Féin into talks. *Backstage*, the British government may not have been too distressed at the decision by the U.S. President to lift the ban on Adams and allow him to raise funds. This decision would bolster the credibility of the Sinn Féin leadership's unarmed strategy in the eyes of the republican grass roots. The cease-fire would be entrenched by appearing to demonstrate the support of the most powerful government in the world for pan-nationalism. As the British Secretary of State had said to a private meeting, "To some extent we have got to help Mr. Adams carry with him the people who are reluctant to see a ceasefire."[47] Molyneaux later argued that the Adams visit to the United States had locked Sinn Féin more securely into the peace process and had made a return to violence less likely.[48]

The British government's publication of the Joint Framework Document and its weakening of the decommissioning conditions in the "Washington Three" resulted in rising Unionist and Conservative backbench dissent. In view of this, John Major needed to reassure unionists by playing his role as "champion of the Union" and the pan-unionist front. Major made a public, front-stage show of his fury at Clinton's decision over the Adams visa and refused to take the U.S. President's telephone calls for five days. Shortly after, Clinton praised Major's "courage and conviction" in pursuing peace in Northern Ireland. The British Prime Minister had taken "brave risks" in making peace "within the context in which he must operate."[49] According to a source close to Clinton, within weeks "the President had developed a genuine respect for Major and figured he was trying to do the right thing and understood why Major might need to make a gesture by not taking a phone call."[50] Clinton later reflected on the British Prime Minister's dilemma:

> He had to be critical of my visa for Gerry Adams because it put him in a very difficult position. He wasn't politically able to say anything good about it, even if

[46] Ibid., 191. Ian Paisley, the Democratic Unionist Party leader, did cast doubt on the sincerity of Major's anger at Clinton, but the problem with such "conspiracy theories" was that no conspirator would own up to them while they were going on; see *The Financial Times* 11–12 and 17 March 1995. It was only later that the possibility of a charade was hinted at by credible sources.

[47] *The Irish Times*, 9 January 1995.

[48] *The Independent*, 20 March 1995.

[49] *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 April 1995.

[50] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 219.

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> he thought it had any merit. For days he refused to take my phone calls. The press reported I was mad at him [over his support for Bush in 1992]. I was never mad with John Major though I didn't mind people thinking I was mad because you know, it always gives you a little psychological advantage.[51]

The British had little answer to Sinn Féin's argument that if they could raise money within the UK why shouldn't they be allowed to raise funds in the United States? In 1995, "Friends of Sinn Féin" raised over one million dollars in six months.

The U.S. President's high-profile rejection of the British government underlined the potential power of the pan-nationalist front and seemed to show republicans the influence they could have through unarmed struggle. Under the headline "Secret weapon sinks special relationship," Sinn Féin's newspaper *An Phoblacht* reviewed the British and Irish press to demonstrate the extent of Clinton's snub to its British ally. At the same time, Major's public display of anger at Clinton demonstrated to unionists that the British government was fighting in its corner and maintaining pan-unionist unity. The U.S. government was believed to have won Adams his first visa to the United States in 1994. But, as former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds commented, it was the appearance of a pan-nationalist victory that was more important than the reality: "*If we could be seen* to win a diplomatic argument [over the British] on the world stage, supported by Washington ... it would have been a big step forward" (emphasis added).[52] Reynolds commented later on the granting of the first visa:

> John Major told me he was taking a very strong stand on it, and I could understand that. Let Washington decide who they want to support. I convinced Washington that it was important as part of the demonstration [to republicans] of the strategy of non-violence, that it could succeed, of having a few victories here and there. Having said that, John had to be seen to be winning at times as well. We all recognized that.[53]

The image of the U.S. President coercing the British government into the peace process against its will appears to be far from accurate. The dynamics of the peace process were already under way long before Clinton's presidency. Although U.S. influence may have exerted some pressure on the British, particularly over Adams's first visa application, its effect has been deliberately exaggerated.[54] The key role played by the U.S. President was symbolic (and included a choreographed, private, then public, handshake for Adams) and important, in giving credence to the Sinn Féin leadership's strategy that the

[51] *The Guardian*, 21 June 2004.

[52] *Endgame in Ireland*.

[53] Cited in Eamonn O'Kane, "The Republic of Ireland's Policy Towards Northern Ireland: The International Dimension as a Policy Tool," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 13 (Autumn 2002): 127–128.

[54] Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 210–211.

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republican movement could more effectively advance its goals through the pan-nationalist front (including the United States) and the unarmed struggle than it could through the armed struggle.[55]

The Clinton Presidency: Internationalization and Unionist Isolation

The exaggeration of international influence on the peace process created the appearance of a powerful pan-nationalist front on the world stage. This had a benign impact on republicans and encouraged them to suspend the armed struggle, but this pan-nationalist performance raised fears in unionist audiences that the growing internationalization of the conflict had resulted in a process that was biased against an increasingly powerless and isolated unionism, with the British government as untrustworthy guarantors of their place within the Union. This inhibited the ability of pro-Agreement unionists to sustain involvement in the peace process and accommodation with nationalists.[56] This raises an intriguing question: has the exaggeration of the role of the international dimension hindered rather than helped the peace process? To what extent has the beneficial effect on nationalism been outweighed by an adverse effect on actors and unionist audiences?

Unionists have long been skeptical about if not hostile to the role of "external" actors in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, unionists have considered Northern Ireland to be an internal UK issue that should not be subject to foreign interference. The perception among influential unionists of an increasingly integrated, interdependent, and globalizing world is that this will see power pass to actors outside of Northern Ireland, many of whom are sympathetic to nationalism.[57] The unionists' international support has been very limited and is confined mainly to Scotland, Canada, and some fundamentalist Christians in the U.S. South. David Trimble, future UUP leader, a member of a party delegation to the United States shortly after the IRA's cease-fire in September 1994, said, "Our concern is to ensure that the pressures of domestic American politics do not intrude into our affairs."[58]

Nationalists, by contrast, have enjoyed some strong international support. Britain's reputation as an imperial power encourages the view that the conflict in Northern Ireland is an anticolonial struggle between British imperialists and the IRA, a national liberation movement. Republicans have sought to promote this script by equating unionists with "white" South Africans, the pieds noirs in Algeria, and (perhaps less frequently and depending on the audience) with

[55] Dixon, "Political Skills or Lying and Manipulation?"

[56] Paul Dixon, "Internationalization and Unionist Isolation: A Response to Feargal Cochrane," *Political Studies* 43 (September 1995): 497–505.

[57] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, 56–57.

[58] *The Financial Times*, 23 September 1994.

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the Israelis. Some unionists have reinforced this image by identifying with colonialists—such as the "white" Rhodesians—and against national liberation movements fighting the British Empire. The anti-imperialist perspective finds unionists on the "wrong side of history" in the context of post-war decolonization, and this delegitimizes the position of the "colonialist" unionists in Northern Ireland.[59]

The process of European integration has been a source of comfort to nationalists rather than unionists. Nationalists have increasingly welcomed the process of European integration because they argue that it will undermine the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland rather than bring the Republic back into the United Kingdom. Nationalists claim that European integration will "harmonize" policy between the North and South of Ireland. Economic integration, they suggest, will promote political integration and pave the way to a united Ireland. Unionists fear that growing European integration will empower European states that have traditionally tended to be more sympathetic to the nationalist cause than to that of unionism.[60] Surveys continue to show that unionists are less likely to think of themselves as European and more likely to be skeptical of the European Union.[61]

Unionists have long perceived the Irish state to be an obvious threat to the Union and a source of sympathy and support for northern nationalists since partition. The Irish Diaspora has spread across the globe, creating potential pools of sympathy for the nationalist cause, particularly in Australia, New Zealand, and, most importantly, the United States. During the recent conflict, U.S. presidents have generally taken a noninterventionist position on the grounds that Northern Ireland is the internal affair of a close ally. This may suggest a pro-British bias and desire to preserve the "Special Relationship." On the other hand, it may be an acknowledgement that the two states involved in the dispute are U.S. allies and for most of "the troubles" have been cooperating to find a power-sharing settlement.[62] Richard Nixon told British Prime Minister Edward Heath

> ... The agony of Ireland and England is something we don't want to exacerbate. That we just hope that we won't say anything that's gonna make it more difficult for you, but we hope you can work it out.... I don't think we should be in the position of demagoguing it ....[63]

However, since 1969, when U.S. presidents have taken to the stage to publicly intervene on Northern Ireland, they have generally done so in favor of

[59] Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[60] Guelke, *Northern Ireland*, 172.

[61] *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey*, accessed at www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/2002/Europe/NIINEU.html, 16 January 2006.

[62] Paul Dixon, "British Policy Towards Northern Ireland."

[63] James Warren, "More Nixon Tapes," *Atlantic Monthly*, September 2004, 101–104.

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the nationalist community. They have tended to have more of an electoral interest in appeasing the Irish American community by making overtures to nationalists than in supporting unionist demands. Traditionally, Irish Americans have voted for the Democratic Party, and Jimmy Carter's presidency saw a more active role for the United States. President Carter issued a statement on Northern Ireland on 30 August 1977 attacking Irish republican supporters in the United States and offering economic aid in the event of a solution to the conflict. This signaled a significant departure in U.S. policy and established a precedent for future interventions.

Republican President Ronald Reagan sought to woo Irish Americans away from the Democrats. U.S. pressure was thought to have played some role in bringing about the signing of the Anglo–Irish Agreement in 1985. Margaret Thatcher's brusque rejection of Irish proposals, known as her "Out! Out! Out!" statement, in November 1984 caused consternation. Briefing notes prepared for President Reagan's meeting with Thatcher at Camp David in December 1984 claimed that "unless there is the *appearance* of progress at the next Anglo-Irish summit, a radicalization will occur in Irish-American opinion which would endanger the current bipartisan support that our Northern Ireland policy enjoys" (emphasis added).[64] Reagan told Thatcher, "making progress [in Northern Ireland] is important" and observed that "there is great Congressional interest in this matter." Indeed, Tip O'Neill had sent him a personal letter, asking him to appeal to Mrs. Thatcher to be "reasonable and forthcoming."[65] According to Richard Needham, a Conservative minister in Northern Ireland,

> ... At any Anglo-Irish banquet, the United States is Banquo's ghost. No political initiative can be undertaken without sounding out both the US government and the Irish-American community, in particular the Kennedys.[66]

President Clinton's involvement in Northern Ireland was, then, part of a pattern of public interventions that favored nationalists. But Clinton's interest was not driven just by the Irish American vote and the pressure of important Irish American politicians such as Ted Kennedy. The Downing Street Declaration of 1993 and secret contacts between the British government and Sinn Féin may have suggested to Clinton that the conflict in Northern Ireland was moving toward resolution. Clinton's role in the process could combat isolationist voices in the United States, provide a model for further interventions in regional conflicts, and by enhancing his image as an international statesman, contribute to his reelection campaign.[67]

The U.S. President's role in creating the image of a pan-nationalist front ran the risk of "over-balancing" the peace process against unionism. As both

[64] U.S. State Department brief (Thatcher visit) 18th December 1984, Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, 199.
[65] "Thatcher–Reagan meeting at Camp David (record of conversation)," 28 December 1984.
[66] Richard Needham, *Battling for Peace* (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1998), 35.
[67] Wilson, "From the Beltway to Belfast"; O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 239.

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the British and Irish governments recognized, the goal was to bring both nationalists and unionists to the negotiating table and achieve some kind of compromise settlement. Unless unionists were also reassured and supported, then, the process would appear too pro-nationalist and prevent unionist parties from getting involved.[68] President Clinton benefited from his role in the Northern Ireland peace process by gaining the support of Irish America, but he would also win prestige for being involved in the negotiation of a historic settlement to the conflict in Ireland.

In order to give some balance to the U.S. President's pan-nationalist performance, some efforts were made to reach out to unionists and maintain contact with them.[69] For example, David Trimble was the first unionist leader to meet the U.S. President in October 1995, and he attended the Saint Patrick's Day party at the White House in March 1996. Invitations were also extended to other unionist politicians, including those of the loyalist paramilitary parties. The UUP did open an office in Washington, and there may have been a more positive attitude toward "foreign interference,"[70] or perhaps Trimble was simply recognizing a political reality. After his first meeting with the U.S. President, the Unionist leader "expressed a guarded unhappiness" with U.S. influence on the peace process. "It complicates life.... In an ideal world we would be operating in a slightly different way perhaps." The United States had a role because of the way "some Irish-Americans have behaved in terms of supporting financially and militarily, terrorism in Northern Ireland."[71]

Clinton had to play his role in the pan-nationalist front while offsetting the impact of this on unionists, maintaining the "Special Relationship" with the UK and putting pressure on the IRA to decommission. Bill Clinton's visit to Northern Ireland at the end of 1995 had to be carefully choreographed to give some reassurance to Protestants as well as Catholics. During his visit to Britain and Ireland, the U.S. President attempted to simultaneously please contrasting audiences by claiming to be Irish, Ulster Scots, and British.[72] Clinton stopped on the loyalist Shankhill, where the IRA killed ten people in a bomb attack in 1993.

> It was a gesture to Protestants who saw him only in terms of the Adams visa, and the visit took off from that moment.
>
> The President's stop looked spontaneous, but it had been carefully planned. Every move and speech had to be scrutinized for balance. If the President referred

[68] Will Hazelton, "Encouragement from the Sidelines: Clinton's Role in the Good Friday Agreement," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 11 (2000): 117. Andrew J. Wilson, "The Billy Boys Meet Slick Willy: The Ulster Unionist Party and the American Dimension to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, 1994–99," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 11 (2000): 121–137.

[69] Wilson, "The Billy Boys Meet Slick Willy".

[70] Henry McDonald, *Trimble* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 199.

[71] *The Sunday Tribune*, 5 November 1995.

[72] O'Clery, *The Greening of the White House*, 13, 17, 236.

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> to Derry, he would say it was in the County of Londonderry, thereby using the Catholic and Protestant versions of the name. If he mentioned the harp and the fiddle, typical Catholic Irish instruments, he spoke also of the fife and the Lambeg drum, favored by the Ulster Protestants.[73]

Gerry Adams "as if by chance" was able to secure a semi-public handshake with the U.S. President on the nationalist Falls Road. Tony Lake claimed that the reason for the successful visit was "the exquisite choreography that made the third act of any Mozart opera seem easy, and that was to make sure that all of the parties got equal or deserving treatment in the time they got with the President."[74]

The U.S. President deployed "creative ambiguity" toward the decommissioning deadlock to pacify conflicting audiences in the spring and summer of 1995. Clinton simultaneously gave the impression that he supported decommissioning, while only asking that republicans seriously discuss it prior to all-party talks. There were reports before Adams's 1995 visit that the United States was going to get the IRA to begin decommissioning by offering to allow Sinn Féin to raise money in the United States.[75] After the Adams visit, President Clinton urged the IRA to "take the next step" and "begin to discuss seriously getting rid of these weapons so they can never be used again."[76] The relinquishing of IRA arms "couldn't come soon enough for me." John Bruton, the Irish Taoiseach, backed Clinton's appeal to the IRA to get rid of their guns.[77] The U.S. embassy in London was also briefing the press that the White House was annoyed at the failure of Sinn Féin to pursue decommissioning and that Adams appeared to contradict the President's claim that decommissioning had been discussed during their chat at the White House.[78] In May 1995, President Clinton insisted that the IRA and loyalists had to "get rid of their bombs and bullets for good" and called for an end to punishment beatings and intimidation.[79]

The U.S. correspondent of the *Irish Times*, however, has argued that the U.S. administration did not "put serious pressure on Adams to make any concessions. Time after time the administration ... ceded to the demands of Adams's promoters on the grounds that to do otherwise would risk unraveling

[73] Ibid., 233–234.

[74] Ibid., 237.

[75] *Independent on Sunday*, 29 January 1995.

[76] *The Financial Times*, 18, 19 March 1995.

[77] Ibid.; *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 March 1995.

[78] *The Guardian*, 31 March 1995. In April, Clinton called for the early decommissioning of arms, and after meeting the British Prime Minister said, "Without a serious approach to arms decommissioning there will never be a resolution of this conflict." *The Independent*, 5 April 1995. The *Financial Times*, 21 May 1995, reported that Gerry Adams denied U.S. officials had put pressure on him to make a move on arms decommissioning, but this contradicted assurances given to Major.

[79] *The Independent*, 26 May 1995.

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the peace process."[80] He claimed that the White House was finessing policy: "In every reference to the issue during the rest of the year, Clinton never publicly went beyond asking Sinn Féin to 'seriously discuss' decommissioning."[81] On 20 June 1995, Clinton's press secretary said the U.S. view was that there should be "serious discussions on decommissioning of weapons—actual progress on decommissioning" but would not be drawn on whether weapons should be handed over before negotiations could begin: "We're encouraging them to make progress."[82] On 25 July 1995, Clinton wrote to Bruce Morrison, Chair of Americans for a New Irish Agenda, arguing that "... Sinn Féin must begin to discuss the issue [of decommissioning] seriously." Irish republicans interpreted this to mean that Clinton did not think that decommissioning should start until talks began. An anonymous Sinn Féin representative claimed that Clinton was "against current British policy on arms handovers. Clinton is our ally."[83]

While publicly the British government was insisting upon decommissioning, privately they appear to have been less concerned than the Ulster unionists about it.[84] In this way, the U.S. administration's Irish policy could be spun differently to placate very different audiences. The British and unionist audiences could see the White House putting pressure on Sinn Féin over decommissioning, while the republican and nationalist audiences could be told that U.S. policy was in defiance of the British. In 1996, the U.S. administration supported the compromise of elections and all-party talks to break the decommissioning deadlock shortly before the IRA broke its cease-fire. Clinton later opposed the nationalist boycott of the Forum, which was to be a route, through elections, to all-party talks.[85]

The limits of U.S. influence on the republican movement were demonstrated by the IRA's continuing refusal to decommission and the end of its cease-fire in February 1996. But the "backstage" reality of the United States attempting to push the republicans to decommission and largely acting in support of British policy may have been concealed from unionist audiences by Clinton's "front-stage" performance for pan-nationalism. The *Irish Times* reported that by November 1996, U.S. involvement in the peace process had to be discreet enough to prevent a backlash from unionists. It believed its role was to back the two governments and not to be seen as favoring either nationalists or unionists.[86]

[80] O'Clery *The Greening of the White House*, 194, 223.

[81] Ibid., 195.

[82] White House Report, 20 June 1995.

[83] *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 August 1995. *USA Today*, 28 August 1995 reported that Clinton favored discussion of decommissioning during talks rather than before them; this was denied by the White House.

[84] Dixon, *Northern Ireland*, 254–259.

[85] Ibid., 260–261: *The Irish Times*, 25 March 1996.

[86] *The Irish Times*, 22 May 1997.

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The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was one of Clinton's major foreign policy successes and an apparent vindication of his internationalist approach and intervention in regional conflicts. President Clinton was publicly associated with the final negotiations leading up to the Good Friday Agreement, and he was able to claim credit for his involvement in the peace process. The U.S. President made phone calls to key actors to encourage them to support the deal, and he was subsequently praised for his powers of persuasion. The President's role needs to be put in perspective: the influence of the United States was not required to bring about Sunningdale in 1973, so it is arguable that although it may have been helpful, it was not essential for the negotiation of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.[87]

The U.S. President's role in the Northern Ireland peace process, in spite of its shift toward a more centrist position between unionists and nationalists, had an adverse impact on unionists. During the referendum campaign that followed to ratify the Good Friday Agreement, Unionist leader David Trimble warned Clinton to stay away from Northern Ireland: "I would certainly prefer it if Bill Clinton arrived here after the referendum than before. I would not want people here to feel they are being dictated to by some foreign power or, indeed, that anything improper is being done to influence their decision."[88] Clinton did not go to Northern Ireland to speak in support of the referendum because he "didn't want to give Ian Paisley any ammunition to attack me as an outsider telling the Northern Irish what to do."[89] Paisley, by 2003 leader of the dominant party of unionism in Northern Ireland, accused the U.S. President of pro-nationalist bias and of being "the arch-sponsor of Irish Republican terrorism...."[90] According to the *Irish Times*, the U.S. administration played down Clinton's role in the talks "in case it could be seen as undue outside interference and arouse unionist suspicions of American intentions."[91]

Opinion polls suggest that Catholics were more favorably disposed toward U.S. interest in Northern Ireland than Protestants. A Coopers and Lybrand poll published in January 1996 shortly after the Clinton visit to Northern Ireland found that a majority felt that the visit had contributed to moving the peace process forward, although Catholics were much more enthusiastic than Protestants. Eighty percent of Catholics thought that the visit contributed toward peace, whereas just 53 percent of Protestants did (overall 64 percent to 36 percent).[92] A poll for the *Sunday Times* in September 1996 found that 75 percent of Catholics and 26 percent of non-Catholics interviewed thought

[87] John Dumbrell, *A Special Relationship*, 199–201.

[88] *Sunday Telegraph*, 19 April 1998.

[89] Bill Clinton, *My Life* (New York: Knopf, 2004), 787.

[90] Ian Paisley, "Peace Agreement—or Last Piece in a Sellout Agreement?," *Fordham International Law Journal* 22 (April 1999): 1274–1275.

[91] *The Irish Times*, 11 April 1998.

[92] *Sunday Tribune*, Coopers and Lybrand Poll published 14 January 1996.

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American interest in Northern Ireland was a help to securing a settlement. Sixty-four percent of non-Catholics and 14 percent of Catholics thought it was a hindrance.[93] A survey conducted in 1998 found that 93 percent of Catholics found the U.S. government to be "very or quite helpful" in the search for peace compared with 55 percent among Protestants.[94]

The British government's role in the peace process has, combined with the internationalization of the conflict, emphasized the isolation of unionism.[95] The British government has been caught between two roles—on the one hand, that of champion of the Union and ally in the pan-unionist front and on the other, neutral arbiter between unionists and nationalists in the peace process. Opinion polls indicate that the British government may have paid too much attention to neutrality and not enough attention to delivering to unionism, thereby exacerbating unionists' sense of isolation. A poll published in October 1999 showed that Catholics and Protestants trusted the British government equally, whereas Protestants trusted the Irish government less than Catholics did.[96] By November 2003, a poll showed that Catholics were more likely to have confidence in the British and Irish governments than were unionists; 49 percent of Catholics had at least a little confidence in the British government, whereas 46 percent had not very much or none at all. The figures for Protestant confidence in the British government were 46 percent who had at least a little confidence in the British government, whereas 51 percent had not very much or none at all. Seventy-one percent of Catholics had a lot or a little confidence in the Irish government, whereas only 23 percent of Protestants did.[97]

The Oranging of the White House?

There has been greater comfort for unionists in scripts about ethnic conflict and terrorism than imperialism. The apparent upsurge in ethnic conflict in the post-Cold War world has brought to prominence a script through which the conflict is seen as one between communal groups, with an emphasis on internal dynamics. This can be more flattering to unionists than the anti-imperialist script, which often writes unionists completely out of the drama by emphasizing the battle between the British state and the IRA. The peace process in Northern Ireland has been looked to as a model for resolving conflict elsewhere. Tony Blair invited the U.S. President to Northern Ireland to underline its appropriateness as an example for resolving the Middle East conflict.[98] The

[93] Quoted in *Irish Political Studies* 12 (1997): 190.

[94] Quoted in Roger MacGinty and John Darby, *Guns and Government: The Management of the Northern Ireland Peace Process* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 117.

[95] Dixon, "Internationalization and Unionist Isolation."

[96] Colin Irwin, *The People's Peace Process in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 241.

[97] *Belfast Telegraph*, 14 November 2003.

[98] John Kampfner, *Blair's Wars* (London: The Free Press, 2003), 177–178.

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Nobel Peace Prize was jointly awarded to John Hume, the nationalist leader, and David Trimble, winning the Ulster Unionist Party leader a newly found, international respectability for his community.

The portrayal of the conflict in Northern Ireland as part of a battle against terrorism has international resonance and is also a favorable script for Ulster unionists. Some unionists have flown Israeli flags in support of the repressive measures that have been taken against Palestinians, whereas republicans fly Palestinian flags. Members of the Clinton administration, including Secretary of State Warren Christopher, were concerned that their role in the Northern Ireland peace process bestowed legitimacy on Gerry Adams and could undermine the credibility of the U.S. fight against international terrorism. When the IRA was found to be buying arms in Florida, there was evidence that Bill Clinton turned a blind eye to the incident in order to help the peace process along.[99]

The election of George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, and the declaration of the "War on Terrorism" have, arguably, made the international climate more favorable to unionism. Before September 11, there were reports that the United States was downgrading its input into the peace process, and Bush indicated to Blair that he would only intervene at Britain's request.[100] President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair had both had their "bounce" from the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, and there may not have been much further applause to be gained for the Bush administration by involvement in Northern Ireland. The IRA's alleged links to the FARC movement in Colombia came to light in the summer of 2001 when three alleged IRA men (including the party's envoy to Cuba) were arrested in Colombia and charged with training the guerrillas in the use of explosives and in urban terrorism. This was serious for Sinn Féin, because the FARC is second only to al Qaeda on the U.S. government's list of terrorist enemies and the FARC had welcomed the attacks of September 11. A U.S. Congressional investigation concluded in April 2002 that members of the IRA were training Colombian guerrillas in urban terrorism and posed a direct threat to the United States and the stability of the region. There was doubt about the extent to which the Sinn Féin leadership knew of the IRA's activities in Colombia, and there were those who wished the United States to turn a blind eye to the matter, as it had to the IRA's Florida gun running.

> Some apparently would hope this matter would disappear so as to not impede shared governance in Northern Ireland. The United States does *not* have the luxury of turning a blind eye when American lives and national interests are put at risk by IRA activity in Colombia. Colombian authorities believe that the rapidly escalating casualties they have suffered from terrorist attacks since the FARC safe

[99] *The Observer*, 22 July 2001; *The Irish Times*, 27 October 2001.
[100] *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 March 2001.

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haven was ended in early 2002 are in substantial measure attributable to these IRA training activities.[101]

The U.S. envoy to Northern Ireland, Richard Haass, told Adams, "If any American, service personnel or civilian, is killed in Colombia by the technology the IRA supplied then you can f___ off."[102] Sinn Féin also opposed the invasion of Iraq. Richard Perle, Chair of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board, called Sinn Féin "an enemy of US interests."[103] The three alleged IRA men were acquitted of the charge of training FARC in April 2004, but this verdict was later overturned.[104]

The Irish republican movement has struggled since the early seventies to reconcile two very different audiences: on the one hand, conservative Irish America and, on the other, domestic revolutionary, socialist republicans. In the early seventies, Sinn Féin speakers visiting the United States were told: "There should be copious references to the martyrs of 1916.... By no means should anything be said against the Catholic Church and all references to socialism should be strictly avoided." Several recent events have damaged the relationship of republicans with conservative Irish American audiences: the alleged links between FARC and the IRA, Gerry Adams's visit to Cuba in December 2001, and Sinn Féin's opposition to U.S. imperialism, the "war on terrorism," and the war in Iraq. After September 11, Sinn Féin's newspaper, *An Phoblacht*, launched an attack on U.S. foreign policy, denouncing the "militaristic and aggressive policy pursued by US governments" in the Middle East and Central America, which had led to "the deaths of many thousands of innocent people."[105] Niall O'Dowd, owner of the Irish American newspaper *Irish Voice*, expressed the "considerable shock and anger in the Irish-American community over Irish criticism of the United States and the war to defeat those who carried out September 11th." He criticized Irish demands for "war by the Marquis of Queensbury rules ... when we are facing the deadliest enemy since Hitler.... As Dante has stated, the hottest place in hell will be reserved for those who remain neutral in a time of moral crisis. Ireland is in danger of entering that circle of the damned."[106]

The September 11 atrocity has further delegitimized the use of terrorism, and this has serious implications for the IRA and for Sinn Féin's tactics, making less likely U.S. tolerance for its terrorist activities. It has become more

[101] U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, "Summary of Investigation of IRA Links to FARC Narco-Terrorists in Colombia," 24 April 2002, accessed at www.house.gov/international_relations/107/findings.htm, 16 January 2006.

[102] *The Guardian*, 28 October 2001.

[103] *Belfast Telegraph*, 5 November 2002.

[104] *The Guardian*, 17 December 2004.

[105] *New York Post*, editorial, 10 November 2002. See Henry McDonald, "The Two Faces of Adams," *The Observer*, 6 April 2003; *The Irish Times*, 27 October 2001.

[106] "Stuck in Neutral: Ireland's Smug America-Bashers," *The Irish Times*, 19 December 2001. There was a similar impact on Republican Congressman Peter King; *The New York Sun*, 22 June 2005.

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difficult for states or nonstate actors to endorse or covertly support terrorist methods: "Apparent support of terrorism can now be more effectively criticized and its supporters embarrassed."[107] According to the anti-imperialist script, the IRA is a national liberation movement fighting a legitimate struggle against the forces of British imperialism. In the human rights script of the early nineties, the republicans could draw analogies between the unjustifiable repression of the human rights of the minority in Northern Ireland and other minorities across the globe. However, the script of the "war on terrorism" strengthens states and delegitimizes terrorist organizations. The IRA, in this script, is not a national liberation movement akin to the ANC but a terrorist organization that uses tactics comparable to those of al Qaeda. The "war on terrorism" is partly a propaganda war to mobilize world audiences and actors against terrorism and marginalize those who employ terrorist methods.[108] Distinctions between the terrorism of the IRA and that of al Qaeda are likely to be lost in the crudity of such a propaganda war. The leaders of the British Conservative Party and the Ulster Unionist Party argued that "there's no such thing as a 'good' terrorist, Mr Blair" and "there is not, and never can be, any moral distinction made between terrorists or terrorism. What happened in America is the same as that which has been carried out in the United Kingdom, and in particular in Northern Ireland."[109] The script on human rights has shifted too; in the aftermath of September 11, it is more apparent that it is not just states that are responsible for violations of human rights but also nonstate actors such as the family, tribe or "the self-proclaimed representative of the oppressed."[110] In this context, the costs to the IRA or other Irish terrorist groups of returning to violence could well be significantly higher than in the past.

Shortly after September 11, the IRA finally decommissioned an unknown quantity of weapons. The IRA's refusal to disarm further and its association with other international terrorist groups has not endeared it to the U.S. President or Irish America.[111] The pan-nationalist front has demanded further IRA moves on disarmament as payback from republicans for their "leg-up" into democratic politics, which has seen Sinn Féin emerge as the principal nationalist party in Northern Ireland and make significant electoral gains in the Republic of Ireland. The IRA has decommissioned some weapons on three occasions but has refused to reveal the quantity, and therefore the significance, of these gestures. In Northern Ireland, unionists have been urged by the two

[107] Robert O. Keohane, "The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalitional Politics" in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds In Collision* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 141.

[108] Keohane, "The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism."

[109] *The Daily Telegraph*, 21 November 2001.

[110] Fred Halliday, "A New Global Configuration" in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds., *Worlds In Collision* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 239.

[111] John Lloyd, "Sinn Féin Could Win the Peace," *New Statesman*, 28 October 2002.

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governments to share power with Sinn Féin, yet in the Republic, the leading parties have refused to share power with that party because it has a private army. George Bush's right-wing presidency may provide some reassurance to Ulster's unionists that the nationalist, or at least Irish republican, tide in the United States is ebbing. David Trimble, the UUP leader, has expressed his preference for Bush over Clinton.[112] After meeting U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Trimble optimistically concluded that the new U.S. administration was not interested in "micro managing regional disputes," and he had no doubt "that the days of moral equivalence in Washington between terrorists and democrats are well and truly over." A Trimble adviser expressed hopes for the "Oranging" of the White House.[113] The Bush administration claimed that it was now acting as an honest broker and guarantor of both nationalist and unionist interests, by implication suggesting that the Clinton administration was pro-nationalist.[114]

The White House has not been "Oranged," and unionists have complained that the U.S. envoy's attack on the British government for canceling the May 2003 election—in spite of the IRA's refusal to provide further decommissioning—indicates that the Bush administration believes there are Irish American votes to be won on the issue. The "leak" of an e-mail by U.S. Special Envoy Mitchell Reiss criticizing Orange marches in the run-up to the U.S. presidential elections may also be interpreted as a play for the Irish American vote. According to one report, 52 percent of Catholics voted for Bush, rising to 61 percent among practicing Catholics.[115] The victory of the hard-line DUP at the November 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election and the May 2005 Westminster general election brought home to all audiences the lessening of support for the Agreement among unionists.[116] The DUP had criticized the British government for the contrast between their enthusiastic participation in the "war on terrorism" and their appeasement of IRA terrorists. Dr. Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP, criticized U.S. envoy Richard Haass for being "very, very favorable to the IRA" during his involvement in Northern Ireland. However, Haass did have "an extremely productive and constructive meeting" with the DUP's "more pragmatic" deputy leader.[117]

In December 2004, a deal between the DUP and Sinn Féin broke down, in part because the IRA wanted to continue their criminal activities. Sinn Féin found itself isolated without the protection of pan-nationalism. All the other significant actors—the British, Irish, and U.S. governments, unionists, and Irish

[112] *The Observer*, 14 March 2004. In a telephone poll for the unionist *Newsletter*, 94 percent preferred Bush to Clinton.

[113] *Belfast Telegraph*, 20 February 2001.

[114] *The Guardian*, 12 January 2002.

[115] *Irish Independent*, 2 April 2005.

[116] Paul Dixon, "'Peace within the Realms of the Possible?': David Trimble, Unionist Ideology and Theatrical Politics," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16 (Autumn 2004): 462–482.

[117] *Belfast Telegraph*, 4 December 2003.

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nationalists north and south—turned on Sinn Féin, blaming it for the breakdown of the deal. A raid on the Northern Bank in Belfast in December 2004, when robbers escaped with forty-seven million dollars, highlighted the question of the IRA's criminal activities. Subsequently, both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Irish police alleged that the IRA had carried out the robbery. The murder of Robert McCartney in January 2005, allegedly by members of the IRA, dramatized the issue of the IRA's criminality at a time when it had become a major block to the peace process and the restoration of devolution. McCartney's murder was not without precedent, but previously, the British and Irish governments had turned a blind eye to such incidents as the IRA's "domestic housekeeping." In the United States, key actors such as Ted Kennedy, who had helped to bring Sinn Féin into pan-nationalism, attacked the republicans and gave support to the sisters and partner of Robert McCartney. For the first time in ten years, Gerry Adams was not invited to the White House for Saint Patrick's Day; however, neither were any of the constitutional political parties. There were reports from a "senior presidential adviser" that the Bush administration saw Adams as the Irish Yasser Arafat, unreliable and unable to fully commit to a final peace deal.[118] The 2005 Westminster general election confirmed the dominance of the hard-line parties, the DUP and Sinn Féin, over their moderate rivals, the SDLP and UUP. On 28 July 2005, the IRA declared that it was abandoning its armed campaign. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning stated on 26 September 2005 that the IRA's arsenal of weapons, explosives, and ammunition had been put beyond use in a massive decommissioning operation.

Conclusion

The argument presented here is that *the international dimension does have an impact on the conflict in Northern Ireland.* The pan-nationalist script emphasized the role of the international in the Irish peace process as a way of persuading key republican audiences to replace the armed struggle with the unarmed struggle. Although there are great difficulties in assessing the role of the international, we can at least cast doubt on some of the more excessive claims for its effect. The continuity in British policy during the recent conflict is highlighted by the similarities between the first (1972–1974) and second (1994–present) peace processes, which produced comparable settlements at Sunningdale (1973) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998). The origins of the Northern Ireland peace process lie well before the end of the Cold War or the peace processes in South Africa and the Middle East, although these developments may well have been helpful.

The pan-nationalist script of the role of the international in the Northern Ireland peace process is unconvincing but the *performance* of this script did

[118] *Sunday Telegraph*, 13 March 2005.

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have an important impact. Pan-nationalists deliberately exaggerated the impact of the international in their performance on the political stage in order to persuade important republican audiences to abandon the armed struggle for the unarmed, pan-nationalist road to Irish unity. President Clinton and other U.S. actors performed to a pan-nationalist script—that saw the apparent "Greening of the White House"—on the political stage to persuade an important section of the republican audience to support unarmed rather than armed struggle. The performance of the United States in the Northern Ireland peace process has been a dimension of that country's "soft power," its ability to persuade and influence foreign, Irish republican, and nationalist audiences.[119] Once the republicans were embroiled in a cease-fire and a peace process, pan-nationalists could scale back their expectations from Irish unity to accommodation with unionism.

The British government had every interest in seeing that the Adams faction in the republican leadership was successful in delivering a united movement to a peace process and was prepared to play its role in the charade to provide republicans with an "honorable" way out of violence. It therefore played the role of the villain in the pan-nationalist performance and played down Britain's more positive role in attempting to bring republicans into the peace process. The British government's feigned outrage at pan-nationalism was designed to calm unionist fears of the developing peace process by creating the illusion of a pan-unionist front to counter the alarm created by the apparent advance of pan-nationalism.

The pan-nationalist performance has had an adverse effect on the unionist audience, emphasizing their isolation and powerlessness. The British government has compounded this by failing to perform in a sufficiently supportive pan-unionist way for Ulster unionists. The British have been reluctant to counter the pan-nationalist performance—first, because it has been useful for sustaining republican involvement in the peace process; and second, because emphasizing the role of the British government in choreographing the peace process could well raise unionist fears of other "backstage" maneuvers by "perfidious Albion" that might betray the Union. The replacement of Clinton with George W. Bush as U.S. President, and the political climate following September 11 have been more favorable to unionism, but this has not resulted in the "Oranging" of the White House. The internationalization of the Northern Ireland peace process may have facilitated the IRA and Sinn Féin's movement toward democratic politics but at the cost of "unbalancing" the peace process, isolating unionism, and undermining Trimble's pro-Agreement unionists.*

[119] Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

* I would like to acknowledge Professor Mick Cox for his generosity in encouraging the development of the argument in this article and the constructive comments of the anonymous referees.

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

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

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

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

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Presidents and the Congressional War Resolutions of 1991 and 2002

GARY R. HESS

In leading the United States into wars with Iraq, Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush sought and gained congressional resolutions authorizing the use of force. These "prior authorization" resolutions granted the Presidents the ultimate decision for war. In the first instance, the President took that step within three days, and in the second, he took the country to war five months later.

Congressional–executive interaction over war making in 1991 and 2002 reflected the fifty-year tradition of the "prior authorization" resolution and its unintended accentuation of presidential power. President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated the "prior authorization" resolution out of his respect for Congress's constitutional authority to declare war. He believed that President Harry S. Truman had made a mistake in taking the country to war in Korea without congressional approval. He wanted executive–legislative collaboration in crises in which there was a risk of military confrontation.[1] In 1955 and 1957, Eisenhower proposed war resolutions directed at crises in the Taiwan Straits and the Middle East, respectively. Congress approved the resolutions, which gave him "prior authority" to use force should he deem it necessary. Eisenhower never invoked the authority. The three most recent resolutions, however, preceded presidential decisions for war, beginning with the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing Lyndon B. Johnson's war against North Vietnam and continuing with the resolutions for the wars against Iraq. These resolutions have thus provided the constitutional justification for America's wars of the last forty years.

[1] Louis Fisher, *Presidential War Power* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 107–127.

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Although initiated in the interest of ensuring respect for Congress's role in war making and executive–congressional cooperation, and despite the record of congressional approval, a history of the resolutions exemplifies—as Edward Corwin famously described it—how "the Constitution ... is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy."[2] In Congress, proponents of executive power and defenders of congressional war-making prerogatives have been troubled by the resolutions' political and constitutional implications. The "strong presidency" advocates—who have shifted from "liberal internationalists" during the early Cold War to "conservative unilateralists" in recent decades—have considered such resolutions a political annoyance, not a constitutional necessity. Supporters of preserving congressional power to declare war—whose core political constituency has shifted from conservative to liberal—have resented the resolutions as preemptive presidential "blank checks."

The influence of the "strong presidency" advocates within Congress, who have made it impossible for the "blank check" critics to resist the erosion of the war-making power, reflects political more than constitutional factors. The prerogatives of the president during a crisis—the powers to control diplomacy, to deploy the armed forces, to use the White House as "bully pulpit," and to determine the timing of a request for a war resolution—work to his enormous advantage in dealing with Congress. He benefits as well from party loyalty—the inclination of congressional members of his own party to support his policies and his claims of presidential war-making power. Hence, a practice that was initiated in the interest of recognizing and enhancing congressional authority has ironically contributed to the growth of presidential power at the expense of Congress.[3]

The legacy of the Vietnam era has shaped the recent presidential–congressional relationship over war making. It has especially contributed to presidential claims of ultimate war-making authority. As the Vietnam War divided the country, a growing number of congressmen and senators questioned the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution's legitimacy as an authorization for war.

[2] Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers, 1787–1957* (New York: New York University Press, 1957), 171.

[3] Harold Hongju Koh, "Why The President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs" in *The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy*, David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 158–180. The literature on presidential–congressional relations on war making is extensive; for overviews, see: Fisher, *Presidential War Power*; Michael J. Glennon, *Constitutional Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, eds., *The U.S. Constitution and the Power to Go To War: Historical and Current Perspectives* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994); Donald L. Westerfield, *War Power: The President, the Congress, and the Question of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996). On the Formosa and Middle Eastern resolutions, see: William Conrad Gibbons, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships*, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 343–349; Philip J. Briggs "Congress and the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine, 1957" in Joann P. Krieg, ed., *Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987), 249–269.

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In response, spokesmen for the administration reminded congressional critics of the open-ended authorization that they had given Johnson (asking pointedly what more a formal declaration of war would have provided), and Johnson publicly denied that he needed the authorization that Congress had provided in 1964.[4] The executive branch thus had it both ways: it proclaimed that the Commander in Chief power enabled the president to wage war in any event, but that the war-authorizing resolution was equivalent to a war declaration, even though it was not necessary. The defiant attitude toward Congress's war-making power was reinforced by the stand-off between Congress and the president over the War Powers Resolution (WPR), which was passed over President Richard Nixon's veto in 1973 and whose constitutionality has been denied by Nixon's successors.[5] An unintended consequence of the WPR has been the repeated presidential assertions, when engaging U.S. forces overseas or threatening to do so, of unlimited war-making power. In the two most recent resolutions, the executive's draft made no reference to the WPR, but Congress insisted on adding references to it before approving the war resolutions.

Although Bush I and Bush II denied the constitutional necessity of congressional approval, domestic and international political imperatives ultimately led them to go to Congress. In doing so, both exercised their power shrewdly, timing requests to Congress to work to their advantage, playing their political hands to gain bipartisan support, and using the "bully pulpit" to enlist public backing.

Although the two presidents offered comparable claims of ultimate presidential war-making authority, they differed in the ways in which they dealt with Congress. This reflected a significant difference in their relative strength at home. In both 1991 and 2002, the "lessons" of the most recent war influenced the changing position of the Democratic Party leadership and most of its rank-and-file toward the "prior authorization" resolution. In 1991, the sense that Congress had been manipulated into granting Lyndon Johnson authority to wage war in Vietnam contributed to strong Democratic Party opposition to the Persian Gulf War Resolution. Realizing the risks of failing in any request for a resolution, Bush I consistently denied that he needed congressional approval. In 2002, the success of that first war against Iraq had an intimidating effect on the Democratic leadership, which immediately endorsed the war resolution, thus ensuring its passage by substantial majorities. This bipartisan support enabled Bush II to adopt an accommodating position and to downplay, but

[4] Gibbons, *The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War*, vol. 2, 402–407 and vol. 4, 213–259, 306–313, 546–592. On the constitutional issues raised by the Vietnam war, see also: John Hart Ely, *War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Randall B. Woods, ed., *Vietnam and the American Political Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Francis D. Wormuth, *The Vietnam War: The President versus the Constitution* (Santa Barbara, CA: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1968).

[5] Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 128–174.

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without compromising, his claims of ultimate war-making power. In sum, Bush I's road to war was that of a president on the "defensive" politically, whereas Bush II's ability to co-opt the Democratic Party leadership underlined a president enjoying a degree of influence reminiscent of the "imperial presidency."

Bush I, Congress, and the Gulf Crisis

When President George H.W. Bush resurrected the "prior authorization" resolution, war—unlike the situation in the earlier presidential requests—was imminent. It came after five months of mounting tension between the United States and Iraq. During the first few weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Bush built international support for United Nations-imposed sanctions against Iraq. At home, he enjoyed strong congressional and popular backing for his policy, including the dispatch of U.S. forces to defend Saudi Arabia. Fully 80 percent of Americans approved of his handling of the crisis, but they were almost evenly divided over using U.S. troops other than in defense of Saudi Arabia.[6]

In mid-September, as Bush and his advisers began contemplating the use of force to liberate Kuwait, they recognized that this would be a controversial step. Bush's diary entry of 13 September underlined his concerns and an effort to draw from the "lessons" of Vietnam: "My gut wonder is, how long will they be with us? How long will the Senate stay supportive, or the House? Once there starts to be erosion, they're going to do what Lyndon Johnson said: they painted their asses white and ran with the antelopes." Bush drew upon his recollection of Johnson's leadership on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as a model. He wrote:

> I wanted to find a way to get Congress on board with an unmistakable show of that support for what we were doing and what we might have to do. Early in September I had asked [White House counsel] Boyden Gray to look into how Lyndon Johnson at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 had worked hard to get individual members of Congress, and Congress itself, to go on record in support of what he was doing in Vietnam. He urged joint hearings of the committees on foreign relations and armed services in both Houses, and asked Congress to insist on roll calls so the record would be complete. In the end, he got a unanimous vote out of the House - 414 [sic] to 0- and a Senate count of 88 to 2. I realized the Vietnam War was different, but his effort made a big impression on me, and I began to think about seeking a similar congressional vote of support.[7]

[6] George Gallup, Jr. and Frank Newport, "The Persian Gulf Crisis: American Opinion Throughout the Month of August," *Gallup Poll Monthly* (August 1990): 7–9, 14–19; John Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 17–36.

[7] George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 371–372.

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Bush, however, did not seek a resolution until January 1991. To some extent, this delay resulted from Congress's unsolicited early backing, manifest in the passage of similar resolutions in the House and Senate in early October that supported his objective of reversing aggression and the imposition of sanctions against Iraq; the resolutions, however, also called for continued efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Most of the Democratic Party majority in Congress was known to be opposed to the use of force to liberate Kuwait, so as Bush planned for shifting the U.S. military mission in Saudi Arabia from the defense of that country to an offensive capability, he was aware that such a step would undermine his support. On 8 November, while Congress was in recess, he authorized a doubling of the U.S. military presence, which was necessary for an offensive operation. That was followed by a diplomatic campaign, spearheaded by Secretary of State James Baker, to line up Security Council support for Resolution 678 authorizing UN members "to use all necessary means" to restore regional peace and security if Iraq failed to comply with earlier resolutions to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991.[8]

These steps strained relations with Congress. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) issued an ultimatum: if Bush wanted war, he would have to request a congressional declaration; there was no constitutional authority for him to act without it.[9] Fifty-three House Democrats and one senator filed a suit in federal court to prohibit Bush from using force without congressional authorization.[10] Republicans, who were supportive of Bush's threat to use force, were themselves disturbed by what seemed to be indifference to congressional prerogatives. Moreover, congressional hearings found a number of former civilian and military officials questioning the wisdom of Bush's military plans. During those hearings, Senator Sam Nunn, the respected Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, posed the fundamental question of those urging caution. He asked administration officials: "If we have a war, we are never going to know whether [sanctions] have worked, are we? That's the major point here."[11] So by the time that the UN Security Council gave near unanimous support to Resolution 678 on 29 November, Bush had concluded that a congressional resolution would probably fail.

[8] Gary R. Hess, *Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 153–184.

[9] Robert J. Spitzer, "The Conflict Between Congress and the President over War," in Marcia Whicker et al., eds., *The Presidency and the Persian Gulf War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), 29.

[10] Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 148–153; David Gray Adler, "Court, Constitution, and Foreign Affairs," in David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., *The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 19–56.

[11] Carroll J. Doherty, "Congress Faces Grave Choices As Clock Ticks Toward War," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Review* (hereafter *CQWR*) 49 (5 January 1991): 10.

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The Assertion of Presidential War-Making Power

Determined to implement the Security Council mandate, and facing criticism at home and overseas for "rushing to war," Bush embarked on a dual strategy: he proposed going "an extra mile for peace" through direct high-level U.S.–Iraqi talks, although making clear that the United States would not negotiate the UN demand for unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; at the same time, he became more assertive of presidential war-making prerogatives. In several public statements, he skirted the constitutional questions, but conceded nothing to Congress. At a press conference on 30 November, the President said that he would welcome a sign of congressional support for the UN resolutions. Yet when asked about his obligations to Congress, he spoke only of "full consultation" and claimed greater consultation than any previous president but said that he could not meet with all 535 members. Pushed on whether he was resisting majority rule, Bush talked about the separation of powers and his recognition of the "limits of the presidency," but closed by stating that "I know what the responsibilities of the President are, and I am fulfilling those responsibilities."[12] When asked by a reporter on 18 December whether he could initiate war without a congressional declaration, Bush spoke of "having the darnedest consultations with Congress ... [the last of which] leaders told me ... was the best ... they'd ever had."[13] Pressed on the same issue four days later, Bush said:

> I want Congress fully on board. I'd love to see Congress say this minute that we fully endorse the United Nations resolutions and the President should fully implement them, because I'm very determined to do that and it would be very nice to send that solid signal out to [Saddam Hussein].... The Congress is a separate body. They are entitled to do it any way they want. But I know the powers of the Presidency, and I've had a chance to discuss that with the key Members of Congress."[14]

Bush "Blinks"—The Request for Congressional "Approval"

In the end, Bush decided to seek congressional "support," but not "authorization." On 8 January, a week before the UN ultimatum would take effect and on the eve of a meeting in Geneva between Baker and Iraq Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that was the manifestation of the "last mile for peace" proposal, Bush sent a carefully worded message to congressional leaders. He did not concede any aspect of what he considered his constitutional authority to wage war. He chided Congress to act in the national interest. It would have been "constructive" for Baker in his meeting to have had such support, and

[12] *Public Papers of the President* (hereafter *PPP*): *Bush 1990* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 1721–1727.

[13] Ibid., 1808.

[14] Ibid., 1818.

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Bush added, somewhat disingenuously, inasmuch as he had not directly requested it, that he would have welcomed a resolution earlier. He stated: "There is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and to safeguard this nation's vital interest . . . [by] adopt[ing] a resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement U.N. Security Council 678." The ultimate authority, Bush asserted, was his, and he was asking Congress to endorse whatever he decided: "I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time."[15]

In a press conference the next day, Bush refused to concede that his request reflected a constitutional obligation. When asked whether he needed the resolution and whether he would be unable to act if it failed, the President replied: " I don't think I need it. . . . There are different opinions on either side of this question, but Saddam Hussein should be under no question on this: I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions." He added in response to a follow-up question: "I still feel that I have the constitutional authority—many attorneys have so advised me." Later, Bush fell back on the argument that "there have been a lot of uses of forces in our history and very few declarations of war. But I have tried. I have done more consultation with Congress than any other President . . . ."[16]

However begrudging the request, Bush had gone to Congress. In the words of constitutional scholar Harold M. Koh, "the president blinked" and had given ground in the "constitutional face-off."[17] Political considerations dictated the President's decision. An opinion poll in early January showed that 60 percent of Americans believed that Bush needed congressional authority before taking the country to war. When Congress reconvened on 3 January, Democratic leaders and a number of Republicans renewed their demands that Congress's war-making power be recognized before any military action was taken. It was clear to the White House that the greater political risk would have been to act without going to Congress.[18] Given the well-known position of many members that Bush was rushing to war and that sanctions had not been given sufficient time, there was a risk of rejection, which would have weakened the U.S. position internationally. That prospect, however, also worked to Bush's advantage, for many members of Congress, even those with doubts about the wisdom of the President's course, were reluctant to undermine American leadership. Bush also benefited from the timing of his request: with the UN coalition poised to attack Iraqi positions in Kuwait, the imperative

[15] *PPP: Bush 1991* (1992), 13–14.

[16] Ibid., 19–20.

[17] Joan Biskupic, "Constitutional Questions Remain," *CQWR* 49 (12 January 1991): 70.

[18] George Gallup, Jr. and Frank Newport, "American Opinion on Events in the Persian Gulf," *Gallup Poll Monthly* (January 1991): 1–3; Doherty, "Congress Faces Grave Choices," 7–10.

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for action was much greater than it would have been had Congress been presented with a similar resolution earlier. So waiting until the last minute worked to his advantage.

Congressional Debate and the "Authorization" Resolution

By the time that congressional debate on the war resolution began on 10 January, Bush benefited as well from the results of the Baker–Aziz meeting. Bush immediately denounced Aziz's refusal to accept Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein as "a total stiff-arm . . . total rebuff," which enhanced the importance of congressional support.[19] That helped as well to shift public opinion (by narrow margins) in favor of using force, as opposed to continuing sanctions. Given the urgency of time, congressional consideration was limited to intense (and extravagantly praised) debate in both houses that took place before packed galleries and a vast television audience. The Republican leadership drafted resolutions in both houses that blended the President's request with an assertion of congressional prerogatives. After restating Iraq's record of defying UN resolutions, the resolutions "authorized" the President to use American forces pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678. Before taking that step, he was to report to Congress that all peaceful efforts to secure Iraqi compliance had failed. The resolution also stipulated that its provisions derived "specific constitutional authorization" from the War Powers Resolution. Two prominent Democrats—Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York—broke with their party's leadership and cosponsored the Republican-drafted resolutions (S.J. Res. 2 and H.J. Res. 77). In opposition, the Democratic Party leaders in both houses offered alternate "return to Congress" resolutions; these directed the President to continue diplomacy and economic sanctions and, if those approaches failed, to then seek Congress's authorization to use force. With the White House strongly opposed to the Democratic resolutions and with the bipartisan resolution designed to attract broad support, the latter was the focus of the three days of debate.

Although the bipartisan resolution attempted to finesse the constitutional issues dividing Congress and the presidency, a number of Democrats sharply criticized Bush for maneuvering Congress into a last-minute decision on war and for denying the constitutional authority of Congress to declare war. Mitchell, Patrick Leahy of Vermont, Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York, Joseph Biden of Delaware, and Edward Kennedy and John Kerry of Massachusetts assailed a resolution that left the decision for war in the hands of the President. Moynihan warned that passage of the resolution would mean that "the primacy of the Congress on this issue under the constitution will have been denied." Kennedy predicted that passage of the resolution "will haunt us for years to come," and to Biden, it "would be a mistake of historic

[19] *PPP: Bush 1991*, 17–18.

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proportions." Kerry, a Vietnam veteran who later became an anti-war activist, asked: "Are we supposed to go to war simply because one man—the President—makes a series of unilateral decisions that puts [us] in a box—a box that makes war, to a greater degree, inevitable?"

The greater part of the debate focused not on constitutional issues, but on the necessity of war. In the Senate, Democrat Bill Bradley of New Jersey charged that "the powerful tools of sanctions, multilateral action, and firm, patient pressure were abandoned before they were allowed to work." Senator Nunn of Georgia pressed again for the continuation of sanctions, observing that no one had expected them to work in five months and asking what made it suddenly "vital" to send Americans into combat. That question was rarely addressed by supporters of the resolution, who stressed the importance of congressional support as a means of demonstrating national resolve that might in fact lead to Saddam Hussein backing down and, if not, would ensure unity in the event of war. Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York stated: "Now is not the time for partisan politics.... [Americans] should stand behind our President and send a clear message to Saddam Hussein that our resolve is firm and that we speak with one voice." Fellow Republican Don Nickles of Oklahoma added: "If this resolution fails, this will be a great victory for Saddam Hussein."

Such calls for national unity—always a staple argument in crises—provided an imperative for supporting the President. It was persuasive to a number of Democrats who had been critical of the movement toward war but who were reluctant to see congressional rejection of his leadership weaken the international position of the United States. Charles Robb of Virginia, a Vietnam veteran and son-in-law of Lyndon Johnson, echoed a phrase from that earlier conflict, saying it was time "to give peace a chance by giving the President what he needs to achieve it.... [It would be] a fundamental mistake to give even the appearance of withdrawing our trust and support." Albert Gore of Tennessee, who had also served in Vietnam (albeit in a non-combat role) supported the resolution for the same reason.[20]

The White House lobbied. Richard Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, who had been a congressman from Wyoming, met with the Republican members of both houses to solidify their support. The President spent much time on the phone with undecided members of both parties and met individually with a number of them. Special attention was directed toward six Democratic senators from three states (Louisiana, Alabama, and Nevada), each becoming the target of a pro-war letter-writing campaign; the administration calculated that each senator would find it easier to vote for the resolution if their Democratic colleague also did.[21]

[20] *Congressional Record 1991*, vol. 137, 102d Cong., 1st sess., S.J. Res. 2, 984–1031. P. Fessler, "Members Solemn Over Crucial Choice with Uncertain Outcome," *CQWR* 49 (12 January 1991): 2–3.

[21] Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 350–351; Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed,* 443–446.

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In the House of Representatives, divisions within the Democratic Party ensured passage of the war resolution. A number of leading Democrats, led by Solarz, broke with their party's leaders. Although Speaker Thomas Foley of Washington strongly opposed the bipartisan resolution, several committee chairmen joined Solarz in support of the President, most notably: Les Aspin of Wisconsin, Armed Services; Dante B. Fascell of Florida, Foreign Affairs; and Dan Rostenkowski of Illinois, Ways and Means. The defection of Aspin was especially significant, for he was as renowned as Nunn on defense issues; but unlike his senatorial colleague, he dismissed sanctions as bringing "pain on the Iraqi people [but] that is not the same thing as pain to Saddam Hussein" and concluded that "war is a reasonable option."[22]

In the end, both houses of Congress approved the war resolution. It was the closest vote on going to war in U.S. history, but a sufficient minority of Democrats joined with virtually all Republicans to secure passage. H.J. Res. 77 carried by a margin of 250 to 183; 86 Democrats voted with 164 Republicans for the resolution (just 3 Republicans voted against the resolution, along with 179 Democrats). In the Senate, the vote, as expected, was excruciatingly close. With each member standing to announce his or her vote, S.J. Res. 2 barely carried: 52 to 47. Ten Democrats (including all six of those specifically targeted by the White House) voted with 42 Republicans to provide the slender majority. (Two Republicans and 45 Democrats voted against the resolution.)[23]

Political Accomplishment within Constitutional Ambiguity

However contentious the debate and however narrow the margin, the constitutional provisions had been followed to the satisfaction of the vast majority of Americans. This led to a remarkable sense of national unity as the nation prepared for war.[24] Bush could justly claim after the vote: "We have now closed ranks behind a clear signal of our determination and our resolve ... to Iraq that it cannot scorn the January 15th deadline."

Still Bush refused to concede the constitutional issue. When he signed the resolution on 14 January, he followed praise of Congress for supporting his policy with the following stipulation:

> As I made clear to congressional leaders at the outset, my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the Presi-

[22] Carroll J. Doherty, "Bush Is Given Authorization to Use Force Against Iraq," *CQWR* 49 (12 January 1991): 65–69; "Congress Faces Grave Choices, 10.

[23] Doherty, "Bush is Given Authorization to Use Force," 68–69; Rhodes Cook, Ronald D. Elving, and C.A. Staff, "Even Votes of Conscience Follow Party Lines," *CQWR* 49 (19 January 1991): 190–195.

[24] Carroll J. Doherty, "Congress Applauds President From Sidelines of War," *CQWR* 49 (19 January 1991): 176–179.

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dent's constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.[25]

So the passage of the resolution did not reduce congressional–executive differences over the war-making power, but the popular and successful war that followed had an intimidating effect on Congress.

Bush II and Regime Change in Iraq

Eleven years later, when President George W. Bush confronted a defiant Iraq, he too turned reluctantly to Congress for support. Like his father, Bush II sought congressional support for political reasons, while refusing to acknowledge its constitutional necessity. Like his father, Bush II could not ignore the pressures from congressional leaders, including many Republicans, demanding that Congress's constitutional role in war making be recognized. In addition, public opinion polls in 2002, as in 1991, indicated that Americans, by substantial margins, believed that congressional authorization was necessary.

In other ways, the circumstances differed, reflecting a significant change in the U.S. relationship with the United Nations. Whereas Bush I had built a solid base of support in the United Nations that strengthened his argument for congressional backing, Bush II lacked substantial international backing; indeed, his case for a war resolution rested in part on the claim that it would facilitate an effort to gain UN support for the campaign against Iraq. So in both cases, the President was able to use the United Nations issue to his advantage in dealing with Congress.

The Controversial Campaign for Regime Change

Throughout the first eight months of 2002, as the Bush administration advanced the objective of "regime change" in Iraq and the doctrine of preemptive warfare, it ignored Congress. The reorientation of foreign policy was cast in the context of waging the war on terror, but it took that conflict away from hunting terrorists and toward rogue states with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. Bush's condemnation of the "axis of evil" linked Iran, Iraq, and North Korea to the campaign against terrorism. In the State of the Union address on 29 January, he charged that those three nations "and their terrorist allies constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes constitute a grave and growing danger." The United States had no choice but to act: "We will be deliberate. Yet time is not on our side."[26] Administration officials

[25] *PPP: Bush 1991*, 40.

[26] [Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents] 2002 Presidential Documents Online via GPO access, accessed at frwais.access.gpo.gov, 1 March 2004, 135; Elisabeth Bumiller, "Surer Voice, Bigger Vision," *New York Times*, 30 January 2002; Michael R. Gordon, "Broadening of

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began talking of "regime change" in Iraq, which troubled many members of Congress and traditional European allies as well. At West Point, on 1 June, Bush boldly spoke of the imperative for a new strategic doctrine, with a military capable of "strik[ing] at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the globe [using] pre-emptive action, when necessary, to defend our liberty and to defend our lives."[27]

This reorientation of national security policy reflected the ascendancy of the neo-conservatives within the administration and the "lessons" they drew from the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars. Among their abiding tenets was the conviction that Bush I had made a monumental mistake in failing to march to Baghdad in 1991 and eliminate the Saddam Hussein regime. They regarded Bush I as still restrained by the Vietnam experience, despite his claim to having "kicked the Vietnam syndrome." To neo-conservatives he had not "kicked" it enough. They were dismissive of his reasons for stopping the war after the liberation of Kuwait (the limits of the United Nations Security Council resolutions, the concern with destabilizing Iraq and the entire region, the expectation of Saddam Hussein's overthrow from within, and the problems of occupation). They saw in the post-September 11 world an opportunity to remedy the "mistake" of 1991.[28]

Congress and the public were skeptical of the imperative for war. Concern intensified when the *New York Times* published detailed Pentagon plans for unilateral war against Iraq. At the same time, the press reported that a number of civilian and military officers at the Pentagon contended that the decade-old policy of sanctions and containment had been effective.[29]

Several prominent Republicans criticized the administration's plans for preemptive war. Especially notable were the views of three leading officials of the first Bush administration. Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, writing in the *Wall Street Journal*, warned that war against Iraq would jeopardize the anti-terrorist coalition and trigger widespread anti-Americanism in the Middle East that would undermine efforts to promote Israeli–Palestinian peace. Former Secretary of State James A. Baker, writing in the *New York Times*, accepted the objective of regime change but foresaw going it alone as generating anti-Americanism and undermining a postwar

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'Doctrine,'" *New York Times*, 30 January 2002; James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans; The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking, 2004), 317–323; Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 87–95; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution), 1–61.

[27] Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 131–133.

[28] Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, 488–492; Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*, 129–144.

[29] Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Military Would be Stressed by New War, Study Finds," *New York Times*, 24 May 2002; James Dao, " Call in Congress for Full Airing of Iraq Policy," *New York Times*, 18 July 2002; Michael Kinsley, "Who Wants This War," *Washington Post*, 12 July 2002; Thomas E. Ricks, "Some Top Military Brass Favor Status Quo in Iraq," *Washington Post*, 28 July 2002.

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occupation; Baker urged cultivating United Nations support and moving forward on the Arab–Israeli peace plan before considering unilateral warfare. Lawrence S. Eagleberger, who had served as Undersecretary of State and briefly as Secretary of State, made much the same point: "I don't know why we have to do it now when all of our allies are opposed to it." Other Republicans also urged caution. In a lengthy essay in the *Washington Post*, Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the Nixon–Ford administrations, challenged not so much preemptive war as the ensuing long-term commitment: "Military intervention should be attempted only if we are willing to sustain such an effort for however long it is needed." From the halls of Congress, other Republicans—notably House Majority Leader Dick Armey of Texas and Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska—challenged the momentum for war. Armey questioned preemptive war:

> If we try to act against Saddam Hussein, as obnoxious as he is, without proper provocation, we will not have the support of other nation states who might do so. I don't believe that America will justifiably make an unprovoked war on another nation. It will not be consistent with what we have been as a nation and what we should be as a nation.[30]

Hagel, a ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, doubted the evidence of Iraq's WMD and shared Kissinger's concern about an extended commitment: "You can get the country into war pretty fast, but you can't get out as quickly, and the public needs to know what the risks are."[31]

The administration at first responded defiantly. In speeches on 26 and 29 August, Vice President Cheney, who as Defense Secretary had been a major architect of the first war against Iraq, set forth an extended indictment of Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat, claiming that he would have nuclear weapons "fairly soon." Delay and inaction threatened U.S. security: "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is amassing [WMD] for use against our friends, against our allies and against us." Although expressing the administration's intention to consult with allies and Congress, the Vice President depicted critics as naïve and promised nothing more than to "proceed cautiously and deliberately [and] to consider all possible options to deal with the threat that Iraq, ruled by Saddam Hussein, represents." The visibility of the normally behind-the-scenes Cheney indicated the significance that the administration attached to the issue. At the same time, administration spokesmen asserted that the President did not need congressional authorization for war. In addition to the conventional reference to the Commander in Chief power, this assertion of presidential authority was also based on existing congressional authorization provided by the 1991 Persian Gulf War Resolution and the September 2001

[30] Todd S. Purdun and Patrick E. Tyler, "Top Republicans Break with Bush on Iraq Strategy," *New York Times*, 16 August 2005; "Pre-Emptive Policy Has Congress Fretting Over Loss of Influence," *CQWR* 60 (15 June 2002): 1605–1606.

[31] Purdun and Tyler, "Top Republicans Break."

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resolution against international terrorism. With the administration promising nothing more than consultation, congressional criticism, again notably from Republicans, increased. Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania responded to Cheney: "It's a matter for Congress to decide. The president as commander in chief can act in an emergency without authority from Congress, but we have time to debate, deliberate, and decide." In an essay in the *Washington Post*, former Senator and 1996 presidential candidate Robert Dole counseled that Bush "should seek congressional approval, even though he has the authority needed . . . . Consultations with Congress are essential, but not adequate when armed conflict is the issue." Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut stated, rather charitably, "The administration has not handled this situation well in recent months."[32]

Lieberman's observations were borne out by public opinion polls, which indicated continued dissatisfaction with the administration's policy. About 60 percent of those polled agreed with statements that Bush had not explained the U.S. position on Iraq, that congressional approval was necessary before any military action could be taken, and that the United Nations should be given more time to resume weapons inspections. Moreover, Americans were divided on the doctrine of preemptive warfare, 41 percent approving it and 47 percent rejecting it.[33] So after several months of belligerent rhetoric and defiance of congressional authority, the administration had failed to make the case for either war or presidential war-making power.

Bush and the Politics of National Security

The politics of the movement toward war changed dramatically. After Labor Day, the administration shifted tactics by becoming more solicitous of Congress, promising that it would seek approval for war against Iraq. Bush moved to the center of the campaign. As Congress reconvened, he met with its leadership on 4 September and found key Democrats not only supportive, but encouraging him to become more aggressively involved in making the case for war. Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota noted that some aspects of the case for war needed to be explained more fully, and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt of Missouri spoke of the necessity to make the WMD issue "graphic" to the American public. It was not all collegial,

[32] Mike Allen and Juliet Eilperin, "Bush Aides Say Iraq War Needs No Hill Vote," *Washington Post*, 26 August 2002; Bob Dole, "The Path to Unity," *Washington Post*, 1 September 2002; Elisabeth Bumiller and James Dao, "Cheney Says Peril of a Nuclear Iraq Justifies Attack," *New York Times*, 27 August 2002; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. and Julia Preston, "Administration Seeking to Build Support in Congress on Iraq Issue, *New York Times*, 30 August 2002; "Bush Hopes to Avoid Battle with Congress over Iraq," *CQWR* 60 (31 August 2002): 2251–2255; Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, 340–342.

[33] Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Aides Set Strategy to Sell Policy on Iraq," *New York Times*, 7 September 2002; Francine Kiefer, "Bush to Lay Out Iraq War Case, " *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 2002; Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 167–172.

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however. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) pointed out that some military leaders questioned the need for war, to which Bush testily replied that it would be better if they expressed reservations to him, not to senators. Yet overall, the session signified that unlike 1991, congressional consideration of a war resolution would not be a partisan struggle.

As the meeting closed, Bush publicly promised to cooperate in hearings on the situation in Iraq and "at the appropriate time to go to the Congress to seek congressional approval for [whatever is] necessary to deal with this threat." When asked by a reporter whether in "seek[ing] congressional approval, does that mean, in effect, Congress will have veto authority over your plan to oust Saddam Hussein," Bush avoided the constitutional question: "I'm confident we will be able to work with Congress to deal with this threat . . . and that's what I meant."[34] Briefings of the Senate by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and of congressional leaders by Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet were combined with appearances by Secretary of State Colin Powell, Rumsfeld, and National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice on national news programs.

After addressing the nation on the first anniversary of September 11, Bush took his case the next day to the United Nations General Assembly, chiding the international organization to live up to its responsibilities to disarm Iraq and affirming American determination to act unilaterally if necessary. At the same time, Bush notably avoided any demand for regime change; he now offered "the Iraqi regime" an opportunity to remain in power if it met five conditions (destruction of WMD, ending support of terrorism, ceasing the suppression of its own peoples, releasing all missing Gulf War personnel, and ending illicit trade). This "moderation" was disingenuous, given Saddam Hussein's well-established antipathy toward Bush and pressure from the United States; moreover, the acceptance of the conditions was seen as opening the way to "the United Nations helping to build a government that represents all Iraqis . . . respect[s] human rights . . . [with] internationally supervised elections." So it was essentially regime change through Saddam Hussein's acquiescence—an unlikely scenario. In addition to whatever gains were made by the appearance of "moderation" on regime change, the speech to the United Nations served a number of political purposes for Bush: critics of unilateral warfare were heartened by the decision to seek a new UN Security Council resolution; hawks responded favorably to its catalogue of Saddam Hussein's defiance of the United Nations and the challenge to the international community; and more subtly, it shifted much of American attention away from questions about the justification for war to whether the United Nations would act—in a sense, UN failure would justify a unilateral preemptive war.[35]

[34] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1481–1482.

[35] Ibid., 1529–1533; Alison Mitchell, "Democrats, Wary of War in Iraq, Also Worry About Battling Bush," *New York Times*, 14 September 2002; Woodward, *Plan of Attack*, 180–185.

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Although a few prominent senators, including Levin and Republican John McCain of Arizona, questioned whether the administration's briefings provided compelling new information regarding an imminent threat from Iraq, the leadership of both parties uncritically supported the President's policy. Daschle told an interviewer that "it would be unfortunate if people drew . . . a premature conclusion that we were opposed to what the president is doing" and promised to "work with the administration to see what we could do to fashion a resolution that would meet his needs." Senators Lieberman and John Edwards of North Carolina—both, like Daschle, prospective candidates for their party's presidential nomination in 2004—endorsed regime change in Iraq and promised support of a bipartisan resolution. Another presidential aspirant, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, spoke of the importance of building an international coalition and of Congress not voting until the United Nations was given more time to act, but added that he might yet vote for a resolution approving the use of force. As one Democratic senator said, "When you combine in our caucus, the hawks, the people in close races, and all those who one day aspire to be president . . . they've got quite a few Democrats who will vote for [a war resolution]." In the House of Representatives, Gephardt, still another prospective presidential candidate, went so far as to concede that his vote against the 1991 war had been a mistake, adding that "everything had changed" after September 11 and that he was anxious to work with the administration on a war resolution.[36]

The difference in the Democratic leadership's position between 2002 and 1991 reflected a decade of attempting to overcome the party's vulnerability on national security. The opposition to the popular and successful Persian Gulf War had accentuated a historic image of irresolution on foreign policy that dated back to the "loss of China" in 1949 and impressions of Truman and Johnson as ineffective leaders in the unpopular Korean and Vietnam wars, and of Jimmy Carter as inept during the Iranian hostage crisis. President Bill Clinton's disregard for the WPR and dismissal of Congress's war-making power as he authorized military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo might, in earlier times, have met with strong Democratic criticism in Congress. Indeed his actions triggered some congressional efforts to insist on congressional authorization, and congressional disapproval of the Somalian intervention led to its termination; but in general, both Democrats and Republicans could agree on little more than resolutions that essentially scolded Clinton. The closest Congress came to asserting its power was over Kosovo in 1999, but even those resolutions suffered from ambiguity and were nonbinding. The Democratic Party position reflected, in part, the tendency of the

[36] Jim VandeHei, "Iraq Briefings: Don't Ask, Don't Tell," *Washington Post*, 15 September 2002; Jim VandeHei and Karen DeYoung, "Bush to Seek Broad Power on Iraq," *Washington Post*, 19 September 2002; Jim VandeHei, "Louder War Talk and Muffled Dissent," *Washington Post*, 25 September 2002; Carl Hulse, "Focus on Iraq Criticized," *New York Times*, 10 September 2002.

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President's party to support him on foreign policy issues, but in a broader sense, it underlined the movement of more Democratic members to accept presidential claims of broad war-making powers as Commander in Chief.[37] In any case, having been deferential to Clinton made it problematic for Democrats to assert constitutional principles in 2002 as many had in 1991. Calculating that the party could ill afford to again appear obstreperous, the advice from Al From, the chief executive of the centrist Democratic Leadership Council, reflected political reality: "I hope the Democrats will support the president—period."[38]

The accommodating position of the Democratic Party leaders underscored the extent to which the executive in 2002, far more so than in 1991, held the high cards in dealing with Congress. Bush played his advantageous position shrewdly. First, the decision to request an early resolution vote forced members of Congress to take a stand on the issue prior to the midterm elections. Democratic leaders had wanted to postpone the matter until after November, but they could not ignore, without damage to their party, the White House claim that national security demanded immediate action. Members of Congress, especially those who were in tight reelection races, took enormous risks in opposing the administration on an issue of national security; by mid-September, Republican candidates in some contests were already pressing their advantage.[39] Bush himself played the "national security card." In a speech at Trenton, New Jersey on 23 September, he indirectly criticized the Democrats for not supporting the strengthening of the country.

Discussing his need for "flexibility" in dealing with terrorism, he praised the Republican-controlled House for its approval of what he sought in the Department of Homeland Security, but castigated the Democratic-controlled Senate for being "more interested in special interests in Washington and not interested in the security of the American people."[40] Facing the prospect of

[37] On congressional–executive interaction on the war power during the Clinton presidency, see: Ryan C. Hendrickson, *The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002); Louis Fisher, "The War Power: No Checks, No Balance" in Colton C. Cambell, Nicol C. Rae, and John F. Stack, Jr., eds., *Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2003), 1–21; Louis Fisher, "Clinton's Military Actions: No Rivals in Sight" in James A. Thurber, ed. *Rivals for Power: Presidential–Congressional Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 229–252; Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 175–201.

[38] Mitchell, "Democrats, Wary of War in Iraq." On the Democrats' national security problem, see James Traub, "The Things They Carry," *New York Times Magazine*, 4 January 2004. On Bush's movement toward war, see: Fisher, *Presidential War Power*, 202–230; Karl K. Schonberg, "Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering War Powers after September 11," *Political Science Quarterly* 119 (2004): 115–141; Michael Genovese, "George W. Bush and Presidential Leadership: The Un-Hidden Hand Presidency of George W. Bush" in Betty Glad and Chris J. Dolan, eds. *Striking First: The Preventive War Doctrine and the Reshaping of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 141–148.

[39] Jim VandeHei, "GOP Nominees Make Iraq a Political Weapon," *Washington Post*, 18 September 2002.

[40] "President Bush Calls on Congress to Act on Nation's Priorities," accessed at 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1 March 2004, 1604.

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more attacks unless they accepted the President's position on the war issue, Democrats now calculated that the best strategy was to act quickly. Instead of planning for extended hearings, as had been anticipated in their earlier statements, Democratic leaders now spoke of approving the resolution within three weeks—which, it was calculated, would enable the party's congressional candidates to focus on other issues prior to the midterm congressional elections.

Second, once Bush took the offensive, particularly with his warnings of an imminent threat, he redefined the terms of the debate. He shifted attention away from preemptive warfare, which had been of concern to many members of Congress of both parties. Underlining the administration's rationale for war was the contention that Iraq threatened American security through its duplicitous development of WMD in violation of the disarmament provisions of the agreement ending the 1991 war and its capacity to support terrorist groups in their anti-American campaigns.

Third, Bush benefited from the extent to which the public accepted the administration's contention of a connection between Saddam Hussein's regime and international terrorism. This "link" enabled the White House and its congressional supporters to respond to critics who contended that preemptive war against Saddam Hussein would divert resources from the war on terror which, they argued, should be the nation's priority.

Finally, in response to those who argued that the United States should work through the United Nations, the Bush administration contended that a show of domestic resolve would enhance the prospects for UN action against Iraq. Promising to make additional efforts in the United Nations, Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell provided a rationale for support of the resolution that was seized upon by a number of Democrats, who regarded UN sanction for war as essential. Bush skillfully played on the United Nations issue by stating that it was time for the United Nations to demonstrate "backbone" and "relevance" or else the United States would have to act unilaterally.[41] By supporting the administration through a war authorization resolution, so the reasoning went, Congress would be enhancing the prospects for international action against Saddam Hussein, thus negating the necessity to implement the resolution. Similar arguments had been advanced on behalf of the 1964 and 1991 resolutions, but in neither of those instances had the prospective enemy been intimidated.[42]

Bipartisanship and Congressional Debate on War Authorization

Operating from a position of strength, Bush had no need to assert presidential war-making prerogatives. The possibility that Congress might reject the 1991

[41] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1547–1554, 1579.

[42] Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 193–218.

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resolution had necessitated his father's unrelenting insistence that the president could take the country to war without congressional authorization. In 2002, however, the President, with support his for the asking, adopted an accommodating stance. The more that he compromised with the Democrats, the greater would be the level of congressional support and the demonstration of national resolve. A bipartisan spirit characterized Bush's meeting with congressional leaders on 18 September. At the conclusion of the session, Bush promised to submit a resolution and Daschle predicted its passage "with strong bipartisan support."[43]

The administration's carefully crafted resolution, presented the next day, finessed constitutional issues. A series of sixteen "whereas" clauses built upon the record of Saddam Hussein's defiance of UN resolutions, Congress's commitment to regime change through its passage of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, and existing presidential power—including references to the 1991 war resolution and the 2001 terrorism resolution, as well as "the President['s] authority under the Constitution to defend the national security interests of the United States." This assertion of inherent presidential power, as well as standing authorizations, made additional authorization appear redundant. The draft resolution nonetheless concluded with a brief "Authorization" section:

> The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council Resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region.[44]

The request for "authorization" and not "approval"—as in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the draft 1991 Persian Gulf War Resolutions—avoided controversy with Congress over that point of contention.

Responding to reporters' questions on the resolution, Bush again skirted the constitutional issues that could have undermined relations with Congress, while tacitly denying the necessity for congressional action. When reporters asked whether he was seeking a "blank check" and "how important [it was that the] resolution give you an authorization to use force," Bush replied that "if you want to keep peace, you've got to have the authorization." After that deferential stance, he went on to speak about a more limited congressional role, indeed sounding much like his father eleven years earlier: "This is a chance for Congress to indicate support. It's a chance for Congress to say, 'We support the administration's ability to keep the peace.' That's what this is all about."[45]

[43] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1573–1574.

[44] Dana Milbank, "Persistence on Iraq Pays Off for Bush," *Washington Post*, 20 September 2002; Todd S. Purdum and Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Seeks Power To Use 'All Means' to Oust Hussein," *New York Times*, 20 September 2002.

[45] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1579–1580.

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The White House followed the draft resolution with the rationale for preemptive warfare. The thirty-three page document, "The National Security Strategy of the United States," declared that the strategies of containment and deterrence were no longer feasible and that the United States would not permit its military supremacy to be challenged: "Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States." Through its military and economic power, the United States would bring "free and open societies" into a union of values and interests embodying "a distinctly American internationalism."[46]

"*Short-Term Politics*" *or Statesmanship? Divisions among Democrats*

With the Democratic Party leaders in Congress embracing the war resolution and tacitly accepting plans for preemptive war, they paid little attention to this far-reaching change in national security policy. A few prominent Democrats, to be sure, criticized what they saw as their leadership's sacrificing principle to politics. Former President Jimmy Carter denounced the doctrine of preemptive war, and former Vice President and 2000 presidential candidate Al Gore, in a speech on 21 September, charged that war against Iraq would deflect resources from the war against terrorism.[47] In the Senate, a few Democrats—most prominently Kennedy, Levin, Dianne Feinstein of California, Joseph Biden of Delaware, and Bob Graham of Florida, the only prospective presidential candidate, aside from Ohio's Dennis Kucinich in the House of Representatives to break ranks with the party's leadership—were critical of the resolution's "blank-check" authorization and the message that this sent to the United Nations. The notice that the United States was prepared to act unilaterally, Levin suggested, provided an incentive for the United Nations to do nothing.[48] An editorial in the *Washington Post* castigated Democratic leaders in Congress: "[They] can't have it both ways: They can either face up to their momentous responsibility in deciding on war or abdicate their authority and join Mr. Bush in playing the short-term political angles."[49]

By that definition, the Democratic leaders chose "the short-term political angles." They pressed for three modest changes in the resolution: first, to eliminate reference to the "restoration of regional peace and security" objective as possibly justifying war against other countries; second, to enhance the role of Congress by requiring presidential consultation and reporting based on references to the War Powers Resolution; and third, to obligate the

[46] David E. Sanger, "Bush to Outline Doctrine of Striking First," *New York Times*, 20 September 2002.

[47] Christopher Marquis, "Democrats Play the Loyal Opposition," *New York Times*, 22 September 2002: Peter Grier and Liz Marlantes, "A Fuller Iraq Debate Rises—But Late," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 September 2002; Michael Kelly, "Look Who's Playing Politics," *Washington Post*, 25 September 2002.

[48] Jim VandeHei, "Louder War Talk."

[49] "Spinning on Iraq," *Washington Post*, 26 September 2002.

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President to make additional efforts to work through the United Nations before going to war. The administration was quickly accommodating on the first two issues, and by 26 September, the resolution had been revised by shifting the "regional peace and security" objective to a new "Whereas" prefatory clause and by adding "Presidential Determination" and "War Powers Resolution Requirements" provisions. In addition, the White House subsequently agreed to a provision that called for what was essentially a "good-faith" presidential effort to seek United Nations support.

Although the administration incorporated these changes into a revised resolution, it resisted the one significant attempt to limit military objectives. In the Senate, Daschle, together with Biden, as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and the Committee's ranking Republican, Richard Lugar of Indiana, crafted an alternate objective, restricting the use of force to secure destruction of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile program or to defend the United States and its allies against those programs. Bush publicly expressed concern that the alternative resolution was weaker than the Iraq Liberation Act and would tie his hands. Gephardt—to the annoyance of Daschle, Biden, and Lugar—seized the initiative and negotiated a compromise with the White House and House Speaker Dennis Hastert of Illinois that provided for the more open-ended objective of authorizing force to enforce "all relevant United Nations resolutions." That revised language also was quickly endorsed by Lieberman and fellow centrist Democrat, Evan Bayh of Indiana, who collaborated with Republicans McCain and John Warner of Virginia in introducing the Hastert–Gephardt language into the Senate resolution. Making no effort to conceal their disappointment with their fellow Democrats, Daschle and Biden acknowledged that their effort for a more restrictive authorization had been effectively killed. So in a White House press conference on 2 October, Gephardt, Lieberman, McCain, Warner, Hastert, and other lawmakers shared the platform with the President in a demonstration of bipartisan support for the revised resolution. Conspicuously absent were Daschle and Biden.[50]

Trying to reduce differences within the party's ranks, Democratic leaders claimed that they had gained concessions that recognized congressional prerogatives and the importance of international support. In the revised resolution (H.J. Res. 114 and S.J. Res. 46), a new section, "Support for United States Diplomatic Efforts," stated congressional support of presidential efforts to:

> (1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq, and encourages him in those efforts;

[50] David E. Sanger and Carl Hulse, "Bush Appears to Soften Tone on Iraq Action," *New York Times*, 2 October 2002; Elisabeth Bumiller and Alison Mitchell, "Bush Strikes Deal for House Backing on Action in Iraq," *New York Times*, 3 October 2002; Carl Hulse, "Endorsement by Gephardt Helps Propel Resolution," *New York Times*, 3 October 2002; 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1661–1662, 1669–1671; Miles A. Pomper, "Senate Democrats in Disarray After Gephardt's Deal on Iraq," *CQWR* 60 (5 October 2002): 2606–2608.

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and (2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions.

The "Presidential Determination" section stipulated that prior to the use of force or as soon thereafter as feasible, the President would report to Congress that further diplomacy would fail to enhance U.S. security. In that event, the President was "authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States . . . to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq."[51]

Buoyed by congressional support, Bush, in a speech in Cincinnati on 7 October, pressed his case for war. Drawing a parallel between the threat posed by Iraq and that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis forty years earlier, Bush quoted President John F. Kennedy's admonition on that occasion that "we no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril." Emphasizing the "link" between Saddam Hussein and the war on terror, Bush effectively ended the debate over whether his goal was disarming Iraq or removing Saddam Hussein by stating that one could not come without the other. He described no satisfactory outcome other than Saddam Hussein's removal from power: "Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves [the Iraqis] and threatens us.... If military action is necessary, the United States and its allies will help the Iraqi people rebuild their economy and create the institutions of liberty."[52]

Normally such a strident speech would have triggered substantial questioning of what some observers saw as a virtual declaration of war, but with the Democratic Party's congressional leadership committed to backing the President, Bush's movement toward war met with scant comment. The most notable exception was Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. In a *New York Times* op-ed essay, Byrd criticized the "rush to war" and Congress's failure to consider "the fundamental and monumental questions of whether the United States should go to war" and its concentration on "how best to wordsmith the president's use-of-force resolution in order to give him virtually unchecked authority to commit the nation's military to an unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation." By "being hounded into action on a resolution that turns over to President Bush the Congress's power to declare war," members of Congress

[51] Alison Mitchell, "Lawmakers Begin Push to Give Authority on Iraq, " *New York Times*, 4 October 2002; David E. Rosenbaum, "United Voice Eludes Majority Leader, *New York Times*, 4 October 2002; *Congressional Record*, 8 October 2002, S 10063–10067, 10104 and 10 October 2002, H 7779.

[52] David E. Sanger, "Bush Sees 'Urgent Duty' to Pre-Empt Attack by Iraq," *New York Times*, 8 October 2002; Todd S. Purdum, "Taking Case to the Public," *New York Times*, 8 October 2002; Woodward, *Plan of Attack,* 201–202.

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were "walk[ing] away from their Constitutional responsibilities . . . [and] giv[ing] away the authority to determine when war is to be declared."[53]

Reflecting such concerns, two Democrats, Senator Levin and Congressman John Spratt of South Carolina, offered "return to Congress" resolutions. The Levin and Spratt resolutions supported the President's objectives, but sought to strengthen the mandate to seek United Nations support. Rather than relying on the "good-faith" promise of the President to seek UN support, they insisted that Congress, not the President, should decide whether the failure of such efforts justified war. Should the Security Council find that Iraq's non-compliance necessitated the use of force, the resolutions authorized the President to commit U.S. forces. In the event, however, that the Security Council did not endorse military action, then the President would be obliged to return to Congress for authorization for unilateral warfare.[54]

In both houses, supporters of the Levin and Spratt resolutions emphasized the importance of being part of a United Nations coalition as a means of enhancing the international legitimacy of any military operation and strengthening the postwar occupation of Iraq. They also argued that the resolution preserved the war-making power of Congress, because it—not the President—would determine whether efforts to work through the United Nations had failed and whether war was necessary. Proponents drew parallels between their resolutions and the road to war in 1991, emphasizing how the first Bush administration had built UN Security Council support and a broad international coalition before gaining congressional authorization; they also cited the opposition of Baker and Scowcroft to unilateral preemptive warfare.[55] Democrats were divided over the Levin and Spratt Resolutions, but with the party's leadership and virtually all Republicans in opposition, they were easily defeated.[56]

Congressional Authorization and Presidential Reassertions of War-Making Power

The debate on the bipartisan resolutions—H.J. Res. 114 and S.J. Res. 46—lacked the drama of 1991. The Senate devoted three days to the issue, and the House half a day. In both houses, Democratic supporters repeatedly stressed the resolutions' bipartisan development that had led to incorporation of sections recognizing congressional prerogatives and to the administration's

[53] Robert Byrd, "The Rush to War," *New York Times*, 10 October 2002. See also: Robert C. Byrd, *Losing America* (New York: Norton, 2004).

[54] *Congressional Record*, vol. 148, 102d Cong., 2d sess., S. J. Res. 46 (8 October 2002): S 10077–10088; H. J. Res. 114 (9 October 2002): S 10191–10194.

[55] *Congressional Record*, vol. 148, 102d Cong., 2d sess., S. J. Res. 46 (8 October 2002): S 10077–10078; H. J. Res. 114 (10 October 2002): H 7751–7769.

[56] *Congressional Record*, vol. 148, 102d Cong., 2d sess., H. J. Res. 114 (10 October 2002): H 7751–7769; S. J. Res. 46 (10 October 2002): S 10250–10264.

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commitment to seek United Nations support before going to war. Gephardt explained his position:

> Completely bypassing the U.N. would set a dangerous precedent . . . [and] it's too high a price to pay. I'm glad that the president said . . . that diplomacy is the first choice for resolving this matter. This resolution also limits the scope and duration of the president's authority to use force. It requires presidential determinations before our armed forces may be used. . . . Finally the bill provides for regular consultation with and reporting to Congress on the administration's diplomatic and military efforts and . . . on the planning for assistance, reconstruction, and regional stabilization efforts in a post-conflict Iraq.

The administration's "concessions" to Congress—despite Gephardt's claims—did not substantially lessen the President's ultimate authority to go to war. A more realistic Daschle, in casting his vote for the resolution, stated that "we are giving the president extraordinary authority" and—reflecting that delegation of power—he could only admonish the President not to ignore Congress. Opponents reiterated the "blank-check" argument and a few, most forcefully Graham, warned of diverting attention from the war on terrorism. Frequently, they contrasted Bush's actions with those of his father in 2001, specifically the lack of international support before going to Congress. The 84-year-old Byrd made an eloquent plea for the Senate not to compromise its war-making authority—"It isn't Robert C. Byrd that counts. It's the constitution"—but his effort to delay a vote failed as the Senate invoked cloture. In the House, Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi spoke for most Democratic members when she warned of an unnecessary war that would divert resources from the war on terror and of an "interminable" postwar occupation that would cost lives and treasure.[57]

On 10 October, substantial majorities gave Bush authority to wage war: 296–113 in the House and 77–23 in the Senate. As in 1991, partisan differences were significant, but in 2002, a sharp division within Democratic ranks contributed to the much greater majorities than in 1991. Most House Democrats did not follow their leadership, inasmuch as 126 of them voted against the resolution, but still, 81 voted in favor. In the Senate, a majority of Democrats (28 to 21) supported the resolution. Thus, what stood out was the role of the leadership of the Democratic Party in giving the President substantial majorities. The congressional vote also reflected public opinion, inasmuch as polls indicated that 62 percent of Americans favored military action against Iraq. The shadow of the congressional elections—little more than three weeks away—loomed over the vote. Among eleven senators in what were considered close reelection campaigns, ten voted for S.J. Res. 46 and

[57] *Congressional Record*, vol. 148, 102d Cong., 2d sess., S. J. Res. 46 (8 October 2002): S 10005–10131; (9 October 2002): S 10164–10195; (10 October 2002): S 10234–10346; Gebe Martinez, "Concerns Linger for Lawmakers Following Difficult Vote for War, *CQWR* 60 (12 October 2002): 2671–2674.

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among fifty House incumbents in competitive races, forty voted for H.J. Res. 114.[58]

With the approval of the war resolution, Bush combined a solicitous approach toward Congress with a reaffirmation of executive power. At a White House signing ceremony on 16 October, with the Cabinet and congressional leaders at his side, Bush stated that "with this resolution, Congress has now authorized the use of force." He went on to speak at length of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program and closed by thanking Congress for "an overwhelming statement of support."[59] Then later in the day, Bush issued a statement upholding the claim of absolute presidential war-making power, conspicuously speaking of congressional "support" but not its "authorization" for war. In language virtually identical to that of his father in 1991:

> There is no social or political force greater than a free people united in a common and compelling objective. It is for that reason that I sought an additional resolution of support from the Congress to use force against Iraq, should force become necessary. While I appreciate receiving that support, my request for it did not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change in the long-standing position of the executive branch on either the President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.[60]

The Prior Authorization Resolutions and the Growth of Presidential Power

Such claims of ultimate war-making authority by George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush accompanying the passage of "prior authorization" resolutions defied the expectations of earlier leaders. Eisenhower's recognition of congressional prerogatives in war making, as evidenced in the first "prior authorization" resolutions on Formosa and the Middle East resolutions, has been repudiated by his successors. And members of Congress who thirty years ago set about, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, limiting presidential power hardly anticipated either that presidents would defy the War Powers Resolution and manipulate the war-making process or that congressional leaders, faced with such arrogant behavior, would hesitate to uphold legislative powers.

Much of the writing on the recent history of the war-making power is sharply critical of congressional acquiescence in the erosion of its authority. Yet, in both 1991 and 2002, proponents of congressional prerogatives seemed to have had, at least initially, strong positions. In 1991, there was a lack of a compelling case for war, as opposed to continuing sanctions; why could not the

[58] Alison Mitchell and Carl Hulse, "House, in 296–233 Vote, Backs Bush on Using Force in Iraq," *New York Times*, 11 October 2002; Martinez, "Concerns Linger for Lawmakers," 2671–2674.

[59] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1777–1779.

[60] 2002 Presidential Documents Online, 1779.

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President have "return[ed] to Congress" for a formal declaration if sanctions had failed? The President prevailed, but the opposition very nearly rejected, for the first time in American history, a president's war recommendation. In 2002, the opponents of war initially seemed to have a substantial position, inasmuch as they raised questions about the imperative for preemptive warfare and the lack of international support; why could not the President have "return[ed] to Congress" after convincing the United Nations of the imperative for war because of inconvertible evidence of weapons of mass destruction? By managing the timing and exploiting the politics of the situation, however, the President again prevailed.

Finally, history also suggests that the war-making power has not been hopelessly compromised. The two cases studied here illustrate the importance of the "last war" in shaping congressional behavior. The "lessons" of the Vietnam War contributed to the congressional assertiveness of 1991, just as those of the Persian Gulf War explain, at least partly, congressional deference in 2002. Although the "lessons" of the current war will be determined only after its results can be more fully seen, in the three years since President George W. Bush launched the war, a number of developments have bred cynicism. The failure to uncover WMD, the corresponding shift in objectives to the promotion of democracy, the lack of an enthusiastic Iraqi reception of the "liberators," the clearly inadequate planning for the occupation, and the mounting casualties since the mission was declared a success all point toward the potential for disillusionment. On the other hand, if the outcome is seen as successful—thus leading to the "lesson" that preemptive warfare transformed Iraq and the region—presidential power will be further enshrined. But if the the Iraq War in retrospect resembles that in Vietnam—renewing the "lesson" of the "limits" of American power—then Congress predictably will be hesitant to give a "blank check" when a president next requests "prior authorization" for war.

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Escaping the Zero-Sum Scenario: Democracy versus Technocracy in Latin America

MARK ERIC WILLIAMS

The last two decades saw a remarkable dual transition sweep Latin America as authoritarian regimes gave way to (qualified) democratic ones, and governments abandoned state-led development models for more market-friendly, neoliberal ones. In many new democracies, technocrats—that is, highly educated, professionally trained policy makers—served as architects of economic reform projects and rose to power as global economic integration, increasingly complex economic issues, and the bankruptcy of past development models encouraged governments to enhance their technical capacity.[1] Although technocrats made their deepest inroads within central banks and executive branch agencies such as finance and trade ministries, technocratic policy making also permeated other public policy realms, including social security, health care, labor relations, and social welfare provision; in some instances, it even made headway at municipal levels of government.[2]

[1] Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., *Technopols: Freeing Politics and Markets in Latin America in the 1990s* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Merilee S. Grindle, *Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Ben Ross Schneider, "The Material Bases of Technocracy: Investor Confidence and Neoliberalism in Latin America" in Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva, eds., *The Politics of Expertise in Latin America* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 77–95.

[2] Verónica Montecinos, *Economic Policy-Making and Parliamentary Accountability in Chile* (New York: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2002); and Peter M. Ward, "De clientelismo a tecnocracía: Cambios recientes en la gestión municipal en México," *Política y Gobierno* 5 (Primer Semester 1998): 95–133.

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For many observers, this increasing technocracy bodes ill for—and indeed, threatens—Latin America's chances for sustained democratic governance. A growing literature calls attention to ways in which technocratic reform projects put at risk such standard democratic features as accountability, checks and balances, effective political representation, and transparency.[3] This paper argues that there are good reasons to take these concerns seriously; the tensions between technocracy and democracy are real. However, it also suggests that democratic governments that embrace technocratic reform projects are not necessarily trapped in a zero-sum game; such programs can also generate externalities that bolster democratic governance by enhancing accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency.

Both the governance and the programmatic dimensions of technocratic reform projects bear upon these issues. The *governance dimension* captures the essence of "technocracy," that is, a political environment in which policy-making authority is vested in a cohort of elite, highly skilled, and electorally unaccountable practitioners. By contrast, the *programmatic dimension* consists of the neoliberal market reforms that technocratic practitioners institute (liberalized trade, privatization, deregulation, and fiscal discipline). Each dimension can potentially stimulate democratizing externalities. However, it is the former, critics rightly assert, that most threatens democratic governance, and the latter's outworking which tends more to support it, especially in the context of domestic political pressures, international constraints, and a prolonged period of market reforms. This paper lays particular stress upon these democratizing tendencies. Its central argument rests on the following propositions:

- The more the content of reforms requires effective institutions to yield expected results, the more likely reformist governments are to strengthen judicial institutions and regulating agencies (or devise new ones) that signal a credible commitment to reform, yet whose political effects also can enhance democratic governance.
- The more newly privatized media firms (print or broadcast) compete over market share, the more likely they are to intensify political coverage, and the more likely such coverage is to enhance transparency and accountability.
- The greater the executive's technical advantage is over the legislature—by virtue of employing more technocrats—the stronger the incentives

[3] Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Judith Teichman, "Mexico and Argentina: Economic Reform and Technocratic Decision Making," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 32 (Spring 1997): 31–55; and Miguel A. Centeno and Patricio Silva, "The Politics of Expertise in Latin America: Introduction" in Centeno and Silva, eds., *The Politics of Expertise*, 1–12.

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can become for the legislature (via political parties) to bolster its own technical capacity to compete, and the better-positioned congress becomes to exert horizontal accountability over the executive and to represent its constituents.

- The more intense the domestic pressure and international scrutiny that technocratic governments experience (that is, demands to address political liberalization and economic crises, or concerns over investment and international trade accords), the greater the incentives administrations committed to technocratic projects have to accept measures that bolster transparency, accountability, and representation.
- And finally, the longer a technocratic market project endures, the higher the prospects are for these externalities to develop.

In short, this paper examines the ways in which technocratic projects, the political dynamics that surround them, and the market pressures they unleash, can stimulate democracy-supporting externalities.

To develop these points, this paper analyzes the policy and political experience of three Latin American countries where government technocrats championed neoliberal reform projects: Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. At the outset of the reform period, each country exhibited distinct political profiles toward democracy. The Argentine government made its democratic transition in 1983; the Mexican government was resisting increasingly strong democratizing trends; Venezuela, meanwhile, had been a working democracy since 1958. Although policy makers adopted similar reform programs in all three cases, the duration of these market experiments varied; in the former two, the reforms have persisted since the late 1980s, whereas in the latter, they began in 1989 and, for the most part, were discontinued in 1993. Consequently, Argentina's and Mexico's reform projects produced greater democratic externalities than did Venezuela's.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section one outlines the ways in which technocratic reform projects may threaten or enhance democratic governance. Section two details the increasing technocratization of economic policy making in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, and its effects on democratic governance in each country. Section three examines the democratizing externalities that technocracy generated in each case. The conclusion notes the conditions under which technocratic policy making is most likely to unleash democracy-supporting dynamics.

Technocracy and Democracy: Is Coexistence Possible?

Accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency are hallmarks of effective democratic governance. The technocratic policy-making style that often accompanies neoliberal reform programs can jeopardize each of these elements.

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Technocracy Threatens Democracy

One way in which technocratic programs weaken accountability is through the means that governments adopt to counter opposition to their policy reforms. Such opposition comes from various quarters, and for various reasons: traditional statist parties that control congress oppose market policy turnarounds; policy makers hold differing views on what reforms (if any) are needed, and how fast or how far a reform program should go; state managers of public enterprises resist career-ending privatizations; and bureaucracies have their own interests, which may conflict with new market policy prescriptions.[4] To overcome these obstacles, reformist governments typically insulate technocrats from countervailing pressures, and enhance their autonomy by organizing policy procedures in ways that minimize conflict over the policy agenda.[5] However, the more autonomy technocrats acquire, the more centralized, exclusionary, and top-down the decision-making process becomes and the more difficult it is for legislatures and citizens to hold these unelected policy makers accountable. The end result is a deficit in both horizontal and vertical accountability, or what Guillermo O'Donnell calls a "delegative democracy," in which presidents govern virtually unimpeded by checks and balances.[6]

Technocratic projects can degrade democratic checks and balances, in part, via the accountability constraints noted above. Another way, however, is by virtue of the greater technical capacity (that is, more technocrats) executive agencies typically enjoy vis-a-vis legislatures. Unable to match the technical prowess of ministries staffed by skilled technocrats from the cabinet to tertiary levels, legislatures cannot challenge the technical merits of executive policy initiatives. This asymmetry, in turn, transforms policy making into primarily an executive-driven process, with congress becoming increasingly subservient to the president (executive tendencies to bypass congress and impose reform policies via decree merely enhance congressional subservience).

The centralized, exclusionary, top-down decision-making patterns that technocratic reform projects entail pose obvious risks to democratic transparency

[4] See, for example, Javier Corrales, "Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules: A Theory on the Politics of Economic Reform in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 32 (January 2000): 127–149; José Piñera, "Chile" in John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 225–231; William Glade, "Toward Effective Privatization Strategies" in William Glade, ed., *Privatization of Public Enterprises in Latin America* (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1991), 117–130; and Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971).

[5] Joan Nelson, "The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant to Eastern Europe?" *World Politics* 45 (April 1993): 433–463; and Mark Eric Williams, "Market Reforms, Technocrats, and Institutional Innovation," *World Development* 30 (March 2002): 395–412.

[6] Guillermo O'Donnell, "Delegative Democracy" in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *The Global Resurgence of Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 94–108; and Guillermo O'Donnell, "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 9 (July 1998): 112–126.

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(and accountability). Closed policy deliberations can render opposition to reform programs less potent, but in the process, they sacrifice the open information flows and dialogue that foster an accountable government. Absent transparent policy procedures, public monitoring of state policy making grows more difficult, and policies themselves grow more prone to irregularities and corruption. Privatization campaigns in Argentina and Mexico, for example, were riddled with opaque procedures. For many Argentines and Mexicans, the backroom deals, cronyism, and procedural irregularities this yielded severely tarnished the legitimacy of these divestment campaigns and the governments that sponsored them.

In slightly different ways, top-down technocratic policy making can also jeopardize political representation. To begin, a congress marginalized from the policy process is not well positioned to effectively represent constituents whose policy preferences may differ from those of executive technocrats. Also, the greater the technocrats' fidelity to standardized macroeconomic objectives and the more that economic performance depends upon external capital inflows, lending institutions, and financial markets, the more sensitive policy makers become to external interests, and the less responsive they may become to their citizens and legislatures. In some instances, political parties can suffer representation deficits too, even when their parties hold the presidency. Argentina's Peronist Party, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and Venezuela's *Acción Democrática* all grew increasingly alienated from presidents whose technocrats took economic policy down paths decidedly different from past party platforms, or curtailed the parties' representation in government by appointing cabinet members with weak, suspect, or nonexistent party credentials.

Finally, technocratic market programs can threaten the economic underpinnings of democracy. A strict focus on economic rationality and efficiency may lead technocrats to discount as "populism" the very social welfare policies that help create the popular support—and social capital—required to sustain and stabilize democratic societies.[7] Also, should the technocrats' economic policies fail to generate broader prosperity or attenuate inequality and poverty, voters may lose confidence in the democratic governments that pushed such programs.[8]

In a variety of ways, then, technocratic reforms can work against the bulwarks of democratic governance, generate significant democratic deficits, or widen preexisting ones. Nevertheless, at least theoretically, technocracy and

[7] Lucio Fernando Oliver Costilla, "The Reconstitution of Power and Democracy in the Age of Capital Globalization," *Latin American Perspectives* 27 (January 2000): 82–104; and Nancy Birdsall, Carol Graham, and Richard H. Sabot, eds., *Beyond Trade Offs: Market Reform and Equitable Growth in Latin America* (Washington DC: The Inter-American Development Bank, 1998).

[8] W. Andrew Moellmer, "Neoliberalism and the Effects of the Economic Reforms on Democratic Consolidation After the Debt Crisis" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 24–27 March 2002).

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democracy need not be diametrically opposed. In fact, technocratic reform projects could well engender externalities that help offset the democratic deficits they create.

Technocracy May Enhance Democracy

One pathway toward this outcome is the content of reform measures themselves, and the "second-stage reforms" required if initial measures are to yield expected results.[9] For example, to enforce contracts, protect property rights, reduce uncertainty, and ensure that market reforms yield robust growth, reformist governments often feel compelled to professionalize their judicial systems, bolster the rule of law, and establish effective, politically independent regulatory agencies and central banks.[10] The greater this professionalization and independence, the more credible (and institutionalized) become the checks upon arbitrary executive actions.[11]

A second pathway is the incentives that a technocratic policy-making environment can provide legislatures to enhance their own technical capacity and, by extension, their ability to subject the executive to credible horizontal accountability and to represent constituents more effectively. Legislatures facing technically sophisticated executive agents are at a distinct disadvantage, unable to evaluate complex executive initiatives or even "speak" the language in which a president's technocrats converse. A legislature weary of simply rubber-stamping or obstructing presidential initiatives may seek to level the playing field by developing its own technical capacity. The more it engages in this practice, the greater will be its ability to balance executive actions, exert accountability, and represent diverse constituent interests.

Economic and political pressures—both domestic and international—constitute a third pathway toward greater transparency and representation. For example, the more investors demand timely, reliable information and

[9] "Second-stage reforms" entail market-completing, equity-oriented, and institution-building initiatives designed to ensure competitive markets, reduce inequality, establish the rule of law, and promote good governance. See Carol Graham and Moisés Naim, "The Political Economy of Institutional Reform in Latin America" in Birdsall, Graham, and Sabot, eds., *Beyond Trade-Offs*, 321–362; Merilee S. Grindle, ed., *Getting Good Government: Capacity Building in the Public Sectors of Developing Countries* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Moisés Naim, "Latin America: The Second Stage of Reform" in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., *Economic Reform and Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 28–44; and Manuel Pastor, Jr. and Carol Wise, "The Politics of Second-Generation Reform," *Journal of Democracy* 10 (July 1999): 34–48.

[10] Hugo Eyzaguirre, *Institutions and Economic Development: Judicial Reform in Latin America* (Washington DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1996); and Sylvia Maxfield, *Gatekeepers of Growth* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

[11] Jodi Finkel, "Judicial Reform in Latin America: Market Economies, Self-Interested Politicians, and Judicial Power" (paper prepared for the Scientific Study of Courts Conference, College Station, TX, October 1999).

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technocrats stress financial transparency to create sound investment climates, the more transparency becomes the watchword of central banks and finance ministries (via quarterly reports and other information flows that signal the government's "credible commitment" to reform). The close affinity between politics and economics, however, can encourage demands for transparency in the political arena, too. Private investors, for instance, might condition further investment on more-transparent electoral practices. Moreover, precisely because neoliberal reforms often generate political unrest that can imperil reform programs and disquiet investors, policy makers may seek to safeguard their projects by giving citizens and partisans greater "voice" and representation through substantive political/electoral reforms. Also, in the context of transnational market integration (as in the North American Free Trade Agreement), external pressure for greater political transparency can spike sharply as trading partners scrutinize heretofore "domestic" affairs such as elections.[12]

In short, although technocratic reform projects often generate democratic deficits, in various ways, they also can stimulate externalities that help offset these deficits. Clearly, there is no guarantee that such externalities will emerge, or that if they do, they will work in a linear fashion to strengthen democratic governance. However, there also is no reason *a priori* to discount their potential development or democracy-supporting dynamics. Thus, in theory, the longer a reform project and the government's commitment to it endure, the more likely is it that democratizing externalities will develop.

Technocratic Policy Making in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela

During the 1980s and 1990s, the governments of Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela adopted similar market reform projects. These initiatives—structural adjustment, fiscal discipline, deregulation, privatization, and trade liberalization—broke sharply with past policies that had been characterized by the proprietary state and extensive government regulation.[13] To varying degrees, these governments advanced their market reform projects by concentrating policy authority within a select group of technocrats. This section details the extent to which these reform experiences displayed the features of technocratic policy making outlined above, and their effects on important elements of democratic governance.

[12] Carol Wise, "Politics Unhinged: Market Reforms as a Catalyst for Mexico's Democratic Transition" (paper prepared for the Annual Congress of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, September 2001).

[13] See, for example, Mark Eric Williams, *Market Reforms in Mexico: Coalitions, Institutions, and the Politics of Policy Change* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001); Javier Corrales, *Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); and Ana Margheritis, *Ajuste y reforma en Argentina (1989–1995): La economía política de las privatizaciones* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1999).

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Enter the Technocrats

Under the government of President Carlos Menem (1989–1999), Argentina's economic policy making increasingly acquired classic technocratic trappings.[14] This was especially true following the appointment of Domingo Cavallo as Finance Minister in 1991. With Menem's backing, Cavallo recruited a large pool of like-minded technocrats (about 150, by most counts) to oversee the reform project.[15] In Venezuela, meanwhile, President Carlos Pérez (1989–1993) "packed his cabinet with independent young technocrats," including the Ministry of Development (responsible for trade reform).[16] The selection of this economic team, notes Andrés Stambouli, responded "less to the traditional criteria of rewarding political collaborators or friends" than to "the criteria of technopolitical competence required for the formulation and implementation of policies to adequately support the program."[17]

In Mexico, however, technocratic policy making was even more pronounced. President Carlos Salinas (1988–1994)—himself a technocrat—appointed technocrats to every major economic and social policy position; they, in turn, often stacked their own agencies with technocrats.[18] The result, notes Miguel Ángel Centeno, was a "technocratic revolution" characterized by the hegemony of a "single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the theoretically optimal use of resources…."[19] Under President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000)—also a technocrat—this trend continued.[20]

And the Democratic Deficits

Although the degree of technocratization was most acute in Mexico (indeed, Mexico became the apotheosis of technocracy), in each case, a general pattern

[14] Judith A. Teichman, *The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 98.

[15] Carlos Huneeus, "Technocrats and Politicians in the Democratic Politics of Argentina (1983–95)" in Centeno and Silva, eds., *The Politics of Expertise*, 190; and Javier Corrales, "Why Argentines Followed Cavallo: A Technopol Between Democracy and Economic Reform" in Domínguez, ed., *Technopols*, 64, 65.

[16] Kenneth M. Roberts, "Party System Collapse Amidst Market Restructuring in Venezuela" (paper prepared for presentation at the 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 30 August–2 September 2001), 13.

[17] Andrés Stambouli, "An Evaluation of the First Year of the Government of Carlos Andrés Pérez" in Joseph S. Tulchin, ed., *Venezuela in the Wake of Radical Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 122.

[18] Miguel Ángel Centeno, *Democracy Within Reason: Technocratic Revolution in Mexico* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); and Williams, *Market Reforms in Mexico*.

[19] Centeno, *Democracy Within Reason*, 39–40.

[20] Pacific Council on International Policy, *Mexico Transforming* (Los Angeles, CA: Pacific Council on International Policy, n.d.), 17.

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of exclusionary, top-down decision making developed that tended to undercut accountability, cloud transparency, weaken checks and balances, and retard effective representation. In Argentina, Menem worked aggressively to concentrate decision-making authority within the executive branch;[21] this process began even before he took office. Having captured the presidency from the Radical Party in the wake of a severe economic downturn, he wasted no time in orchestrating a massive privatization campaign. As President-Elect, Menem convinced Congress to pass two major pieces of reform legislation—the Law of State Reform (Law 23.696) and the Economic Emergency Law (Law 23.697). Together, they served as an omnibus privatization law that tipped the balance of power over divestment decidedly toward the president vis-a-vis Congress. Although the Argentine legislature did retain a measure of "voice" in divestment and other reform measures, it remained very much a junior partner in economic policy making.[22]

Menem also launched deregulation and trade liberalization policies, plus fiscal, financial, and tax reforms; in general, he pushed these measures via executive decree.[23] This penchant to rule by decree declined somewhat once Cavallo became Finance Minister, yet policy-making authority itself remained squarely within the executive branch (that is, at Finance). Having engineered the 1991 Convertibility Law that tamed inflation by fixing the peso's value to that of the U.S. dollar, and completed the merger of the Ministry of Public Works and Services (which traditionally supervised public enterprise operations) with his own agency, Cavallo spoke for Menem on all things economic. Thus, notes Judith Teichman: "While formulation of economic policy had always rested in the hands of the Minister of Economy, never had it become so insulated ... from societal forces [and] resistant to pressures from other areas within the state."[24]

In addition to marginalizing Congress from the policy reform process, thereby weakening horizontal accountability, Menem worked to minimize other democratic checks and balances that might impede his program. In 1990,

[21] Margheritis, *Ajuste y reforma*; Luigi Manzetti and Scott Morgenstern, "Legislative Oversight: Interests and Institutions in the United States and Latin America" (paper prepared for delivery at Notre Dame Conference on Horizontal Accountability in New Democracy, Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, May 2000); and Mariana Llanos and Ana Margheritis, "Liderazgo presidencial y dinámica institucional durante el primer periodo presidencial de Menem: El caso de las privatizaciones," *Política y Gobierno* 4 (Segundo Semestre 1999): 441–475.

[22] See Corrales, "Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules"; and Mariana Llanos, "Understanding Presidential Power in Argentina: A Study of the Policy of Privatisation in the 1990s," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33 (February 2001): 67–99.

[23] Rubio Ferreira and Matteo Goretti Delia, "Menem's *Decretazo* (1989–1998): The Inefficiency of the Constitutional Reform to Modify the Practice of the Executive Regarding Need and Urgency Decrees" (paper presented at the 1998 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, IL, 24–26 September, 1998).

[24] Teichman, "Mexico and Argentina," 47.

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he persuaded Congress to enlarge the Supreme Court (from five to nine justices), then "packed" it with sympathetic appointees;[25] he also sacked four of the five members of the National Auditing Board—a type of fiscal tribunal that monitored irregularities in state accounts. The following year, the purge continued, this time against the National Attorney for Administrative Investigation (whose office prosecutes irregularities in public administration). When the agency's top official challenged the legality of procedures related to the divestment of the state-owned telephone monopoly, ENTel, and the air carrier Aerolíneas Argentinas, Menem fired him via executive decree.[26] Of course, Menem's brand of technocratic policy making held no monopoly on excessive presidential power.[27] The point made here is simply that concentrated power within the executive often accompanies technocratic reform projects, and, as Argentina's experience illustrates, constitutes one of their principal democratic deficits.

Venezuela's reform program exhibited a similar top-down trajectory. Just two weeks into the new administration, President Pérez unilaterally deregulated price controls on goods and services, reduced import tariffs, liberalized domestic interest rates, and announced privatization initiatives. Like Menem, Pérez implemented "most of his original adjustment package through executive decrees," and he advanced his reform *paquete* in classic "shock therapy" fashion—quickly, without public discussion, and "unhindered by lengthy congressional debates and public lobbying for policy modifications."[28]

In Mexico, meanwhile, Salinas and his technocratic agents aggressively restructured policy-making procedures in ways that minimized opposition to reform, concentrated decision-making authority, and literally organized policy contestation *out* of the policy arena.[29] In the process, Salinas took a strong presidentialist system and made it stronger still.[30] Like his Argentine and

[25] A 1990 legal challenge to Menem's rule-by-decree led the new Supreme Court to issue a ruling that essentially sanctioned the executive's ability to promulgate decrees as he saw fit, as long as once he informed Congress of the decrees, Congress did not disapprove. A 1994 ruling reaffirmed the transfer of legislative powers to the executive. See Manzetti and Morgenstern, "Legislative Oversight," 33.

[26] Alberto R. González Arzac, "Aerolíneas, ENTel y la Inspección General de Justicia," *Realidad Económica* 97 (Primer Semestre 1990): 55–63.

[27] For example, Argentine, Mexican, and Venezuelan administrations led by Presidents Juan Perón, Luis Echeverría, and Hugo Chávez—all non-technocratic governments—displayed enormous presidential power.

[28] Roberts, "Party System Collapse," 12; and Brian F. Crisp, "Lessons From Economic Reform in the Venezuelan Democracy," *Latin American Research Review* 33 (Winter 1998): 28.

[29] Williams, "Market Reforms, Technocrats, and Institutional Innovation," 399–404.

[30] Jeffrey Weldon, "The Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico" in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 225–258; and Wayne A. Cornelius, *Mexican Politics in Transition: The Breakdown of a One-Party-Dominant Regime* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1996), 36.

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Venezuelan counterparts, he used decrees to implement reform measures such as divestment and deregulation.[31] However, he also used presidential appointments, dismissals, and prosecutions to send "clear signals about the importance of being on the presidential bandwagon"—and of identifying "unequivocally" with his technocratic modernization project—all the while restricting authoritative policy deliberations to select executive branch officials.[32] To be sure, Salinas's reforms did encounter serious opposition from some state actors and organized labor, but they faced only token opposition from the PRI-controlled Congress, and none from the courts.[33] Consequently, as in Argentina and Venezuela, in Mexico too, the technocratic neoliberal project proceeded with only minor public discussion, persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building—all important elements of democratic governance.[34]

Not surprisingly, in each country, the technocratic thrust of these reform programs generated important democratic deficits. Accountability to legislatures, courts, "watchdog" agencies, and the public declined; transparency grew more clouded; checks and balances grew weaker (and at times seemed almost nonexistent); and representation suffered. On this last point, it is worth noting the extent to which even ruling parties experienced severe representation deficits.

During Menem's first term, for example: "Of the total cabinet of forty-seven ministers and secretaries (the rank below the ministerial level), only three belonged to the Peronist union sector," the ruling party's strongest constituent base.[35] Similarly, in Venezuela, Pérez not only "appointed a very non-Adeco [non-ruling party] cabinet, composed mostly of political friends ... and highly trained, non-partisan, market-oriented social scientists ... [but also] encouraged ministers to recruit non-Adeco staffs, even when the ministers themselves preferred otherwise."[36] Consequently, *Acción Democrática*, Venezuela's ruling party, "never felt that it had any weight in the formulation of economic policy" and chaffed at its unprecedented marginalization.[37] By contrast, in Mexico, Salinas did appoint members of the PRI to top policy posts, but his technocratic appointees boasted limited party and political experience and a policy preference quite at odds with the PRI's historic populist orientation. Although his technocrats were all "party members," Salinas never brought the party into policy consultations. Even when his administration amended the federal constitution to permit the privatization of communal *ejido* lands (thus officially ending Mexico's fabled land reform

[31] Grindle, *Challenging the State*, 81–86; and Williams, *Market Reforms in Mexico*, 90, 118.
[32] Grindle, *Challenging the State*, 92–93.
[33] Williams, *Market Reforms in Mexico*, 34–36, 112.
[34] Teichman, *The Politics of Freeing Markets*, 160.
[35] Ibid., 115.
[36] Corrales, *Presidents Without Parties*, 121.
[37] Ibid., 123.

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program), Salinas's technocrats devised and imposed this measure without consulting the PRI officials who represented peasant farmer organizations.[38]

In short, to varying degrees, each government's technocratic reform project effectively "locked out" ruling parties from substantive governing circles; these representation deficits, in turn, affected executive–ruling party relations in different ways. In Argentina, by the end of 1990, Menem's stance toward his party had strained executive–ruling party relations to the breaking point; in Venezuela, Pérez's reliance upon technocrats from outside *Acción Democrática* had antagonized his own party to the point that executive–ruling party relations collapsed.[39] In Mexico, presidents consistently privileged—and sided almost exclusively with—one faction of the PRI, that is, the technocratic wing. And although Salinas did retain the allegiance of a majority of his party (mostly by spending billions of anti-poverty dollars in ways that benefited the PRI's electoral prospects),[40] his reform project and technocratic governing style deeply disturbed many *PRIístas*. As Pedro Joaquin Coldwell, the PRI's former Secretary-General explained, Salinas's reform program converted the PRI into "a political instrument for the government's neoliberal project," and left the party's old-guard populists suffering "profound ideological confusion."[41]

Not only did technocratic reform projects generate specific democratic deficits in each country, but in different ways, they threatened the consolidation of, transition to, and continuation of democracy in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela, respectively. In Argentina, by 1999, Menem's penchant for unilateral, top-down policy making had cast long shadows over the prospects of democratic consolidation.[42] In Mexico, Salinas's technocratic team worked against emerging democratizing trends, and sought to prolong the PRI's authoritarian rule by consistently privileging its economic program over political liberalization and democracy.[43] Once Salinas left office in 1994, it would take another six years for Mexico to experience a genuine transition to democracy. Finally, in Venezuela, Pérez's economic reforms and exclusionary policy-making style proved so unpopular that they cut the reform program short by unleashing violent public protests, two attempted military coups, and increasing political instability. These dynamics ultimately cost Pérez his job (via

[38] Merilee S. Grindle, "Reforming Land Tenure in Mexico: Peasants, the Market, and the State" in Riordan Roett, ed., *The Challenge of Institutional Reform* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

[39] Corrales, "Presidents, Ruling Parties, and Party Rules," 127–149.

[40] Salinas engaged in this "political spending" via the National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL, a giant pork barrel project that helped to assuage the social tensions that the reforms unleashed and to shore up political support, by funneling billions of dollars to grassroots projects in regions where the ruling party faced stiff partisan opposition. See Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig, and Jonathan Fox, eds., *Transforming State–Society Relations in Mexico: The National Solidarity Strategy* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.–Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1994).

[41] Leslie Crawford, "Zedillo Under Fire as Peso Wobbles: Political Troubles Add to Problems Facing Mexico's President," *Financial Times,* 31 August 1995.

[42] Llanos and Margheritis, "Liderazgo presidencial," 472.

[43] See Centeno, *Democracy Within Reason*, 212.

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impeachment), hastened the collapse of Venezuela's two-party political system, and paved the way for Hugo Chávez to win the presidency in 1998. Chávez went on to rewrite the constitution, degrade Venezuela's democratic institutions, and steer the country back down a populist (and politically unstable) path.

Clearly, a number of factors beyond the scope of this paper influenced democratic setbacks in these countries, and by no means can all of these be laid at the feet of technocratic reform projects. Nevertheless, the point remains: in each case, the reform programs did generate expected democratic deficits. To what extent did democracy-supporting externalities ensue as well?

Technocratic Policy Making and Democracy-Enhancing Externalities

Although their form, quantity, and intensity varied across cases, the most prominent democratic externalities emerged in precisely those countries in which technocratic reform programs endured the longest. In Argentina and Mexico, the content of reform initiatives moved governments to adopt various second-stage reforms (again, to ensure that initial measures yielded anticipated results) that also enhanced political accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency. In Argentina particularly, the executive's greater technical capacity vis-a-vis the legislature incentivized Congress to upgrade its own technical capacity, bolstering horizontal accountability and effective representation in the process. Moreover, in both countries, market forces unleashed powerful transparency effects, while domestic and international pressures—linked in part to the reform programs—compelled leaders to embrace initiatives conducive to democratic governance.

Argentina

As Menem's reform program unfolded, the administration recognized an increasing need to professionalize financial accounting agencies and the judiciary, in order to strengthen investor confidence, enforce contracts, protect property rights, and attract greater foreign and domestic private investment.[44] Domestic and international concerns over corruption in public administration and privatization sales increased the incentives to pursue this path.[45] Accordingly, in 1992, Menem supported new legislation creating the General Auditor of the Nation (Law 24.156). Under congressional control, this agency serves as the public sector's external auditor, with jurisdiction over all budgetary, financial, legal, and management matters concerning public administration.[46]

[44] Manzetti and Morgenstern, "Legislative Oversight," 27–30; and Finkel, "Judicial Reform in Latin America."

[45] Manzetti and Morgenstern, "Legislative Oversight," 39.

[46] Ibid., 40.

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The General Auditor submits its reports directly to Congress, and its scrutiny of Menem's privatization program helped lawmakers balance the executive and exercise greater horizontal accountability. Two years later, Menem also supported constitutional revisions granting the Supreme Court greater judicial independence (and hence, the potential to check executive excesses).[47]

In an unanticipated twist, Menem's reform program also helped augment political transparency and some measure of accountability, mainly by stimulating intense competition between newly privatized and increasingly deregulated media outlets. By divesting two major television stations (channels 11 and 13) and relaxing legal prohibitions against firms owning both newspapers and broadcast media, Menem "let the genie of competition out of the bottle."[48] The result was more aggressive, expansive political coverage by media consortia, and in the battle for market share, coverage of political scandals, in particular, became a weapon of choice (Menem's government made an easy target). Particularly when coupled with increasingly professionalized journalistic norms,[49] this competition helped buttress media independence, strengthen transparency, and provide at least the potential for greater vertical accountability.

Still other democratic externalities developed inside Congress itself, where the ruling Peronist Party, faced with the executive's greater technical expertise and its onslaught of technically complex initiatives, gradually increased its own technical capacity, thereby permitting Congress to subject the executive to more effective horizontal accountability.[50] The process began slowly in 1991 and gained momentum mid-decade. It was especially prominent in the Chamber of Deputies, which "incorporated more economist-legislators (emulating the Executive), underwent greater diversification and specialization at economics-related committees, and showed more willingness to question the Executive, introduce bills and modify Executive-introduced bills."[51] By 1995–1997, more economists sat on the Chamber's Finance and Economy committees than members of any other profession, and economists had become preponderant in the Chamber's committees on Trade, Industry, Budget, and Regional Economies and Development.[52] In terms of assessing the

[47] In addition to his concern over ensuring that economic reforms were effective, Menem also accepted this measure in order to win opposition parties' support for a constitutional amendment permitting his reelection in 1994. See Gabriel Negretto and Mark Ungar, "Independencia del poder judicial y Estado de Derecho en América Latina: Los casos de Argentina y Venezuela," *Política y Gobierno* 4 (Primer Semestre 1997): 102.

[48] Silvio R. Waisbord, "Knocking on Newsroom Doors: The Press and Political Scandals in Argentina," *Political Communication* 11 (January–March 1994): 27.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Javier Corrales, *Legislative Oversight of New Technocracies: The Argentine Case, 1983–2001* (New York: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2002).

[51] Ibid., 31.

[52] Ibid., 20.

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economic policy agenda, this process brought more balance into executive–congressional relations.

Mexico

As in Argentina, the outworking of Mexico's technocratic reform project also kindled externalities that bolstered accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency. For example, after achieving a stable macroeconomic situation by 1992 (inflation in single digits and a budget surplus), Salinas sought to entrench the credibility and positive results of his reforms over the long term. In 1993, he orchestrated a constitutional amendment granting the Central Bank more autonomy, thereby augmenting checks and balances.[53] In hopes that the PRI's authoritarian regime might endure, Salinas chose not to establish a completely independent Central Bank (which might restrict subsequent PRI governments' ability to manage the economy). Nevertheless, in terms of limiting the executive's ability to manipulate monetary policy, the reforms did introduce important checks on what had been rather broad degrees of freedom.

By contrast, the transparency and accountability effects that Mexico's privatization program generated were more significant and politically consequential. Here, the divestment of state-owned television channels and increased market competition facilitated an "opening" of Mexico's historically controlled, pro-regime electronic and print media.[54] The upshot was that throughout most of the 1990s, the media increasingly served to buttress vertical accountability. It subjected politics, policy making, and especially elections to increased scrutiny; it devoted greater (and more impartial) coverage to opposition parties and civic organizations; and it provided unprecedented reporting of politically sensitive topics. In the end, the dramatic transformation of media coverage played a significant role in Mexico's democratic transition by "stimulating civic mobilization, triggering scandals, and facilitating opposition electoral victory."[55]

In ways less direct, the privatization initiatives that Mexico's technocrats pushed also bolstered Congress' representational (and more modestly, its balancing) capacity. By 1997, the surge of opposition party victories—fueled, in

[53] See Pedro Aspe, *Iniciativa de reforma constitucional para dotar de autonomía al Banco de México* (presented as an address to the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, Mexico City, 24 May 1993); and Delia M. Boylan, "Democratization and Institutional Change in Mexico: The Logic of Partial Insulation," *Comparative Political Studies* 34 (February 2001): 3–29. Salinas's successor, Ernesto Zedillo, also introduced greater transparency into government finances: where Salinas released information on Mexico's foreign reserves just three times a year, the Zedillo government placed this and other data on various web sites that provided frequent updates.

[54] Chappell Lawson, *Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

[55] Ibid., 6.

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part, by the greater media transparency that divestment unleashed—had altered the legislature's partisan composition. This, in turn, increased its ability to represent diverse interests and modify (if not check) the executive's budgetary and spending initiatives.[56] Since 1997, the number of substantive changes to executive budgetary initiatives has grown dramatically, and in 1999, lawmakers modified the executive's budget proposal so extensively that President Zedillo threatened to veto it.[57]

Finally, Mexico under Zedillo offers a clear example of technocratic leaders accepting (and thus, reluctantly facilitating) political liberalization and democratization in order to preserve their reform programs. The democratic externalities here played out most prominently in accountability, transparency, and representation. Two weeks into the new administration, Zedillo confronted a currency crisis that plunged Mexico's economy into depression. Membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement placed Mexico under intense U.S. media scrutiny, and the magnitude of the crisis forced the President to accept a U.S.–International Monetary Fund rescue package.[58] The political backlash that followed the peso's meltdown threatened both Zedillo's capacity to govern, and the perception of his commitment to maintain Mexico's market reforms. To safeguard the reforms, Zedillo reaffirmed his commitment to them (in hopes of recapturing investors' confidence) and accepted the rescue package's requirements for greater transparency in financial accounting. More important, however, he also acceded to opposition party demands for substantive democratic reforms.[59]

The electoral reforms that emerged in 1996 were the product of intense, multi-party negotiations imposed upon a besieged technocratic president. They established greater media access for political parties, an autonomous Federal Electoral Institute, important campaign finance reforms, and direct election of Mexico City's mayor. These measures significantly enhanced the capacity of opposition parties to compete in elections, a capacity made stronger still by the "media opening" noted above. The net effect was much fairer elections in 1997, in which the PRI lost control of both the Lower House and Mexico City, and again in 2000, in which it lost the presidency. This, in turn, marked Mexico's definitive transition to democracy.

In the political heat of Mexico's economic crisis, Zedillo also consented to constitutional amendments that further professionalized the Supreme Court (a process under way since 1994). These amendments empowered the Court to adjudicate disputes between the federal, state (and inter-state), and municipal

[56] María Amparo Casar, "Las Relaciones entre el poder ejecutivo y el legislativo: El caso de México," *Política y Gobierno* 6 (Primer Semestre 1999): 83–128.

[57] See Luis Carlos Ugalde, *The Mexican Congress: Old Player, New Power* (Washington DC: The CSIS Press, 2000), 26–28, 157.

[58] Wise, "Politics Unhinged."

[59] Pamela K. Starr, "Monetary Mismanagement and Inadvertent Democratization in Technocratic Mexico," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 33 (Winter 1999): 35–65.

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governments.[60] Thereafter, the Court ventured increasingly into a political realm it had long eschewed. In 1996, it struck a blow against the PRI's traditional corporatist representation system, ruling that laws mandating that state employees affiliate with a single, government-sanctioned union were unconstitutional; the same year, it struck down laws obligating businesses to join state-sanctioned chambers of commerce and industry.[61] The Court also involved itself in highly charged partisan contests; in 1997, it upheld an opposition party challenge to the electoral code in the state of Oaxaca, and in 1998, it supported another opposition party challenge to Quintana Roo's electoral code.[62]

Venezuela

In important ways, Venezuela represents a case of technocratic failure, for despite its intentions to reform, the Pérez administration actually achieved very little "technocratic results." The administration did manage to privatize a few state-owned enterprises, and it experimented with deregulation for a spell. It did not, however, achieve a permanent economic structural adjustment, nor did it generate a pattern of sustained economic growth with stable macroeconomic indicators. Most important, its market project collapsed in the face of widespread, violent opposition (riots, strikes, attempted coups), and successive administrations rolled back many reforms that Pérez inaugurated. Not surprisingly, compared to Argentina and Mexico, the democracy-enhancing effects of Venezuela's reform project under Pérez were meager. Four interrelated factors account for this outcome: intense resistance to the reform program, congressional failure to balance the executive's technical capacity, the political paralysis and uncertainty that engulfed the Pérez administration, and consequently, the truncated duration of the reforms.

Stiff, sustained opposition to the reforms' content and implementation, for example, stifled the need and opportunity to pursue second-stage measures. Moreover, as executive–ruling party relations deteriorated, *Acción Democrática* adopted a highly obstructionist strategy toward Pérez's agenda while the Radical Party floundered in disarray. Consequently, Congress failed to upgrade its technical capacity. Finally, a crisis of governance fueled by prolonged political turmoil consumed the attention of principal political actors (the executive, parties, and Congress), climaxing in Pérez's impeachment, the

[60] See Jorge A. Vargas, "Mexico's Legal Revolution: An Appraisal of Its Recent Constitutional Changes, 1988–1995," *The Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law* 25 (Summer 1996): 497–559; and Hector Fix-Fierro, "Judicial Reform and the Supreme Court of Mexico: The Trajectory of Three Years," *United States-Mexico Law Journal* 6 (Spring 1998): 1–21.

[61] Pilar Domingo, "Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court in Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 32 (2000): 705–734.

[62] Mark Eric Williams, "Traversing the Mexican Odyssey: Reflections on Political Change and the Study of Mexican Politics," *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 18 (Winter 2002): 153–184.

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election of anti-reform candidate, Rafael Caldera, and the abandonment of Pérez's technocratic project altogether.

In this context, the only notable externalities to emerge were measures adopted in 1992 and 1993. The former gave Venezuela's Central Bank greater independence,[63] the latter sought to professionalize the judiciary and provide the Supreme Court more autonomy. Neither, however, had long-term political significance. According to an International Monetary Fund study on central bank independence, Venezuela's post-reform Central Bank still ranks thirteenth out of fifteen Latin American central banks (Argentina's ranks first and Mexico's fifth), enjoys more independence on paper than in practice,[64] and is poorly equipped to check executive actions. (In fact, since 1994 "most of the central bank's operations have been done by decree," due to ongoing political and economic disorder.)[65] Similarly, political support inside the government for Venezuela's judicial reforms failed to survive the purges accompanying Pérez's May 1993 impeachment. "By the middle of 1993, not a single government minister involved in the development of the [reforms] remained in office,"[66] power struggles between Venezuela's Judicial Council (which administered the judiciary branch) and Supreme Court stalled the implementation of the reforms for two more years,[67] and by 1999, the Chávez government had dissolved the Supreme Court and replaced it with a new Supreme Tribunal of Justice that was subordinate to the executive branch.[68]

Conclusions

This paper has argued that although a technocratic reform project's governance dimension can threaten democratic accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency, its programmatic dimension can generate

[63] Specifically, the reforms gave the bank independence to formulate monetary policy, introduced staggered, six-year non-renewable terms for its governors, and prohibited the bank from financing government debt. Ricardo Hausmann, "Quitting Populism Cold Turkey: The Big Bang Approach to Macroeconomic Balance" in L.W. Goodman, J.M. Forman, et al., eds., *Lessons of the Venezuelan Experience* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 275, 277.

[64] Luis I. Jácome H., "Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America During the 1990s" (IMF working paper, WP/01/212, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, December 2001).

[65] David M. Gould and Mary S. Rosenbaum, *Latin American Central Banking: Have Reforms Made a Difference*? (Dallas, TX and Atlanta, GA: Research Departments, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 11 June 1998), 8.

[66] Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "Halfway to Reform: The World Bank and the Venezuelan Justice System" (August 1996), 4, accessed on the website of Ciaonet at http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lch11/lch11.html, 28 September 2004. See also *Implementation Completion Report on a Loan in the Amount of US$30 Million to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for Judicial Infrastructure Development Project*, Report No. 26173 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 28 June 2003), 3.

[67] *Implementation Completion Report*, 15.

[68] Michael Coppedge, "Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty Versus Liberal Democracy," The Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series (working paper #294, The Kellogg Institute, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, April 2002), 32.

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democratizing externalities that, to some extent, help to mitigate these democratic deficits. Hence, the argument is not that technocratic reform projects ultimately work to the good of democracy, but rather, that they *can*. Under what conditions, then, might we see democracy-supporting dynamics?

Both the Argentine and Mexican cases suggest that the duration of reforms and a government's credible commitment to them can induce democratic externalities. The longer a reform program endures and the stronger a government's commitment to it is, the more likely it is that the content of market initiatives will stimulate some variant of democracy-enhancing second-stage reforms. The Venezuelan case reminds us, however, that in terms of generating such externalities, governmental commitment to a reform project and that project's duration are not of equal weight; both clearly matter, but the former is more a contributor to their development than a sufficient cause.

In a technocratic environment, the prospects of greater horizontal accountability via congress hinge on the legislature's ability to upgrade its technical capacity. This, in turn, is a function of executive–ruling party relations, the strategies that parties adopt toward technocratic executives, and internal party dynamics. As Javier Corrales has shown with respect to Argentina, ruling parties that tire of rubber-stamping executive initiatives may adopt a tactic of "negotiated support," whereby they willingly support a president in exchange for concessions (that is, modification of bills and proposals). "Precisely because they seek to negotiate with the Executive branch they will want to acquire technical guidance."[69] The more they strive to match an executive's technical capacity, the stronger are the prospects that congress as an institution will upgrade its technical skills, and the more likely it is that greater horizontal accountability will ensue.

Of course, not all strategies that parties adopt toward the executive are conducive to this type of horizontal accountability. In Salinas's Mexico, the ruling party sought neither to match the executive's technical prowess (as in Argentina) nor to obstruct executive initiatives (as in Venezuela). Instead, the PRI mostly accommodated the reform project, despite the populists' misgivings. It did so mainly because Salinas looked after the party's electoral interests, controlled its candidate selections, and wielded meta-constitutional powers to ensure that the party—and thus, Congress—conformed to his policy wishes.[70] The result was a pattern of executive–ruling party relations that left the PRI-controlled legislature few incentives to challenge Salinas's policy initiatives via technical upgrades. Only after Zedillo (who lacked Salinas's

[69] Corrales, "Legislative Oversight of New Technocracies," 13.

[70] For example, Salinas placated the PRI's old style, populist "dinosaurs" via PRONASOL—the multibillion dollar pork barrel program that helped the PRI compete politically and provided patronage money to disburse. He also deposed seventeen sitting governors who had fallen out of favor, jailed PRI union leaders who opposed the reforms, and controlled the party's nominations for congressional elections. However, because Salinas also protected the PRI's competitive edge, the upshot was, to some degree, a positive-sum game for the executive, ruling party, and Congress too.

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political skills) abandoned this relationship and the PRI saw its electoral prospects dim in the mid-1990s[71] did the ruling party begin challenging executive policy and budgetary initiatives more aggressively. Yet even then, the PRI chose merely to oppose Zedillo's market reforms and attack the technocrats,[72] not to hold the executive accountable by acquiring greater technical expertise.

Like the strategies parties adopt toward the executive and the pattern of executive–ruling party relations these strategies produce, the internal conditions of parties themselves also affect the legislature's propensity to develop greater technical expertise. Simply put, political parties that suffer internal divisions or disarray are poorly positioned to mount effective campaigns that enhance their technical capacity. Such was the case with Argentina's opposition party, the Radicals, whose internal divisions in the 1990s and poor record of economic management from the 1980s had left the party deeply demoralized. It also was the case with Venezuela's opposition party, the Christian Democrats, where one faction supported Pérez's reform program and another (led by Rafael Caldera) staunchly opposed it.[73]

The conditions conducive to greater democratic transparency are less clear-cut, because enhanced economic and financial transparency plays a less direct role in supporting democracy. Still, the stress that technocratic reforms place on transparency can have dramatic political consequences when technocratic administrations confront intense international scrutiny in the context of economic integration, economic crises, or strong domestic pressures for political liberalization. In these circumstances, they may feel compelled to institute greater political and electoral transparency in order to safeguard their reform programs. As Mexico's experience under Zedillo reveals, such measures can sustain and further propel democratizing trends. The cases of both Argentina and Mexico also suggest that greater transparency (and, to some degree, accountability) is likely when market reforms such as divestment of state-owned media and intensified market competition induce media openings.

This article, then, has implications for democracy in Latin America and in other regions in which technocratic reform projects have been adopted. Despite their tendency to generate deficits in accountability, checks and balances, representation, and transparency, these reform programs can also stimulate externalities that help restore or promote democracy in each dimension. These findings not only challenge conventional thinking about the relationship between democracy and technocracy, but also should hearten those concerned

[71] Besides acceding to political reforms that created a much more competitive electoral environment, Zedillo also discontinued Salinas's pork barrel PRONASOL initiative.

[72] For example, at its raucous 1996 General Assembly, the PRI rank and file revamped the party's candidate selection criteria in ways that made nearly all of Mexico's politically inexperienced technocrats ineligible to run for the presidency, Senate, or governorships. These rule changes stipulated that candidates for these offices must have been party members for at least ten years and have held prior elected office. See Williams, "Traversing the Mexican Odyssey," 178.

[73] Corrales, *Presidents Without Parties*, 57.

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about the future of democracy in an era in which technocracy casts long shadows. Because the current backlash against technocratic reforms in some quarters is unlikely to eliminate them in the near term, understanding the externalities that reform projects can create—and leveraging them to support democratic governance—seems a wise path to follow.

Toward this end, the energy expended in attacking technocracy as undemocratic and working or wishing for its demise could be better spent by increasing the pluralism of technocracies themselves. This is especially true for political parties, who, by virtue of their positions in congress, are well positioned to be proactive. By upgrading their own technical expertise, parties can empower legislatures and promote other beneficial ripple effects—both practical and political. *Real and open* debates among technical experts, for example, can better identify the pros and cons of economic policy, diffuse more information regarding these issues among the electorate, and enhance accountability, representation, and transparency in the process. Political parties, therefore (both ruling and opposition), should strive to become *more* technically savvy, not less. Augmenting their technical capacity is no substitute for traditional means of party representation; it is, however, a new, important, and undervalued tool that can permit parties to represent their constituents more effectively in a technocratized environment. Ultimately, the more we understand the democracy-supporting potential of technocratic reform projects, the more likely political actors are to maximize their potential and avoid the zero-sum scenario.*

* I wish to thank Erik Bleich, Javier Corrales, and Vinay Jawahar for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. I am also grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions.

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







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Book Reviews

Electing Justice: Fixing the Supreme Court Nomination Process *by Richard Davis. New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. 224 pp. $28.00.*

The death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005 and the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor have occasioned the first Supreme Court confirmation proceedings in eleven years. Publication of *Electing Justice*, therefore, could hardly be more timely.

In Richard Davis's view, judicial selection, for most of American history, has been marked by insularity. Rarely has acceptance or rejection of nominees been affected by anyone outside the executive branch, the Senate, and the legal community. That cozy arrangement has passed. Beginning no more than forty years ago, a new process began to emerge that involved not only the traditional players, but external ones—the news media, interest groups, and public opinion. The few controversies, over nominees such as Stanley Matthews (1881), Louis Brandeis (1916), and John Parker (1930), in which many players participated, have become routine. The Senate Judiciary Committee's public hearings in 1962 on Byron White lasted all of one hour and thirty-five minutes, and the published record filled but twenty-six pages. Those for Rehnquist, in 1986, consumed four long days and 1,165 pages, a statistic soon surpassed by marathon committee sessions and multi-volume sets for Robert Bork (1987) and Clarence Thomas (1991). Moreover, the time between nomination and confirmation has lengthened substantially. For Warren Burger in 1969, barely 19 days elapsed between the two events; for "constituency" candidate (p. 62) Thomas it was 107. Even for "consensual" candidate (p. 63) Stephen Breyer (1994), the gap was 77.

Reasons for this altered state of affairs abound. Technology has revolutionized the news business. The range of issues that today occupies the Court's time is unprecedented. The docket reads like a policy agenda for the nation. That reality coexists alongside intense partisan divisions in Congress that are fed by each party's reliance on, and loyalty to, its base. The democratization of other aspects of the political process, such as nomination and election of presidents, has transformed the selection of justices into "an election without voters" (p. 9). Indeed, the puzzle is "not why the process has become more

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open but really why a system dominated by a small set of elites lasted so long" (p. 178).

What is needed, Davis believes, is a restructuring of selection to "mesh constitutional structure with reality and preserve the trend of democratization" (p. 13) by taking into account the permanent role of external players. This goal can be achieved through modified behavior of participants and by statutes and constitutional amendment. Included in the first category is a new approach to confirmation hearings that steers clear of the inquisition and current charade, in which senators "pretend to ask questions the nominee will actually answer, while nominees pretend to answer the questions the senators actually ask" (p. 160). Moreover, when nominees have established views on issues, they should state them. Yet in suggesting that nominees also "should never imply that they would vote a certain way on future cases" (p. 168), the author expects senators and the public to grasp a difficult subtlety and therefore may be asking forthcoming nominees to walk the political plank. The second category includes popular nonpartisan election of justices for eighteen-year terms, following nomination of several candidates by the president and vetting by the Senate (p. 171). For Davis, this step would openly acknowledge the Court's political role. Selection by the electorate would promote accountability and, by divorcing the Court from any particular group or institution, shore up its independence. One suspects, however, that the forces of transformation that the author describes so well would doom the changes he deems necessary for a confirmation process worthy of both Court and people.

DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.
Franklin & Marshall College

Making Sense of Suicide Missions *by Diego Gambetta, ed. New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. 378 pp. $45.00.*

The attacks of 11 September 2001 have filled entire library shelves with books on terrorism and Islam, and have sparked a jump in the number of works on "suicide terrorism." Wisely, Oxford University professor Diego Gambetta has shunned the label "suicide terrorism" in this edited volume to focus instead on "suicide missions"—a term that allows the contributors to examine suicide attacks used not only by terrorist organizations, but also by insurgent groups (e.g., the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]) and by conventional armies (Japan's *kamikaze*). The product of this enterprise is a very readable, insightful, and methodologically rigorous volume that, despite raising more questions than it answers, stands as the most sophisticated book-length treatment of this burgeoning topic to date.

In his well-researched introductory chapter on the *kamikaze*, Peter Hill convincingly argues that rather than the "glory of dying for [the emperor]"

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(p. 24), it was the protection of family and country that motivated Japan's suicide attack squads.

In the following chapter, on the Sri Lankan LTTE, Stephen Hopgood argues that the attacks of the organization's elite suicide squad, the Black Tigers, "aim primarily to win the war, not to spread terror" (p. 55). He doubts that the cult of the LTTE's leader, Vellupilai Prabhakaran, is a sufficient explanation for the use of suicide missions. Instead, he contends that the use of this modus operandi results from a desire to achieve victory in an asymmetric war against a more powerful enemy.

Next, Luca Ricolfi discusses suicide attacks against Israel using a statistically valuable analysis based on an integrated database. Ricolfi's linkage of Lebanese and Palestinian suicide attacks against Israel, however, may raise some eyebrows, especially in light of the chapter's deceiving title ("Palestinians, 1981–2003").

In an intellectually stimulating essay ("Al Qaeda, September 11, 2001"), Stephen Holmes shows that the grievances of the September 11 attackers were not distinctively Islamic but were, at the very least, a blurring of personal frustration, political protest, and religious conviction. Although largely speculative, Holmes's brilliant philosophical foray into the minds of the September 11 hijackers is the most thought-provoking treatment of this subject that has come to this reviewer's attention.

Among the book's many strengths is the broad wealth of methodologies used to offer insights into the genesis of suicide missions. Chapters 5 and 6 prove particularly useful in this regard. In chapter 5 ("Dying without Killing"), Michael Biggs examines self-immolations, a subject usually excluded from research on suicide attacks. In chapter 6 ("Killing without Dying"), Stathis Kalyvas and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca address the question of why so few organizations embark on suicide missions. They observe that suicide missions tend to occur in organizations that enjoy either very limited or very strong support among their constituencies (for example, al Qaeda and Hamas, respectively). In the intermediate cases, such as those of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna or the Irish Republican Army, "in which the degree of popular support is crucial but generally weak" (p. 223), suicide missions are a rarity.

Both Jan Elster, in chapter 7, and Diego Gambetta, in the concluding chapter, refer to the inherent complexity of suicide missions. Common themes of all suicide missions, the book's editor summarizes, include the need for organizational support, which may vary in type and structure. Suicide missions, Gambetta contends, are carried out largely, although not exclusively, by the weaker side in asymmetric conflicts, and they "have been used to attack only democracies" (p. 265)—a statement that seems outdated in light of attacks increasingly directed against non-democratic states (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as well as particular communities, such as the Shias in Iraq.

Indeed, the book's limited ability to explain what increasingly crystallizes as a new generation of suicide attacks attributed to global jihadi groups—

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attacks that do not emanate from traditional organizations or that are not targeted exclusively at democracies, such as attacks in Turkey, Iraq, Morocco, and, most recently, the United Kingdom—is one of its few shortcomings.

ASSAF MOGHADAM
Harvard University

Healthy, Wealthy, & Fair: Health Care and the Good Society *by James A. Morone and Lawrence R. Jacobs, eds. New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. 382 pp. $29.95.*

If there is one quality the United States lacks, compared to other advanced societies, it is a sense of social solidarity—the belief that everyone can contribute to the well-being of others. The individual and the market prevail instead. Unlike our reliance on voluntarism, which rests on individual initiative, social responsibility, as it is practiced in Europe at any rate, includes—in fact, requires—state action. But Americans simply don't trust their government and don't like big government. Social Security and Medicare are exceptions—for the "deserving" who contributed their dues.

All of the authors in this masterful volume edited by James Morone and Lawrence Jacobs recognize that the U.S. government exacerbates the problem of inequality. Although some public programs have improved the lives of disadvantaged Americans, the politics of checks and balances hinders national efforts to advance equality. Tapping what they believe is our best vehicle for "bold action," the editors call on the populace and its leaders to "think big" (p. 13). They and their contributing authors seek to inform Americans about the great injustices that exist in our systems of income redistribution and health care, believing that this knowledge could and should create a "revolution." In their view "the vibrant American sense of community" is a powerful vehicle for change. The theme of this book is that "our current dilemmas call for a return to that robust, egalitarian spirit of help-your-neighbor" (p. 15). It follows that the outpouring of assistance during natural disasters could be channeled to alleviating the disasters of poverty and ill health, bypassing the inadequacies of government.

In describing and explaining the sorry state of gross inequalities in income and health in the United States, more than half of the chapters analyze the ideologies, interests, and structural faults that support the status quo. Private interests, including organized labor, counteract efforts to represent minorities and the disadvantaged; the courts reflect dominant social and political power; and Congress has become a "graveyard." Several chapters propose bottom-up change. They find that the spirit of community grows in grassroots initiatives that multiply success. Once in place, even small policy changes can grow and eventually make a difference, as occurred in the Medicaid program.

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One chapter addresses head on a fundamental tension in the mission of this volume. Lawrence D. Brown astutely observes that there is a danger in relying on community spirit and grassroots initiatives, for they rest on "small-scale social thinking" that reinforces "self-satisfied localism" and precludes "the solidarity that cements a strong sense of national community" (pp. 330, 331). He argues that incrementalism can achieve significant social improvement. It can "blunt, disguise, and protect redistributive deeds," making them more manageable and slowly eroding the prevailing big thinking of an anti-redistributive right (p. 328). He also outlines the many forces—structural, institutional, and normative—that congenitally hinder big thinking in the United States. His resolution comes in the suggestion that these two paths to achieving equality (comprehensive big thinking and incrementalism) are not contradictory, but complementary and interdependent. Each is situated in time and place. The current big thinking in Washington harbors a meanness that is not reflected in the community. So, when the opportunity arises, the myriad small steps that the other authors are witnessing can coalesce and create the Big Idea that will, in turn, bind them—and us.

This volume offers superb analyses of what is wrong with American social policy, why it is weak, and how it results in our low rankings in the health Olympics. It is must reading for relevant courses. We can only hope, along with the authors, that the vision it advances is realized sooner, rather than too late.

MARY RUGGIE
Harvard University

Military Tribunals and Presidential Power: American Revolution to the War on Terrorism *by Louis Fisher. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005. 279 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $16.95.*

In July of 2005, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled unanimously that President George W. Bush had authority under federal law to try by a military commission ("military tribunal" is a synonymous term) members of al Qaeda who were determined by competent authority not to merit prisoner-of-war status. Given the long history and frequent use of military tribunals in the United States, the court's ruling is not surprising.

As Louis Fisher shows in his new book, *Military Tribunals and Presidential Power*, military tribunals were used: in the Revolutionary War, against the British spy, Major John Andre, (who was hanged); in the conflict with the Creek Indians in Florida in 1818, against two British subjects; during the Mexican-American War, principally against American troops, to deter them from harming Mexican citizens (117 individuals tried); during the Civil War, against spies and others who materially assisted the Confederacy; in 1862 in Minnesota, against several hundred Dakota Sioux who committed violence upon settlers (38 hanged after

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most were pardoned by President Lincoln); in 1865, against the conspirators in the Lincoln assassination (four sentenced to death); during the American occupation of the Philippines early in the twentieth century, against the local population; during World War II, against Nazi saboteurs and in Hawaii; and at the end of the war, against some thousands of Japanese and Germans. For the most part, the courts have either upheld the legality of military tribunals or ruled that they had no authority to overturn their decisions. (The Civil War case *ex parte Milligan* is the most conspicuous exception.)

Fisher's principal complaint with the history and judicial endorsement of military tribunals is the dominance of the executive branch in initiating and directing them. This has resulted in "a stunning transformation from a republican form of government, characterized by legislative control and a vigorous system of checks and balances, to a system of military tribunals that concentrates power in the executive branch and particularly in the presidency" (p. 253). Defenders of military tribunals, by contrast, can draw on the same history Fisher details to argue that since the beginning of the republic, presidents and legislators have recognized the value and legitimacy of military tribunals to try offenses against the law of war. As the Supreme Court wrote in 1952 (quoted in the DC Circuit's July opinion), military tribunals are "our common-law war courts. . . . Neither their procedure nor their jurisdiction has been prescribed by statute" (Quoted on p. 18 of *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*, U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, 15 July 2005, accessed at http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/dc/045393a.pdf, 10 January 2006).

Although Congress has left the creation, structure, and use of military tribunals to executive discretion, federal law has long recognized military tribunals. Under the law, such tribunals have "concurrent jurisdiction" with courts martial (which mainly govern members of the Armed Forces) for "offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals" (*U.S. Code*, Title 10, § 821). Also, the law authorizes the president to issue regulations to govern "courts martial, military commissions and other military tribunals." Here the president should apply the principles of law and rules of evidence used in the federal courts "as far as he considers practicable" (*U.S. Code*, Title 10, § 836). The Bush administration cites both provisions in defending the legality of military tribunals.

Perhaps the deepest constitutional question regarding military tribunals is whether a president has independent constitutional authority—either as holder of the executive power or as Commander in Chief—to establish and use military tribunals. Fisher's answer is a resounding no. Yet in the leading Supreme Court case upholding military tribunals—the Nazi saboteur case, *ex parte Quirin*, (1942)—the justices showed some support for the argument of independent presidential authority: "By his Order creating the present Commission [President Roosevelt] has undertaken to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions

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which may constitutionally be performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war" [*Ex parte Quirin*, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), 28]. Because the justices unanimously held that Roosevelt had ample statutory authority for his order, it was not necessary to explore the full reaches of the Commander in Chief power in this respect.

Although the issue of independent presidential authority to establish military tribunals is not likely to be resolved by the courts anytime soon, there are any number of other important questions about such tribunals on which to focus our attention in the years ahead. May they be extended to American citizens? (Bush has limited them to non-citizens.) Do lawful non-citizen residents of the United States have any greater legal protections than foreigners? Are there any constitutional protections for defendants before military tribunals that trump the president's statutory authority to apply the usual federal rules of evidence only "as far as he considers practicable" (cited above)? And, generally, will the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the procedures and decisions of the military tribunals used against members of al Qaeda or other international terrorists? For addressing these and related questions, Fisher's highly readable and engaging account is the indispensable introduction.

JOSEPH M. BESSETTE
Claremont McKenna College

Trust and Mistrust in International Relations *by Andrew H. Kydd. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005. 388 pp. $39.50.*

Andrew H. Kydd's impressive new book speaks to a range of topics, including debates within realism, the capacity of hegemons to foster international cooperation, the qualitative analysis of events data, how to interpret the origins and demise of the Cold War, challenges facing the United States in the post-Cold War era, and the roles of trust and reassurance in interstate relations. This is a book everyone should read.

Kydd's research revolves around four game-theoretic models he designed to capture the prospects for cooperation in an unregulated environment. Common to all of the models is the assumption that uncertainty about the trustworthiness of others impedes collaboration. Nevertheless, in nearly every case, Kydd shows that trusting parties can overcome their fears and work together even though doing so involves a risk of exploitation. Information is the key. Anything that permits states to accurately assess their counterparts' intentions enables trustworthy types to distinguish themselves from scoundrels and establish mutual cooperation.

The implications of this argument are significant. Kydd provides practitioners reason to believe that building trust, even among suspicious parties, is not hopeless and that "step-by-step" diplomacy can build trust even among highly suspicious parties. Kydd shows theorists that predictions about the

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inevitability of conflict depend on some uncomfortable assumptions: states must be both untrustworthy *and* incapable of learning about the reliability of others for the most pessimistic "war of all against all" scenarios to come to fruition. Permitting even slight variations in these assumptions opens the door to levels of cooperation that are difficult to reconcile with portrayals of international politics that emphasize persistent conflict.

Methodologically, Kydd suggests that analysts can use observed behavior to draw inferences about the trustworthiness of states, even if direct evidence about their motivations is unavailable. This is an interesting idea, given the difficulty of measuring trust and of gaining access to the kinds of data typically required to assess intentions. Kydd argues that what scholars need in order to draw conclusions about trust are predictions about the types of behaviors that trustworthy and untrustworthy states are likely to exhibit. For example, Kydd sides with scholars who conclude that the USSR was untrustworthy after WWII, based on its efforts to dominate smaller states, like Poland, because trustworthy states are unlikely to engage in such behavior.

Kydd also makes some questionable claims. For instance, he finds that making states more powerful makes them less trustworthy. However, asymmetric power relationships, in which one actor gives another control over something of value, are central to trusting relationships. Initial capability differences between potential trustors and trustees should not matter at all. Rational actors know that trusting others means that their interests may be damaged, and yet they do it anyway, because they believe that their counterparts will not take advantage of them. The underlying problem is Kydd's conceptualization of trust. Although Kydd portrays trust as the expectation that others will cooperate, it is better defined as the expectation that others will advance rather than harm interests placed under their control. Using this latter definition would have made it difficult to conclude that *ex ante* power relations are significant, but it also might have forced Kydd to reconsider his claim that binding commitments are critical for establishing trusting relationships. Binding commitments may help states cooperate, but because they limit the discretion of trustees, they are a substitute for trust, not a cause.

These objections aside, Andrew Kydd's book is a model of systematic thinking about important subjects. The field of international relations is stronger because of its publication.

AARON M. HOFFMAN
Purdue University

Trust and Rule *by Charles Tilly. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 216 pp. $19.99.*

At least since the publication of Robert Putnam's seminal *Making Democracy Work* (*Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton,

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NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), trust, whether personal, societal, or embedded in particular social institutions or networks, has been a central preoccupation of social scientists. As Putnam and others have contended, trust is the central component of the social capital that greases the wheels of democracy. Moreover, trust, in almost all of its guises and virtually everywhere, from the industrially advanced West to the remote confines of the Third World, appears to be in decline. This development, in turn, is thought to place democracy, both at home and abroad, at considerable peril.

Charles Tilly's treatment of the subject of trust does not depart far from these central conventional wisdoms about the importance of trust to a well-functioning democracy. Nonetheless, in *Trust and Rule*, he brings to light a host of discreet interactions between trust and democratic politics largely overlooked by other scholars. Arguably, the book's most important contribution is unpacking how trust affects the processes of democratization and de-democratization at the national level. This is one of the weakest points of the renewed emphasis that scholars have placed upon the concept of trust.

For the neo-Tocquevillean school of thought pioneered by Putnam, trust is a by-product of the configuration of civil society. Strong civil societies are rich in trust, whereas weak ones are, on the whole, devoid of trust. This simplistic analytical formulation leaves unclear how and why trust matters to the development or detriment of democracy at the national level. Tilly himself directly addresses this point by noting that "Putnam's work on Italy and the United States puts the connections between trust and democracy prominently on the agenda of democratic theory without actually stating a clear argument concerning the causal chain between trust and democracy" (p. 132).

Tilly views trust as a historical product rather than a phenomenon whose variation can be explained without reference to history. In particular, he contends that trust is best understood in terms of risks. He writes: "Trust networks consist of ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failure of others" (p. 12). Trust's relationship to democracy is an interactive one: the integration of trust networks into public politics promotes democracy, whereas the withdrawal of trust networks weakens democracy.

Tilly theorizes that democracy combines extensive integration of trust networks into public politics with the heavy reliance of rulers on commitment rather than coercion and as means of ensuring political compliance. This leads him to conclude that the future of democracy depends on the capacity of states to hang onto trust networks, because their withdrawal from public politics damages democracy. This withdrawal is likely to occur not only because of bad political performance, but also as a consequence of a host of other factors, including privatization of social security or health care, withdrawal of elites or minorities from public schools, and substitution of electronic communication for direct contact among political activists.

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Few scholars are likely to disagree with Tilly's well-reasoned theories, although many are likely to object to the methodology he adopts to prove them. Typical of his approach to the study of political phenomena, his historical-analytical framework is literally all over the place. It spans centuries and incorporates a disparate collection of empirical experiences ranging from medieval Europe to contemporary Mexican and Spanish politics. Certainly, this is likely to be a source of frustration for those who like their social science research agendas neatly packaged into well-defined historical narratives.

A more substantial criticism of the book, however, is the way in which Tilly and many others continue to regard trust (however defined) as the only compass for understanding the workings and fate of democracy. It is high time to rediscover the democratic virtues of a guarded—and indeed mistrusting—public.

OMAR G. ENCARNACIÓN
Bard College

From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government in Hungary and Poland *by Susan Rose-Ackerman. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 272 pp. $50.00.*

Susan Rose-Ackerman's latest book is the clearest statement yet of the inadequacy of mechanistic indicators of democracy. Free elections, the existence of political parties, and even freedom of speech and association are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a government that is answerable to the citizens it serves. They can help to remove officials from office, and introduce their replacements; but they cannot ensure that governments will fulfill their electoral programs, provide public goods instead of seeking private benefits, or reflect popular needs.

This study of the channels of accountability in two post-communist democracies powerfully demonstrates that to achieve policy-making accountability, in which policies reflect the "interests and needs of the population" (p. 5), several additional institutional channels have to connect governments and citizens. Rose-Ackerman examines five of these: the demands of external organizations, specifically the EU; formal institutions of oversight and control, such as ombudsmen, constitutional courts, or audit offices; decentralized government institutions, such as elected local officials and regional governments; government procedures for public consultation and participation in policy making; and civil society groups and the policy input they provide.

The key finding of the book is that as critical as these five channels are, they have developed unevenly, and often with considerable flaws, in post-communist democracies. For example, even nominally independent audit commissions and ombudsmen are subject to parliamentary approval, and thus to political nominations. Civil service organizations, whether environmentalists in Hungary

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or student groups in Poland, are rarely taken into account when government policies on natural resources or education are formulated. Such organizations, even when formally included in consultations, suffer from under-funding and lack of outreach. As a result, Rose-Ackerman argues, two-pronged reforms are necessary: first, an open accounting by the government of the reasons and justifications for its policy proposals; and second, a new framework for the funding and support of civil society organizations. Throughout, the argument is buttressed by carefully researched and extremely well documented evidence, ranging from government statistics to extensive interviews with key policy makers and activists.

As compelling as the study is, the analysis raises two critical questions. First, why compare Poland to Hungary? Since there is little variation in any of the five dimensions between the two countries (with some exceptions, such as elected regional governments in Poland and the distinct preferences for devolution in the two countries), what theoretical leverage do we gain from this comparison? In other words, are Poland and Hungary different enough to illuminate key causal mechanisms or policy prescriptions? What broader population of countries or issues do they represent—could, for example, this comparison shed light on the more problematic post-communist regimes of Russia or the Balkans? Second, in arguing that the existing structures are inadequate, the question becomes: compared to what? Rose-Ackerman argues that the United States provides several examples of public participation and oversight in the policy process—but it is not clear whether these provide the most effective solutions available, or ones that best meet her criteria.

Nonetheless, these concerns do not subtract from what is a beautifully clear, meticulous work of scholarship that is as concerned with analyzing the shortcomings of post-communist democracy as it is focused on providing potential solutions.

ANNA GRZYMALA-BUSSE
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Dying To Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror *by Mia Bloom. New York, Columbia University Press, 2005. 251 pp. $24.95.*

One of the obvious consequences of September 11 is a renewed interest in the phenomenon of terrorism. Dozens of books and articles have been published on this subject matter in the last four years, but unfortunately, as in the 1970s, when there was another wave of publications, resulting from the emergence of revolutionary terrorism in many developed countries, most of them have very little added value and do not employ the analytical and methodological tools of the social sciences.

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The most shocking manifestation of terrorism today is the suicide mission (SM). It is only logical that scholars have turned their attention to this phenomenon. Mia Bloom's book represents a welcome addition to a rapidly growing field of research in which several monographs and edited volumes have been published very recently.

The more original part of the book is the theoretical one. The author considers that SMs are rational from the point of view of both the organization and the individual. However, the concept of rationality is so loose and encompassing, including all kinds of instrumental and expressive factors, that it is very hard to understand what could count as irrational behavior in this context. More interestingly, Bloom offers three testable hypotheses—there will be SMs: when other terrorist or military tactics fail, when there is competition among terrorist groups, and when the constituency in whose name the terrorists act accepts the killing of civilians.

Although there is no research design to test these claims in a truly comparative way, the book contains rich information about Palestinian terrorist organizations, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey, and to a lesser extent SMs in Chechnya and Iraq. Strangely enough, al Qaeda plays a very minor role in the book. But al Qaeda casts some doubts on all three hypotheses. It is not clear what exactly the previous failure of al Qaeda is, how al Qaeda, given its transnational nature, is constrained by public opinion, or how competition with other organizations has induced al Qaeda to launch SMs.

The hypothesis about competition is, in fact, the more problematic. Given her own evidence on Sri Lanka, it seems that the SMs of the LTTE in the 1990s took place once this organization had eliminated its competitors. The lack of figures in the book makes it hard for the reader to reach any definitive judgement. Even in the case of Palestine, it is not obvious whether the adoption of SMs by other organizations, apart from Hamas, is a result of outbidding or, more simply, from a process of contagion. Once other organizations learned the technique and its efficacy, they adopted it. One may argue that outbidding and diffusion have, at this level of generality, similar observational consequences. A more fine-grained analysis would be necessary to settle the issue. Finally, it is worth noting that competition among terrorist organizations was fierce during the Troubles in Northern Ireland and in Italy in the 1970s, and did not lead to SMs.

The book contains a chapter on historical antecedents, but the late-nineteenth-century anarchists and Russian social revolutionaries, the first truly human bombs, are not even mentioned. There are also chapters on the contagion of SMs across countries, on women who participate in SMs, and on current events in Iraq and their foreseeable consequences for terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.

IGNACIO SÁNCHEZ-CUENCA
Juan March Institute, Madrid

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The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush *by Dale R. Herspring. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005. 512 pp. $45.00.*

Over the past decade, the topic of civil–military relations has gone from being the exclusive purview of a small group of scholars and practitioners to a topic of high public drama and extensive political and journalistic hand wringing. Most of the popular examples of civil–military relations gone wrong come from the Clinton presidency, with those on both the right and the left pointing with alarm to the same events, with competing conclusions. Autobiographers from that era point with "Shock and Awe" to various threats to "The Republic" narrowly averted on their watch. All such tales share a common error. They assume that the 1990s provided the first such challenge to the very core of American democracy.

Richard Herspring takes up the commendable challenge of reminding us that when it comes to civil–military relations, there is little new under the sun. Tracing events through the Cold War era to the present, Herspring effectively and fairly charts multiple approaches to the complex dynamics of civil–military relations. The one great failing of this book, however, is a flaw that he partially acknowledges at the outset. In his effort to thoroughly examine twelve presidents and countless generals and admirals, he chooses to rely almost entirely on secondary sources.

Reliance on secondary sources to study Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman does not diminish the quality of Herspring's analysis. From Dwight Eisenhower's presidency forward, however, available primary source records have not been exhaustively reviewed and resolved. Given that some of those presidents and their apologists and critics still walk among us, this is a dangerous practice. In the latter chapters of this lengthy work, that weakness is clearly apparent.

Nowhere is this more evident than in his discussion of the Clinton presidency. Given the cottage industry of hate-based and error-filled tomes, one would expect a scholar of the American presidency to tread carefully. Instead, Herspring accepts at face value tales that have become urban legends, including the now-infamous report of a confrontation between General Barry McCaffrey and a White House staffer, reprinted here in its original alarmist form. McCaffrey and others present on that occasion have consistently debunked this version, explaining that the rude and offensive individual in question was not on the White House staff and that the President was angered and embarrassed by this event.

This is not to accuse the author of partisan bias. In most instances, Herspring simply ignores available original documents long in public circulation. President Ronald Reagan, for example, is poorly served here by accounts that oversimplify many of his now widely acknowledge successful and nuanced approaches to security policy. Lyndon Johnson is seen in his familiar, one-

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dimensional role as the epitome of all that is wrong with civil–military relations, although the archival record shows a far more complex reality. John F. Kennedy receives more credit than is his due in his relationship with General Maxwell Taylor. Taylor is seen coming to the young President's rescue, when, in fact, Taylor contributed both wisdom and folly in near-equal measure.

There is much in this book to commend to the careful reader more fully versed in these case studies. Herspring's introductory framework and general conclusions about institutions and their processes can be effectively applied to narrower, more exhaustively researched cases. Had he done so, this book would almost certainly be among the essential readings on this topic.

JAY M. PARKER
Center for the Study of the Presidency

The Business of Lobbying in China *by Scott Kennedy. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2005. 278 pp. $49.95.*

The impact of business associations and the practice of lobbying in China have been largely ignored by the literature. These are extremely sensitive topics in China and thus very difficult to research. Business associations have traditionally been little more than an arm of the state. Moreover, insofar as business associations deviate from their traditional form and function, they do not fit into any of the prevailing models of Chinese political economy. Scott Kennedy's excellent new book, *The Business of Lobbying in China*, confronts these challenges and provides a much-needed fixative to this lacuna in the literature.

Kennedy quickly dispenses with the conventional wisdom that "Chinese firms are not interested in public policy because they are subject to a state-controlled associational system" (p. 2). He then moves on to demonstrate the poor fit of several of the prevailing models of China's political economy in explaining the phenomenon of business associations and lobbying in China. First, taking aim at the state corporatism model, Kennedy argues that many Chinese business associations are, like their government counterparts, largely *de*centralized. They demonstrate a non-hierarchical, "flat" organizational structure that is not subject to control by trans-sectoral associations. Moreover, there is considerable overlap, competition, and horizontal division between many of these associations.

If this suggests a growing degree of pluralism, Kennedy is quick to qualify such a conclusion. While documenting a number of instances of association autonomy, Kennedy also shows that associations are required to register with the government and that they are often staffed in part by government officials. These constraints, ironically, force these associations to interact with the government along a "variety of avenues, indirect and direct" (p. 45). Kennedy is thus careful never to overstate the significant yet necessarily modest degree of pluralism exhibited by these associations. Finally, Kennedy also rejects

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clientelism as a primary explanatory variable, asserting at one point that "even companies that had good connections credibly downplayed their importance" (p. 110).

Rather, Kennedy argues that what is occurring combines elements of all three of these models. His central thesis is that variation in the manner and the outcomes of government–business interactions in China "are related to the varying economic circumstances of individual firms and the sectors of which they are a part" (p. 56). Kennedy supports these claims with three sectoral case studies: steel, consumer electronics, and software. The chapter on steel nicely updates Edward Steinfeld's earlier analysis (*Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), while the consumer electronics and software chapters offer fascinating new insights into the dynamics within these sectors. Each of these chapters is organized around a thorough description of the associational structure for the specific sector and concludes with several case studies that illustrate how these associations actually work.

One question that remains somewhat ambiguous at the conclusion is the specific causal relationship between politics and policy. Conceptually, Kennedy treats policy as an outcome of lobbying. Yet his case studies imply strongly that particular policies can induce or undermine collective action—and thus the form of political activity—among these business associations. Price floor and standardization controversies demonstrated a singular lack of cohesion among associations, whereas taxation served to unite these same associations. Most important, these dynamics hold *across* the sectors examined by Kennedy. While I think that Kennedy is correct that, on balance, politics determines policy, I would have preferred a more detailed discussion on why a reversal of the causal relationship between politics and policy provides a less robust explanation.

That aside, Scott Kennedy has produced an exceptional book that should be required reading in graduate and upper-level undergraduate courses on China's political economy and the political economies of developing countries more generally.

ANDREW C. MERTHA
Washington University, St. Louis

Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the Balkans *by Brian C. Rathbun. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2004. 228 pp. $39.95.*

International norms on the use of force were badly shaken by the civil conflicts of the 1990s. Although the end of the Cold War seemed to open huge possibilities for new actors and actions, the rules on the legitimate use of force had been designed to prevent external aggression and respect the norm of non-

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intervention in sovereign states. What then to do with the violent collapse of Yugoslavia, civil wars in Africa, war-induced humanitarian crises, or the growing demand for military power in support of diplomacy and robust "peace enforcement"? European states especially faced the dilemma—should they act, how, and under what rules toward Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere, and should they create a European defense independent of the United States?

According to this detailed study based on extensive interviews, private papers, and public speeches, elected politicians in Britain, France, and Germany chose policies based on partisan ideology. Left and right matter in conceptions of the appropriate use of force internationally (anti-militarists who stress the "spiral model" and multilateralism versus "hawks" who apply a "deterrence model" and may also prefer unilateralism) and in their definitions of national interest (inclusivists versus exclusivists). When their values conflict in a particular case, "ideologues" use "simple evaluative rules" of low complexity while "pragmatists"—found among those more engaged in foreign policy or in a governing coalition rather than the opposition—are able to "differentiate," make trade-offs, and evolve.

This study is a serious contribution to the literature on the domestic sources of foreign policy and the role of "ideas" as against either "national culture" or "electoral profit." The book is particularly useful in demonstrating the role of history—not so much in Brian Rathbun's effort to argue the crucial legacy of World War II for national attitudes toward force (he would need more cases to go beyond the obvious or to distinguish this argument more clearly from that of the culturalists he criticizes), but in his demonstration that the 1990s, particularly the war in Bosnia, was a critical juncture. The freedom (and necessity) to apply principles to new circumstances led to "normative evolution" (p. 31) on the use of military power abroad; preferences on Kosovo or defense cooperation, for example, would never have been possible without the agonies over Bosnia and the policy precedents set, which he illustrates most strikingly for Germany.

A theory of partisan preferences (p. 19) is not, however, a theory of foreign policy. Principles operate in relation to available and specific options, international mandates, alliances, and the interdependencies of coalitions and policy choices. The book ignores the role, for example, of German policy toward Croatia in 1991, evolving debates on NATO, Mitterrand's flight into Sarajevo, or General Rupert Smith's successful military strategy to end the Bosnian war, whereas Iraq in 2003 is called a humanitarian intervention. Opening the realists' domestic black box on the parliamentary side of foreign policy should not lead one to close it on the executive and external sides. Although Rathbun's descriptions of policy options on military power or politicians' reaction to the hostage crisis of 1995 or the Srebrenica massacre map closely with the partisan debates at the time, they bear almost no relation to the specific policies and operations being adopted, their causes, or the international and alliance context shaping national policies. The resulting

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misinterpretations in these three cases lead one to question the utility of a theory of partisan preferences on foreign policy divorced from the actual policy options, actors, choices, and context—and particularly on a subject of such magnitude as the evolution in attitudes toward military force since 1991.

SUSAN L. WOODWARD
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Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race, and Exclusion in Southern Europe *by Kitty Calavita. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 278 pp. Cloth, $90.00; paper, $39.99.*

Policies related to immigrant integration in Europe have come under scrutiny in the past few years, particularly after the murder of Theo Van Gogh, the March 2004 terror attacks in Madrid, and more recently, London, in July 2005, in which immigrants and naturalized citizens were involved. In this context, Italy and Spain, the "new countries of immigration," face major challenges in dealing with immigration flows. These former sending countries are now the recipients of large numbers of people from Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Kitty Calavita has undertaken an analysis of the nature of immigrant integration in these countries and the impact of laws and labor market segmentation. She finds that the niches that these immigrants fill, along with laws that often lead to their illegal status, contribute to their exclusion, despite vigorous efforts to integrate them.

Calavita argues against the idea of a trend toward transnational citizenship, with immigrants gaining rights similar to those of citizens. Instead, she finds racialization and the development of an underclass of workers with uncertain status, even in the face of recurring regularizations of illegal immigrants. The focus of the analysis is on "third-world" immigrants who come from non-European Union countries (that is, developing countries). These immigrants (or illegal immigrants) tend to take jobs that natives are unwilling to do, particularly in manufacturing, domestic service, and agriculture. For example, in Italy, manufacturers in the North could rely in the past on a labor supply from the South. However, those workers have become unwilling to relocate for jobs paying wages that would barely allow them to survive in the expensive cities of the North. These industries now rely heavily on immigrant labor, as do industries such as hothouse agriculture in Spain.

Calavita begins her book with a rather refreshing acknowledgement of the fact that her fieldwork led her to change her hypotheses regarding the outcome of immigration policies. She did not find approaches to immigrant integration that were more progressive in traditionally leftist regions and less progressive in conservative regions, so her empirical focus shifted to the "question of how immigrant marginality and exclusion get constructed and reconstructed despite apparently strenuous efforts to reverse them" (p. 8).

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Both Italy and Spain passed laws aimed at integrating immigrants in the late 1990s, although these laws were toughened by conservative governments who had used the issue of immigration control to gain electoral support, particularly in Italy. However, Calavita finds that there are more regional differences in policy than there are cross-national differences. The regional differences tend to be based on the initiatives of local politicians and nongovernmental organizations, regardless of their ideological perspectives.

Calavita identifies an important contradiction between laws that encourage immigrant integration and the nature of immigrant labor, in which immigrants are expected to take dangerous and/or low-wage jobs that will keep them in the underclass. The legal status of immigrants becomes contingent on their holding work permits, yet, even with legal residence permits, immigrants are often only able to find work "off the books" in the "black economy." Also, immigrants are more likely to be homeless, which can be a barrier to the provision of services such as healthcare. Therefore, despite large amounts of money and sincere efforts put into policies that would integrate immigrants, these efforts are destined to fail, because many of these immigrants are economically marginalized.

Calavita has done a very insightful and important analysis of the economics of immigration, immigrant integration, and the law in action in Spain and Italy. This book is highly recommended for those interested in immigration politics, immigrant integration, and how laws impact day-to-day life for those looking to improve their lives in Europe.

TERRI E. GIVENS
University of Texas, Austin

Modern Romania: The End of Communism, the Failure of Democratic Reform, and the Theft of a Nation *by Tom Gallagher. New York, New York University Press, 2005. 428 pp. $55.00.*

In this book, Tom Gallagher examines Romania's experimentation with elections and democracy from 1989 to 2004. On the basis of detailed evidence, the author argues that Romania has not "transitioned" to democracy and that the terminology of transitions to democracy may be inapplicable to the Romanian context. He convincingly, and not controversially, documents the domination of the Romanian state by middle-ranking Communists, led by Ion Iliescu, who thrived during the fifteen years following the end of authoritarianism. The book contains a long catalogue of examples of looting of the state by the country's elites, as well as manipulative use of nationalist slogans and tactics.

Importantly, the author argues that Iliescu's strategy in his third term, starting in 2000, was to co-opt the rest of the political class, including the party of the ethnic Hungarian minority living in Romania, by sharing with

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them the spoils of power. He writes that Romania was closer to a model of "political corporatism" in 2000 than in 1990, with politicians from the ruling party sharing power with entrepreneurs and speculators—many with *nomenklatura* backgrounds (p. 344).

Gallagher argues that the opposition coalition, which governed amid great expectations from 1996 to 2000, failed to implement meaningful reforms, because although it was in office, it was not in power. The coalition faced an uphill battle in attempting to implement economic reforms in the context of a state dominated by the enemies of reform and of intense disagreements among coalition partners about the way forward.

This is an engaging book, rich with insightful evidence, and useful reading for scholars interested in Eastern European politics and democratic transitions. It provides ample food for thought about the obstacles to democratization in countries with little or no experience in the practice of democracy. Romania's failures are important for students of democratization, especially given the country's relatively privileged position as an EU candidate country and its expected admission to the EU in 2007.

However, the author is reluctant to refer to broad analytical categories and political science arguments about democratization, political party and civil society development, state building, and international influences on all of these. For the most part, he limits himself to the meticulous presentation of evidence and lets us come to our own conclusions. Nevertheless, it is often unclear what the reader is intended to derive from the book, in terms of general lessons or conclusions about post-Communist states and democratization. To what benchmarks of democracy, free market, and economic development is the author comparing Romania? For example, the author refers repeatedly to the Romanian state as an obstacle to reform, but does not inform the reader of how he defines the state, how states are expected to develop or reform in the context of electoral politics, and how the Romanian state has failed to do so. How would we begin to compare the Romanian, Serbian, and Russian states in the 1990s?

The reader is provided with little guidance on how Romania's experience compares to that of other countries. In the introduction, the author writes that Romania should not be compared to Poland or Slovakia, but rather to Angola or to the post-Soviet Central Asian states (p. 16). However, apart from the evident similarity of elites looting the state and enriching themselves at the expense of the public, the similarities are not developed further.

Modern Romania is a good introduction to Romanian politics in the 1990s, written by a knowledgeable and passionate author. It provides extensive evidence, is clearly written, and demonstrates eloquently the complexity and challenges of political transitions.

KATIA PAPAGIANNI
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Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Détente *by Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin, eds. New York: Routledge, 2005. 166 pp. Cloth, $100.00; paper, $36.95.*

Since 1999, the so-called "seismic diplomacy" has fostered a significant thaw in Greek–Turkish relations, and for the first time in the last sixty years, there is a real opportunity for a breakthrough. The book traces the motives behind the rapprochement and explores the record in business contacts, cultural perceptions, security environments, and defense expenditures in both countries. Despite some gaps and drawbacks, the result is an interesting account of the issues, prospects, and limitations of bilateral contacts.

On the positive side, the book is a truly collaborative product of scholars from both sides of the Aegean, edited by Ali Carkoglu and Barry Rubin. The reader is treated to an in-depth analysis of the political and cultural changes in Greece that made the rapprochement possible, as well as the impact of the United States, the carrot of EU membership for Turkey, a snapshot of Turkish public opinion, and the issues associated with defense budgets in both countries. There are surprising findings, such as the absence of an action–reaction sequence in defense expenditures in either country, and a bit of theory at the end, where Carkoglu injects a two-level games perspective into the discussion. All this makes the book readable and interesting.

There are, however, drawbacks and omissions. As an edited volume, the book suffers from the lack of a common framework. The introduction is short and weak, and does not give a road map of the big picture. So the reader is left to figure out why the essays are related and how they illuminate the big picture. This is not a trivial matter. Ahmet Evin, for example, provides an interesting summary of the changes in Greek perceptions of Turkey that made the rapprochement possible. He is right to argue that it still remains mostly an elite-driven process that has hardly touched the masses. But we are left wondering whether it was only changes in Greece that made this possible. The implicit argument is yes, but that appears one-sided. Surely, the end, from a military perspective, of the Kurdish conflict and the general crisis of the Turkish political system and economy in the late 1990s created the requisite conditions for a change in Turkish attitudes. But we are not given this perspective in the form of a full-blown essay. Similarly, a marvelous and very informative essay on the state of Turkish public opinion shows in unmistakable terms the obstacles still needed to be overcome before full normalization in bilateral relations takes place: Average Turks are deeply xenophobic, with Greeks and Armenians (both Christians, the authors point out) at the top of the enemy list; Greece is seen as by far Turkey's worst friend and the country most likely to attack Turkey. Despite such views, however, there is still considerable desire to normalize relations. Unfortunately, we are not given a similar analysis of Greek public opinion. Although I suspect the results would be somewhat different (not by much, I fear), it is impossible to gain a full

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picture of bilateral obstacles without looking at the Greek side. Moreover, because the survey (a commendable effort, to be sure) was taken in 2001, insufficient time has elapsed to allow discernment of any significant change as a result of seismic diplomacy. One hopes there will be similar surveys given repeatedly over time.

Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is that it omits policy recommendations. We know much about what causes conflict but precious little about how to defuse it. Greek–Turkish relations in the last five years or so are the perfect example of how to do it. Although it remains an insightful book, the editors miss a wonderful opportunity to provide a road map that will set an example of conflict resolution for generations to come.

NIKOLAOS ZAHARIADIS
University of Alabama at Birmingham

The Vital Partnership: Power and Order, America and Europe Beyond Iraq *by Simon Serfaty. Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005. 187 pp. $24.95.*

Simon Serfaty's new book on the partnership between the United States and members of the European Union (EU) is as timely as it is insightful. In a refreshingly balanced appeal for a revitalization of transatlantic relations, he illuminates the structural reasons and compelling long-term trajectories that underline why a close cooperation between these two centers of Western power is mutually beneficial, if not a necessity.

In light of past difficulties in forming multilateral coalitions, he identifies a temptation for the United States, coming from a position of unparalleled military strength and a robust economy, to pursue its national interests unilaterally. Yet, he warns that unilateral actions in imposing a democratic order on the rest of the world are neither credible nor sustainable. With Iraq as his prime example, he sees the United States answering an imperial call to impose its vision of a democratic world order without Americans being willing, attracted, or destined to maintain such an order. Instead, Serfaty argues that a superior European wisdom and culture exists and could serve to balance American brute strength. This European component would then assure domestic and international audiences of the benign intentions of the West.

For the Europeans to be a credible peer to the United States in this process, however, the EU has to become stronger militarily and more united politically. Only a united Europe has the political clout with the international community to alleviate fears of American unilateralism. Ideally, the membership of the EU should converge with that of NATO (including Turkey), thereby providing a streamlined interface between the two sides of the Atlantic. For this to take place, the United States will have to appreciate the fact that a stronger EU, freed from its "provocative [anti-American] instincts," is ultimately in America's

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interest (p. 39). Having a European counterpart to the United States, rather than a counterweight, would give the West the needed cohesion to address emerging threats to Western interests akin to Samuel Huntington's visions in *The Clash of Civilizations.*

In addition to presenting an insightful analysis of current structural problems within the transatlantic alliance, Serfaty explores long-term trajectories of European–American relations. Although his analogies are a stretch on occasion—such as de Gaulle coming across as an Atlanticist—most of his historical comparisons provide a strong sense of the durability and necessity of the transatlantic partnership, on one hand, and the need for infusing this alliance with new significance in the post-September 11 world, on the other. Furthermore, his detailed analyses of transatlantic power shifts through population growth and economics are as balanced as they are insightful.

With Serfaty focusing most of his analysis on the role of the three big powers in the EU—France, Germany, and Britain—one would have liked to hear more about his insights into the role of the Eastern European states within the transatlantic context. While, obviously, there is no significant history of these states within the transatlantic network yet, the prospect of Eastern European cooperation with the United States seems more hopeful, inasmuch as these countries seem to demonstrate less of what Serfaty identifies as cultural superiority and obstructionism vis-a-vis the United States.

On the other hand, economic links between differing geographic regions, such as the United States with Latin America and the EU with Russia, might undermine the transatlantic partnership. As my own research on the German–American relationship in the early 1970s demonstrates, strengthening Soviet–German ties created differing political interests on the two sides of the Atlantic. Such structural reasons could make the Atlantic partnership less vital in the long run. Apart from these minor detractions, this book is a must-read for anyone who takes transatlantic relations seriously.

WERNER D. LIPPERT
Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Saving Our Environment from Washington: How Congress Grabs Power, Shirks Responsibility, and Shortchanges the People *by David Schoenbrod. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2005. 320 pp. $28.00.*

By providing an insider's look at the development and implementation of national environmental laws, David Schoenbrod builds an argument for returning control over many areas of environmental protection to state and local governments, and away from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). He argues that Congress has intervened too broadly in local environmental problems by requiring the EPA to set national standards for pollutants.

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The result: Congress seldom makes the tough decisions that elected representatives should make. Instead, they pass a statute delegating responsibility to "appointed functionaries at the EPA" to make the rules that impose behavioral change on polluters, states, or local governments (p. 9).

Schoenbrod's argument is not new. For at least two decades, a chorus of environmental scholars, state and local officials, and a few environmental groups has argued for devolution of environmental policy. Most often, the chorus applauds the increased capacity and willingness of state and local governments to move toward tougher environmental standards. This is especially true when a presidential administration seeks to relax environmental standards or curtail environmental programs. Moreover, protecting watersheds and wetlands, and protecting children from lead-based paint exposure necessitate the involvement of citizens and local governments.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the book is the ability to get the reader inside the implementation process. Through his first-hand account as an attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Schoenbrod helps readers understand why he believes the current process is flawed. His account of his first case against the EPA (the best one in the book) indicts the EPA for failing to protect children from lead in gasoline. Lead was among the most worrisome pollutants as Congress considered the Clean Air Act in 1970, and Schoenbrod notes that scientists at the EPA were "ready to move on lead" as soon as the ink dried on the new law (p. 30). Yet, three weeks later, the agency failed to list lead as a pollutant requiring regulatory controls. More telling, the agency issued at least two reports suggesting that then-current levels of lead exposure posed little risk to children. Despite two successful lawsuits against the EPA during the next four years, in which federal courts admonished the agency to stop its administrative foot-dragging, lead remained unregulated until 1975.

Real progress toward unleaded gasoline came not because the EPA used its authority under the Clean Air Act to set a national standard, but because Congress required a 90 percent reduction in automobile emissions in another section of the law. Lead-free gasoline helped to protect anti-pollution equipment on automobiles. As new cars entered the market, refiners asked the EPA to ban leaded gasoline. Notes Schoenbrod: "The EPA acted with resolution only after the most powerful opposition had vanished" (p. 35).

As this and other cases in the book illustrate, the promise of science guiding environmental decision making remains unfulfilled. Decisions at the EPA will always, according to Schoenbrod, reflect politics as well as science, and the agency will "curl up like a frightened caterpillar" when faced with intense controversy (p. 222). The result is an agency that is a victim of political forces and the whipping boy of a Congress that wants to claim credit for passing environmental laws while also pressuring the agency to go easy on implementing them, especially if costs are high.

Schoenbrod's suggestion that "ordinary politics can succeed where the EPA fails" (p. 113) and that states, not the EPA, should issue standards for

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air and drinking water (pp. 224, 225) may meet with skepticism, but his eyewitness accounts provide fascinating reading for those interested in environmental protection.

DENISE SCHEBERLE
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Moving Up or Moving On: Who Advances in the Low-Wage Labor Market *by Fredrik Andersson, Harry J. Holzer, and Julia I. Lane. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005. 179 pp. $29.95.*

Does labor force attachment decrease poverty? Advocates of the 1996 welfare reform legislation certainly thought so when they touted the new law's "work first" approach as a means to establishing self-sufficiency in the welfare population. Gaining employment, however, does not guarantee success in escaping poverty. As Fredrik Andersson, Harry Holzer, and Julia Lane show in *Moving Up or Moving On*, there are different pathways to success in the low-wage labor market. They examine the characteristics of individuals and firms to determine which workers are most likely to escape poverty.

The strength of their work lies in their longitudinal approach to investigating which individual skills and firm qualities lead to greater wage growth and eventual self-sufficiency for the poor worker. The authors employ a rich data set with detailed information on both firms and individuals. These data allow them to fully investigate the behavior of both sides of the labor market, as well as to capture the interaction of the two, when looking at the effects of job transitions on wages. By looking at both sides, they are able to formulate policy prescriptions for better matching jobs and workers to improve labor market outcomes. They also examine whether staying with the same employer or switching jobs is more likely to lead to better wages.

Andersson, Holzer, and Lane focus on "persistent low earners" (p. 25). In doing so, their goal is to investigate those with permanent rather than transitory earnings difficulties. They then track these workers over time to see if they can determine which employment paths best lead workers out of poverty.

Although studies have shown that poverty levels have remained relatively stable, the authors reveal that there is substantial mobility into and out of low-wage work. In other words, the workers who make up the lowest earnings category one year may well earn more the next, but they are also highly likely to return to the lowest level of earnings. And although persistent low earners tend to share certain demographic characteristics, they also tend to be employed in firms with low wage growth and high turnover. These firms tend to be smaller firms or firms in specific industries (especially retail and services).

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The authors find that those workers most likely to increase and maintain higher earnings over time were those who switched jobs early and then maintained employment in the next job. Given that the persistent low earners in this study tended to be initially employed in firms with high turnover and low wage premia, it follows that those who transition to an industry or firm with lower turnover and higher wage growth would benefit from the change. However, they also find that those who started in high-wage firms or temp agencies also benefited from an early change in employment by transferring some of the skills they accumulated in the earlier job.

So how do workers find these better jobs? The authors discover that the characteristics of firms that offer the best opportunities for low earners are varied. Further, many of these firms tend to be located in different areas than the persistent low earners. Although it may not be easy to pinpoint a firm with wage growth opportunities using its individual characteristics, firms that offer better opportunities for high wages and wage growth today are most often those who provided them in previous periods.

In summary, Andersson, Holzer, and Lane leave us with the impression that there are things that can be done to help workers out of poverty. By targeting job training to the skills needed in these better wage jobs, helping individuals identify the "good" jobs, and improving access to firms that supply them, we can create policies to help low earners gain the early work experience, job training, and mobility needed to achieve the best earnings outcomes.

HELEN C. CONNOLLY
Northeastern University

Disabling Interpretations: The Americans with Disabilities Act in Federal Court *by Susan Gluck Mezey. Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005. 248 pp. $27.95.*

Susan Gluck Mezey's most recent book on disability rights seeks to explain the failure of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to achieve the results expected by disability advocates and legislative supporters. Specifically, Mezey argues that the failure of the ADA to achieve robust protection is due, in large part, to the interpretive methodology employed by the national judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court. Disability advocates and lawmakers loaded the legislative record with evidence of Congress's intention to provide expansive protection for the disabled and to create a broad and inclusive understanding of who qualified as disabled. However, Supreme Court majorities did not employ legislative intent as their interpretive methodology and, instead, opted for textual analysis. In so doing, "the Court [] disappointed the disability community ... which had looked to the courts to advance the civil rights aims of the law" (p. 8).

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As an assessment of "the degree to which the federal courts have effectuated the remedial purposes of the ADA" (p. 5), Mezey balances a thorough review of the literature with insightful analysis of the available data, which primarily consist of legal sources and personal interviews with "over fifty individuals involved in the disability rights movement in the United States" (p. 5). To Mezey's credit, the book blends evidence and narrative in a thoroughly readable way. Perhaps most interesting, Mezey raises several problems that progressive interest groups face in achieving their policy objectives. First, disability advocates and lawmakers relied on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a legislative model for the ADA. However, they did not account for the different political conditions under which the two acts were passed. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed by a liberal political regime in which both political parties advocated racial egalitarianism. Federal judges acted as coordinate members of the dominant national regime and asserted judicial power on the behalf of racial minorities. Disability advocates and lawmakers seemingly adopted the same civil rights paradigm without assessing the state of political conditions under which the ADA was to be passed. Conservative judges and justices appointed by Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush proved unwilling to adopt an expansive view of disability rights.

Second, Mezey draws attention to the difficulty that progressive social movements faced by highlighting how the failure to capture one branch—the national judiciary—and the subsequent apathy of the other two branches—marked by the failure of Congress and the president to override judicial statutory interpretation—can cause a movement to falter, even after its greatest legislative achievement. In this way, Mezey identifies a legislative "hollow hope" different from the judicial "hollow hope" identified by Gerald Rosenberg (*The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). In the American political system, progressive change is difficult because of the numerous veto points that enable a political opposition to secure retrenching victories unless the progressive movement can successfully capture all branches of government over an extended period of time. Progressive change requires sustained and sequential electoral victories, and absent these victories, significant progressive change is unlikely. Had disability advocates taken into account institutional resistance to progressive change, they might not have assumed that legislative victory equaled political victory.

Unfortunately, the book does not explore these broader political phenomena upon which it touches. The limited scope of the book is, perhaps, its greatest weakness. The failures of the ADA are probably epiphenomenal, given the conservative shift in American politics during the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, scholars of disability rights will also find little new empirical data in the book. However, Mezey is fastidious in her analysis and insightful in her conclusions. The book presents an interesting case study of the difficulties of progressive social and legal movements in the United States and could

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easily find a home in courses for upper-level undergraduate students or a graduate seminar.

BRADLEY D. HAYS
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Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s *by Michael W. Flamm. New York, Columbia University Press, 2005. 258 pp. $36.50.*

In recent years, historical scholarship has attended to the trajectory of the political right in the turbulent 1960s, while simultaneously, a variety of scholarly and popular writers have examined the ways in which the political right has used a media-based ideological campaign to gain and solidify power in the contemporary United States.

Michael Flamm brings these two strains together in a meticulously documented account of how the political right successfully exploited the theme of law and order, chiefly between 1964 and 1968, to begin dismantling the liberal agendas of the John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson administrations, laying the groundwork for the right's ascendancy. Accordingly, *Law and Order* makes an important contribution to the literature on the 1960s era and its link to today's political discourse.

Beginning with the 1964 Barry Goldwater campaign and culminating in Richard Nixon's election in 1968, political conservatives successfully manipulated growing public concern about crime by linking it through race-coded attacks to civil unrest, most notably the inner-city "riots" of those years, and eventually to negative public reactions to the growing militancy of antiwar protesters. In effect, Flamm argues, the Democrats failed to come up with a persuasive response to these attacks; hence, law and order, not Vietnam, was the pivotal issue in the crucial 1968 election.

Law and Order is not principally an assessment of crime policy. Instead, it emphasizes the way in which different arguments about crime and the role of government played out in both conservative attacks and administration defense strategies—and more radical critiques. With extensive documentation—fully 70 of the book's 258 pages consist of footnotes—Flamm takes the reader through the arguments and strategic concerns of diverse factions both inside and outside of government, supplementing these with sociological references and public opinion survey results. His book is a fascinating and highly readable account of how competing perspectives were argued and elections were influenced in this important public policy area.

Law and Order proceeds from early concern about juvenile delinquency and opportunity in the late 1950s and early 1960s to the unleashing of a law-and-order campaign in 1964, led by candidate Goldwater but also joined by Alabama Governor George Wallace. While articulating now-familiar themes

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about welfare state dependency, states rights, and a liberal-activist Supreme Court, the conservative campaign also played the race card, pointedly pinning some of the blame for crime on the Civil Rights Movement's use of civil disobedience. Although this campaign failed to reach the white ethnic working class in the North, the "Southernization" of American politics had begun (p. 35).

The tide began to shift with the 1964 Harlem riot and the Watts riot in 1965. Subsequent chapters trace the political battles over crime from the Johnson administration's 1965 "War on Crime" through conservative electoral triumphs in 1966 (notably that of California Governor Ronald Reagan) to an in-depth examination of the political turbulence that occurred around the Newark and Detroit conflagrations of 1967 and the assassinations and political conventions of 1968.

Flamm's epilogue briefly traces connections between "law and order triumphant" (chapter 9) and later manifestations like the Willie Horton ad in Vice President George H.W. Bush's campaign, simultaneously arguing that the salience of law and order has been largely supplanted by the "war on terrorism" in contemporary political discourse.

Similar political and media dynamics are clearly at work today, however, and political campaigns continue to manipulate these familiar tropes. The right has argued with considerable success in mainstream media that their political ascendance has come *in response to* rising public concerns, many of which they trace to the 1960s. With greater attention to the connections among political propaganda, media coverage, and public opinion measures, *Law and Order* could have shed far more light on the validity of this claim.

EDWARD P. MORGAN
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The Logic of Persecution: Free Expression and the McCarthy Era
by Martin H. Redish. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 2005. 300 pp. $55.00.

In the 1990s, two sets of documents became available that shed new light on the Communist Party in the United States. One, the so-called Comintern documents from Soviet archives, showed that the American party had been funded by the Soviet Union and that the leadership was under Soviet control. The other, the Venona transcripts, were decryptions of cable messages sent by Soviet intelligence agents back to Moscow during World War II. These showed that a number of high-ranking administration officials were engaged in espionage for the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the two sets of documents undermined the prevailing view that American Communism was benign. The documents also suggest that the hysteria of the McCarthy era was not without some basis in fact.

Martin Redish, a First Amendment expert at Northwestern Law School, uses the new information on the McCarthy era to reopen the debate on what

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the appropriate legal response to Communists should have been. While he eschews any claim to be a historian, he offers insights that deepen the understanding of both the McCarthy era and freedom of expression.

Four principal means were used after World War II to cripple the Communist Party. Teachers were forced to sign loyalty oaths (on pain of perjury) to keep their jobs. A loyalty review program initiated by President Harry Truman in 1947 caused a number of Communists working in the federal government to quit or be fired. Hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) exposed unrepentant current and former Communists who, in turn, were blacklisted by private industry—especially in Hollywood. Finally, approximately 150 top party officials were prosecuted under the Smith Act, and in *Dennis v. United States* (1951), the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of the highest leaders, gutting the party.

Redish devotes the bulk of the book to analyzing each of the methods of control of Communists through the lens of the modern First Amendment. One of his most useful insights—taken from the First Amendment requirement of viewpoint neutrality—substitutes "Nazi" or "Klansman" for "Communist" in particular instances. Thus, if one believes that Klansmen should not teach courses in race relations, one cannot, in principle, complain when Communists are disallowed from teaching courses on capitalism. A blanket prohibition on their teaching would be improper, however, because there is no easy way to introduce ideology into mathematics and science courses. Similarly, there are some positions in government where a blanket ban on Communists makes sense. Redish supports blacklisting—which he labels "private shunning" (p. 144)—because it represents a First Amendment right not to associate with those whom a person believes are morally (or politically) repugnant, and there were many good reasons—religious, economic, political—that people would wish to shun Communists. Although private shunning is protected, the HUAC's naming names should have been held to violate separation of powers, because in doing so, the Committee was engaging in a judicial function. And the fact that some Communists were spies cannot justify putting them on trial for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government. That punished the Communists not for what they might have been doing, but for holding politically unpopular ideas.

One annoying feature of *The Logic of Persecution* is the continuous repetition of the book's themes. Another is the extended and largely unnecessary discussion of public education in the chapter on loyalty oaths. Nevertheless, these could be pluses. A good teacher, who has good students, could profitably use the book for an undergraduate civil liberties course.

No one is likely to agree with all of Redish's conclusions, but the book fully achieves its objectives. It illuminates both the McCarthy era and the First Amendment.

L.A. POWE, JR.
The University of Texas

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Women with a Mission: Religion, Gender, and the Politics of Women Clergy *by Laura R. Olson, Sue E.S. Crawford, and Melissa M. Deckman. Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press, 2005. 208 pp. $37.50.*

A wealth of scholarship demonstrates both the existence of a political gender gap in the United States and the importance of clergy as political actors. With this as a backdrop, *Women with a Mission* explores the politics of female clergy. The theoretical argument is that religious identification and gender affect clergywomen's political principles and the organizational pressures they encounter. Together, their principles and organizational pressures interact with the larger political context. Political mobilization, defined as priorities, action agendas, and strategies, emanates from this dynamic (see chapter 2).

Laura Olson, Sue Crawford, and Melissa Deckman find that clergywomen care about and are animated by progressive causes—in particular, social justice and fighting discrimination. This finding is no doubt compounded by an unavoidable selection bias, which the authors acknowledge: clergywomen are drawn exclusively from progressive denominations, which encourage progressive activism. Women who are especially progressive and want a career in ministry are likely to be drawn to these denominations. However, the most interesting findings relate to the political strategies employed by clergywomen (see chapter 5), particularly as they relate to direct advocacy. One might expect, for example, that a political gap between clergy and congregation would demobilize clergy advocacy. Yet even on controversial issues, they find "a plethora of organizational pressures that work ... to mobilize clergywomen for political action" (p. 132). It is congregational *diversity* that tends to demobilize clergy—not polarization between clergy and congregation.

To gain leverage over their political puzzle, the authors employ multiple empirical techniques. They conduct interviews with clergywomen in four major metropolitan areas. This is buttressed by survey data from the 2000 Cooperative Clergy Project. The observations from both techniques are seamlessly integrated and very complementary. Their approach is also highly inductive. It focuses exclusively on women and, for the most part, avoids making comparisons between male and female clergy. The strength of this approach is that it provides a very rich account of female clergy politics. The weakness is that it makes it difficult to assess the unique political contributions women bring to ministry. Indeed, when reading through the book, one cannot help but occasionally ask, "Wouldn't this finding apply to men as well?" Although their interview data do not allow for male–female comparisons, the Cooperative Clergy data surely allow for such comparisons. Other scholars have addressed this question, and the authors are careful to reference the relevant literature. Even so, drawing this distinction out in their own work would have allowed the authors to make an even stronger argument.

The authors identify an important puzzle, and their finding that clergywomen are politically active, particularly with regard to progressive and

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feminist causes, is an important one. As the authors note, the presence of women in ministry is growing. If they bring an especially left-leaning outlook to bear on the politicization of their respective denominations, then the polarization of progressive and traditional religious denominations will only be exacerbated. It might be an interesting next step to look beyond clergy within congregations. Is there a systematic difference between clergy who do congregational work and those who work in seminaries, for example? If there is, then imagine what we might learn by casting a wider net. It would also be interesting to investigate the politics of female church leaders in more-traditional denominations. Women may not participate in ordained ministry in these denominations, but they show leadership in other ways. They teach religious education classes, for example, and in that sense, they are in a position to shape politics in the congregation. In any case, this volume makes a valuable contribution.

ELIZABETH A. OLDMIXON
University of North Texas

Elusive Togetherness: Church Groups Trying to Bridge America's Divisions *by Paul Lichterman. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005. 384 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $21.95.*

In this detailed analysis of actual interaction in Protestant church groups, Paul Lichterman gives us reason to rethink conventional notions of social capital and the place of religion in civic life. Using painstaking participant observations and interviews of church-related groups in "Lakeburg," Lichterman demonstrates just how difficult it is for people to build bridging social capital. *Elusive Togetherness* demonstrates that in order to know what associational life brings about, we have to understand the nature of the communication within it.

Lichterman offers up a nuanced reading of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* as his point of departure. He identifies a "social spiral" argument that underlies much of the contemporary work on social capital: associating in groups, particularly across social chasms like race, religion, and class, is supposed to teach participants to spiral outward, or establish bonds with others. However, Lichterman shows, such lessons do not automatically flow from experiences in the church groups he observes. Whether people get practice in social spiraling depends on the types of customs groups create and reinforce. He demonstrates this through fieldwork with eight volunteer groups or projects affiliated with a mainline Protestant church network, one program affiliated with an evangelical protestant network, and fieldwork with several related county organizations and groups. One example of the work of customs comes from his ethnography with a mainline "Fun Evenings" program, which recruited volunteers to staff activity evenings for at-risk youth at a downtown

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youth center. Instructions to volunteers reinforced a custom of detached supervision, not engagement with the youth, preventing any bridge building.

The main story peeks through the heavy detail: the benefits of associational life depend on the nature of the communication that takes place in voluntary groups. The one group Lichterman observed that seemed more successful at spiraling outward was unique in its "reflexive" talk. That is, the group created a custom of thoughtful, self-critical talk that directly addressed the nature of the ties between volunteers and program clients. Such talk, therefore, has a practical use in civic life. Talk is not "just talk"; it enables certain types of action. Without reflexive conversations, volunteering seems to give people practice in coexistence rather than in cooperation.

Lichterman describes how some of the talk in the groups he observed intellectualized the task of bridge building. Rather than talk about themselves and the barriers they were experiencing in their particular relationships, they spoke about social divides in abstract terms. One wonders if this dynamic is exclusive to the type of well-educated city in which Lichterman conducted his fieldwork. However, the cost of a one-city study is offset by the analytic purchase Lichterman gets from examining many groups in the same locale.

Because Lichterman focuses specifically on church-related groups, his book is also an important contribution to our understanding of how religion works in civic life. We see that the translation of religion into civic benefits is not straightforward. Even church groups that profess to exist for the purpose of reaching out stumble in this task. And how well church groups are able to build bridging relationships varies greatly, even among groups affiliated with the same mainline Protestant church network. We learn that understanding the contribution of religion to civic life requires an understanding of how members translate their religious beliefs into customs of association with others.

This book is a thorough, insightful ethnography that is an important contribution to our understanding of civic engagement, social capital, and the place of religion in civic life.

KATHERINE CRAMER WALSH
University of Wisconsin, Madison

To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance *by Richard J. Ellis. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005. 297 pp. $29.95.*

Recent decades have taught us that social and cultural issues—busing, abortion, school prayer, gay marriage—matter just as much to Americans as economic ones. Now scholars too are exploring the history of these vital issues, assembling a literature to which Richard Ellis's *To the Flag: The Unlikely History of the Pledge of Allegiance* is an important, commendable addition. Lucidly and without jargon, Ellis comprehensively analyzes a century of debates about the pledge and their import.

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The pledge of allegiance originated in the late nineteenth century, when many Americans feared their countrymen were forgetting the spirit of the Civil War, which they recalled as an era of patriotism and (a bit paradoxically) national unity. Drafted by Francis Bellamy, a socialist minister, for the quincentennial of Columbus's voyage, the pledge emerged from a larger push to instill American pride in the public schools. In a persuasive if uncontroversial argument, Ellis roots this movement in anxieties about immigration. With boatloads of non-Protestant aliens arriving daily, older-stock Americans saw the pledge as a thickening agent in the melting pot. More interestingly, Ellis also finds a second reason for this patriotic surge: disturbed by the dehumanizing effects of industrial capitalism, he suggests, pledge advocates hoped that a daily dose of "fraternity" would counteract the Gilded Age's materialistic individualism.

From the start, some liberals doubted the wisdom of rote incantations—in 1900, *The Nation* derided "idiotic flag-fetishism" (p. 52)—but such skeptics were, and have remained, a minority. Nonetheless, the courts eventually recognized the dangers in forced oaths. Most significantly, the Supreme Court in 1943 ruled that the government couldn't compel anyone to recite the pledge.

Yet *To the Flag* tells no happy tale of steady liberal progress. Ellis deals thoroughly with the 1954 insertion of the phrase "under God" into the pledge, a move that not only defined Americanism as monotheistic but also implicated the federal government for the first time in certifying the pledge. (Previously, only private organizations had refined the pledge's wording.) With Cold War ideologues insisting that religious belief—as opposed to, say, a non-totalitarian government—distinguished the United States from the Soviet Union, the 1954 alteration had a definite religious purpose and would thus be deemed unconstitutional when challenged in 2002. Somewhat jarringly, Ellis breaks frame to discuss in this chapter the recent court challenges to the God-infused pledge, although the acuity of his legal history partly justifies the narrative choice.

Ellis is especially good in re-covering forgotten battles over the pledge, especially the student-led challenges to its institutionalized recitation in the 1960s. He sidles deftly from such state and local tussles to the use of the pledge as a national political wedge issue by Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr., who in 1988 notoriously painted his rival for the presidency, Michael Dukakis, a son of Greek immigrants, as not quite American. Since 1988—and even more so since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks—conservatives, following Bush, have increasingly exploited popular sentimentality about the pledge to target liberals, and the book's concluding sections recount a dreary series of profiles in bullying and cowardice, punctuated sporadically by a surprise hero such as former Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura, who vetoed a mandatory pledge bill in 2002 because, as he pithily said, "Patriotism is voluntary" (p. 194).

Although it's not hard to discern that Ellis tends to support the civil libertarians (as do I), he admirably strives to understand, rather than judge, participants on every side. *To the Flag* thus goes far toward explaining why an issue

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that some persist in deeming trivial still provokes passion and outrage in loyal Americans everywhere.

DAVID GREENBERG
Rutgers University

At the Water's Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War *by Melvin Small. Chicago, IL, Ivan R. Dee Publishers, 2005. 256 pp. $26.00.*

Melvin Small sets out to explore the rather unremarkable point that domestic politics affect foreign policies, and contends that this has not been adequately examined in the Vietnam era. Studies of Lyndon Johnson's political agenda, especially the impact of Vietnam on the Great Society, and of the media and the antiwar media abound, however, so Small's book is simply another—and not unique—addition to a topic that has been well covered. And his finding that the various presidents in the Vietnam era—John Kennedy, Johnson, and Richard Nixon—made decisions with domestic politics in mind is nothing new either. This book, then, is simply another pedestrian effort to tell an already well-known story.

American presidents in the 1960s and 1970s, like their predecessors during previous U.S. wars, developed their approaches to conflicts abroad with an eye toward politics at home. Small spends very little time on the Kennedy years, and thus neglects the intense politicization of Vietnam by a young President whose credibility had been diminished by the disastrous invasion of Cuba and who needed "clean-cut success," in the words of his advisor, Walt Rostow, in Vietnam to overcome the Bay of Pigs debacle as well as other global setbacks.

For the Johnson years, which comprise the bulk of the book, Small reiterates what we already know. LBJ played politics with the 1964 election, both running as a peacemaker, as with the famous "Daisy" ad, and conniving to use the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to preempt Barry Goldwater's attacks from the right. He tried to mollify the liberals by creating the Great Society, but infuriated "the Left" by under-funding it and then shifting his emphasis to Vietnam. The President hoped to reach out to "doves" by pursuing a liberal agenda, but recognized the power of the anti-communist "hawks," and thus became a "dawk," an ungainly term that was not really used at the time but which Small invokes with relish. As we know, this all came to a head in 1968, when liberals bailed out on LBJ and rallied behind, first, Senator Eugene McCarthy, and then Senator Robert Kennedy (whom Small blames for LBJ's intransigence in one of the stranger twists of logic in this book). This is yesterday's news, and Small tends to undermine his own arguments at that. On one hand, he expresses his sympathies for LBJ's political dilemmas and tends to be especially critical of the antiwar left, but he also contends that the political threat from "liberals, radicals, and hippies," as well as dissatisfied African Americans (as demonstrated by urban uprisings in Watts and elsewhere) was "relatively minor."

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Small's work on the Nixon years is better, principally because it is less known, but, again, he is offering a traditional narrative, in which the President develops his policies for Vietnam with one eye on Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and China, and the other on the 1972 election.

But it is his treatment of the antiwar movement, a subject on which he has written extensively, that is most troubling. Small simply buys into the idea that "evocative images of mostly young, long-haired American antiwarriors"(p. 95) actually hurt the cause of ending the war. Time and again he regurgitates conservative attacks on those opposed to the war. In 1969, he suggests, they were as responsible as Nixon for polarizing the country as the New Left "accelerated their violent assaults against the government" (p. 126). During a discussion of a Billy Graham pro-war rally, he rips at "rude, chanting demonstrators" who were both "unpatriotic and irreligious" (p. 159). In summary, he assails "the rowdy young protestors, who looked like hippies, used dope and foul language, and seemed to disrespect authority and the flag. They appeared to be part of a movement supporting black, brown, gay, and women's power that was trying to destroy traditional American values and culture" (p. 212).

In contrast to his critique of the antiwar movement, Small goes easy on Johnson and Nixon far too often. He buys into the old canard that the United States won "battle after battle" but lost the war. He apologizes for the televised execution of a Viet Cong prisoner by the Saigon Chief of Police during the Tet offensive of 1968. He repeats the Nixon justifications for the invasion of Cambodia in 1970. He explains away the "atrocities, rapes, and other assaults against civilians" (p. 166) as the natural consequence of warfare. And he often falls in line with the pro-war American faction that waged a ruthless and relentless war against a "bloody, Communist enemy" (p. 195).

If this is representative of current historiography on Vietnam, then the field seems to have hit a roadblock. Under the guise of a political analysis of the domestic impact of Vietnam, Small has provided regurgitated cliches and a conservative attack on many of those opposed to the war. Apparently, if we are to accept Small's version, only middle-class protestors in coats and ties should have been publicly opposing the war, in polite and measured tones at that. It is indeed ironic, and sad, that he is far more critical of those who protested the war than of those who waged it.

ROBERT BUZZANCO
University of Houston

The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Politics *by Beth A. Rosenson. Washington DC, Georgetown University Press, 2005. 256 pp. $26.95.*

On Saturday, June 30, 1787, Gunning Bedford, Jr., Delegate to the Constitutional Convention from Delaware and James Madison's college roommate, rose to object to what he saw as a corrupt juggernaut of large economic and

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political interests rolling over his constituents. In a famous statement that resonates with the theme of Beth Rosenson's book, Bedford said, "I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you possess the power, the abuse of it could not be checked." (30 June 1787, http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/const/yates.htm).

Rosenson begins her book with clear indications that Bedford's lack of trust and a more modern cynicism about lawmakers are abroad in the land. The contribution of this carefully researched and interesting book is to uncover the whys and wherefores behind the anticorruption reforms passed by state and local legislative bodies to regulate their own behavior. In short, what factors account for such reform in some periods and places and its failure in others? The states, as celebrated laboratories of democracy, should be a good place to discover and compare the influence of these factors, because similar ethical issues arise among them. The examples, both major (California, New York, and Massachusetts) and minor (Vermont, Arkansas, Rhode Island, and many others), do show differences in the way that Rosenson's major influences either stimulate change or do not. The problem is that each of these states has a very different political environment that evolved distinctively. Rosenson does include "history of corruption" and "political culture" as variables, but they are such large and complex topics that she is forced to group cultures, for instance, into categories such as "traditionalist."

Rosenson mitigates the problem of accounting for history and culture by summarizing, in convincing chronological narratives, the major factors that were most influential in most states in persuading legislators to put limits on their own behavior. Scandal, compensation, ideology, actions by other states, majority party control, and also history and culture are listed as having varying degrees of influence during demarcated periods over the past fifty years.

Scandal is the constant. Rosenson explains how the media, opposition politicians, and ambitious or perhaps moral governors drive a legislative scandal toward new legislation. Her discussion of this factor and of good-government groups that focus on scandals with intensity—;but with little consideration for the influence of their actions on the ability of agencies to perform—helps us understand the way that "scandal" has been defined and redefined in the modern era. Some of the most fascinating discussions tracked in the book are the debates among legislators over specific reforms, for example, how cutting out meals with lobbyists will "stifle the social life at the Statehouse" (p. 3). The book's focus on "conflicts of interest" is an interesting one, because it is only since the Progressive Era that this category has been considered corrupt. Beginning the analysis in 1954 makes it unnecessary for Rosenson to consider, theoretically, the politics that defined these conflicts as illegal.

One reasonable but limiting characteristic of the book is its focus on legislative behavior. State legislatures are also responsible for regulating the ethics and behavior of public contractors, public administrators, and even of volunteer members of public boards and commissions. The vast sums of money that flow to contractors are mentioned in the course of describing scandals in New York State. But the crooked contractors in the major Parking Violations

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Bureau scandals of the 1980s were in cahoots with party officials in New York City, not state legislators. Thus, Governor Mario Cuomo and the New York media pressed the legislature to reform contracting regulations. A "volume two" might consider the factors that motivate lawmakers to regulate the behavior of private actors.

Any criticism above is directed at those points where the author might have expanded an already comprehensive discussion. Rosenson has made a needed contribution to the study of corruption in a well-written, systematic analysis.

FRANK ANECHIARICO
Hamilton College

The New Wars *by Herfried Münkler. Oxford, Polity Press, 2005. 224 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $27.95.*

After a half millennium in which the European great powers accounted for most of the world's wars, including the most destructive wars, we have witnessed a gradual shift in warfare away from the great powers, away from Europe, and, increasingly, away from states. The landscape is now dominated by civil wars and insurgencies, ethnic and religious wars, terrorism, and armed violence by warlords and other paramilitary actors for their own parochial ends. Clausewitz's classic formulation of war as fought by state armies under the direction of state leaders on behalf of state interests no longer provides a fully satisfactory framework for explaining the "new wars" (Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Original publication of *On War*, 1832; publication of this edition, 1996). But what can replace it? How should we think about war? In what respects, if any, are the new wars really new? Is it analytically useful to include all of the diverse forms of organized violence, past and present, under the same conceptual and explanatory umbrella? Or are we dealing with fundamentally new phenomena for which new analytic concepts are necessary?

These are not easy questions, but one of the best places to start in a search for answers is Herfried Münkler's recently translated book *The New Wars*. This book is worth reading not only for Münkler's creative theorizing in an attempt to answer some of these questions, but also for his summary of recent German scholarship on war, much of which is not familiar to American scholars.

Münkler argues that in many respects, the new wars are new. States and state armies are no longer the dominant actors, the strategy of decisive battles has been replaced by the strategy of exhaustion, and civilians are now the dominant targets. Norms regulating the conduct of war have eroded, and massacre and the sexualization of violence are commonplace. War is less a Clausewitizian instrument of state policy and more an instrument of personal greed that has become a way of life and acquired a logic of its own. A clear

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separation between war and peace has given way to an intermediary state in which violence "smoulders on." Although war played a major role in state building in early modern Europe, it is now associated with the destruction of states. Yet Münkler also demonstrates that the patterns of the new wars are not entirely new. They were the norm in the Middle Ages, before the rationalization and centralization of violence under the modern state, and they can be found during the Thirty Years War. The evolution of war has not been linear.

In any work of this scope, the reader will find things to quibble about. Münkler goes too far in arguing that inter-state war, particularly between advanced industrial and technological states, has been "superceded" (p. 117), and that the asymmetrical wars that have replaced the symmetrical wars of the past will determine the development of the twenty-first century (p. 135). The new wars have always coexisted with the old. The Ottomans, for example, engaged in European balance-of-power wars and also conducted *ghazi* wars on their frontiers. The future will be shaped, as it has been in the past, more by the politics of symmetry—the rise and fall of the great powers and the interactions among them—than by the politics of asymmetry.

As the great powers continue their perpetual dance, they will continue to face asymmetrical threats to their interests, and in perceiving and responding to those threats, political leaders will no longer be well served by traditional conceptual frameworks. Münkler has made a major contribution by rethinking war, peace, and security. *The New Wars* is essential reading for international theorists, practitioners, and informed citizens eager to understand the rapidly evolving world in which we live.

JACK S. LEVY
Rutgers University

Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar (1918–1945) *by Sergei Khrushchev, ed. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005. 935 pp. $55.00.*

Those familiar with the life and career of Nikita Khrushchev have always known that he was a bit of a chatterbox. In public, he could, and sometimes did, speak extemporaneously for hours on end. So it was no great surprise when it gradually became known that he had, in retirement, dictated hundreds of hours of reminiscences into a tape recorder. Even so, the scale of the Khrushchev memoirs is hard to credit: the complete Russian edition, published in 1999, runs to roughly 1.5 million words. The present volume is the first of a four-volume English edition. It represents a huge achievement, not only for Nikita Khrushchev's vocal chords but for all those involved in preparing the English version, which appears with an extensive array of notes, maps, and other aids for the English-speaking reader and an outstanding introduction by the writer Andrei Bitov.

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As a historical source, the Khrushchev memoirs are hard to match in the field of twentieth-century Russian history: Nikita Sergeevich may not be much in the public mind these days, in Russia or the West, but his decade in power marked a crucial period of transition for the Soviet Union and he remains the only Soviet leader to have left us any substantial memoir at all. Of course, three volumes of extracts from the Khrushchev memoirs have already appeared in English, the first in 1970, the second in 1974, and the third in 1990. Valuable though they were, the selections chosen for those volumes reflected the editors' priorities rather than Khrushchev's own; this first volume makes clear not only how much larger the originals are than the published extracts but also how much more attention Khrushchev devotes to matters that receive relatively little attention in the three previous volumes. Perhaps the most striking thing about volume 1 is thus how little that is new; we learn about Khrushchev's very early career—there is almost nothing on the first thirty-five years or so of his life—and how large the war looms. Khrushchev's recollections of the Second World War run to over 400 pages, as against fewer than 40 on his early life.

Khrushchev's memory is almost as impressive as his volubility: it was clearly very good, and he seems to have recalled fairly accurately a great deal of what had happened in the 1930s and 1940s, at least insofar as these things can be assessed against other evidence. Whether his interpretations are as reliable is, however, open to question: Khrushchev's favorable early opinion of Iosif Stalin colors his judgements of the man even when he is describing the Soviet dictator at his most brutal. Khrushchev also maintains, *inter alia*, that Marshal Georgii Zhukov really was aiming to seize power and govern through a military junta in the late 1950s. It is not clear whether pensioner Khrushchev has come to convince himself of this or whether he simply wants his unknown readers to accept it. There and elsewhere, one has the sense of a man trying hard to believe what he wants—even needs—to believe.

Finally, one is struck by Khrushchev's narrative priorities. These, too, differ from those of the editors who prepared the earlier volumes. There is a lot less high politics here than one would expect. Khrushchev's focus is very often on chance encounters and small vignettes, often told at great length, rather than on reflections on the "big picture" or revelations about key historical events. Yet it is this above all else that makes this work so readable, for it allows Khrushchev's personality to come through in the text in all its contradictions and complexity.

WILLIAM TOMPSON
Birkbeck College, University of London

Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo *by John Norris. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 2005. 360 pp. $49.95.*

In March 1999, NATO went to war for the first time in its history, not to defend a member state against attack, but to stop the ethnic cleansing ordered

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by Yugoslav ruler Slobodan Milosevic against Kosovar Albanians living in his country. Bombing without United Nations authorization while violating the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state for humanitarian purposes, NATO acted in uncharted waters. Despite political dissension in the Alliance, conflicts among the military brass, periodic Russian threats (and ultimately, a dangerous Russian military deployment), the United States somehow led a campaign that succeeded in stopping the violence and ending Serb control over Kosovo.

As communications director for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, the lead American negotiator during the war, John Norris had a ringside seat for the diplomacy that ultimately produced a settlement. The story is a dramatic one, and Norris tells it well, drawing the reader into the web of relationships within and between the countries involved.

Remarkably, when Talbott began his work with Finnish President and EU Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to reach agreement on the list of demands to present to Milosevic, no one seemed to expect the negotiations to succeed. Rather, the United States pursued the diplomatic track to keep the Allies on board while NATO continued its bombing campaign and to keep Russian President Boris Yeltsin from taking any dangerous actions on behalf of the Serbs. While to this day we do not know why Milosevic ultimately capitulated when presented with the NATO terms by Ahtisaari, the fact that Chernomyrdin was sitting next to the Finn and making it clear that the Russians could not help the Serbs to negotiate a better deal was critical.

Norris is particularly good at conveying just how grueling diplomacy can be. The number of flights that Talbott and his team took to Europe and Moscow, resulting in a marathon series of exhausting negotiations, is extraordinary. When the political settlement was finally reached, a new dispute broke out over the deployment of NATO and Russian forces in the region, which was not resolved until after Russia had unilaterally sent troops to the airport near Pristina, Kosovo. The troops then found themselves stranded and begging for food and water from NATO when Russia could not gain overflight privileges from its neighbors to resupply them.

The disarray within Russia veered from the comedic—after one negotiating session, Russian foreign ministry officials introduced themselves to officials from the Russian defense ministry—to the terrifying, as when the Russian defense minister did not know that his troops had been ordered to move into Kosovo. But Norris is far from smug about the problems within Russia; he also describes the uncertainties in the NATO chain of command. Although some of this story has been told before, Norris provides a great deal of new material and his own insights to enrich our thinking about these events.

One wonders whether NATO would ever in the future be able to conduct a similar operation, given the complexities involved, both politically and militarily, in an organization that makes decisions by consensus; but whatever the

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problems in working through the Alliance, the campaign had a legitimacy that a coalition of the willing alone would not have had.

Although scholars will be disappointed with the lack of footnotes, even readers familiar with the general contours of the Kosovo war will learn a great deal from an extraordinary tale—one that is told extraordinarily well.

JAMES M. GOLDGEIER
George Washington University

The Russian Military: Power and Policy *by Steven E. Miller and Dmitri Trenin, eds. Cambridge, MIT Press, 2004. 272 pp. Cloth, $50.00; paper, $25.00.*

After the August 1998 Russian currency crisis, in which the value of the ruble dropped precipitously (losing more than 60 percent of its value against the dollar), President Boris Yeltsin removed Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and offered the position of prime minister to former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Russia was facing imminent financial collapse, and panic had spread throughout the country, yet Chernomyrdin made one demand before he would agree to serve as prime minister: he wanted control over the military and other armed elements of the Russian state. His demand was rejected, yet his striving for such control was revealing: at a time when the average Russian citizen had lost most, if not all, of his life savings, a prospective prime minister's attention was focused not on economic and financial considerations, but on matters military.

This incident forcefully illustrates that true power in Russia (and Soviet and Czarist Russia before it) derives not from the consent of the governed, but from the power ministries. Although Russia pretends to adhere to the formal accouterments of a democratic state—rule of law, an independent judiciary, a constitution, and so on—true power resides elsewhere. It is control over the all-important power ministries that report directly to the president, and not the prime minister, that truly determines who rules Russia.

Understanding developments in the military is central to understanding the development of Russia as a State. The Russian military is a microcosm of society, a fact that suffuses the analysis contained in this outstanding volume edited by Steven Miller and Dmitri Trenin. Examining the state of the Russian military today, Miller and Trenin seek to understand why the military's doctrine, weapons procurement process, training, manpower recruitment system, and so much more are still grounded in Cold War strategic thinking. Russia "is not simply the Soviet Union writ small" (p. 2). Its landmass has been greatly reduced, it has roughly half the population of the former Soviet Union, its western buffer zone has been eliminated, the threats and challenges it faces are vastly different, and yet Russia has failed to reform the armed forces when the imperative to do so appears to be so compelling.

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Chapters by prominent experts on the Russian military, including Pavel Baev, Aleksandr Golts, Alexei Arbatov, Roy Allison, Vitaly Shlykov, and Rose Gottemoeller eloquently and persuasively argue that the forces undermining successful military reform are the same forces working against Russia's transition to a democratic society: corruption and lack of accountability; lack of transparency and availability of basic information; the opaqueness of the decision-making process; misallocation of resources; the indifference of the elite to the general population; and the desire of those in power to remain in power.

Conducting business on behalf of the Russian State and its citizens is of secondary importance to remaining in power. As Baev points out, "Putin's record of reshuffling rather than restructuring the military's top echelon ... suggests a preference for neutralizing potential [domestic] political challenges" rather than a serious commitment to creating a military capable of confronting genuine security challenges to the State (p. 62). And, because, as Trenin points out, "any attempt to radically reform Russia's military ... cuts to the core of the nation's identity" (p. 218), the military is unlikely to experience serious reform until the State is radically transformed.

The rather mundane title and equally bland blue cover belie a deeply analytical, comprehensive assessment of the Russian military in all its complexity. If ever a book should not to be judged by its cover—or title—this one is it.

DEBORAH YARSIKE BALL
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

The Impact of Norms in International Society: The Latin American Experience, 1881–2000 *by Arie M. Kacowicz. Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005. 228 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper, $20.00.*

This book is a welcome contribution to the growing body of knowledge produced by scholars working at the intersection of international and domestic politics. Arie M. Kacowicz argues that regionally developed norms of peace and security have conditioned state behavior in South America to such an extent that they have ultimately helped to produce and maintain the long peace characteristic of the region. He identifies a number of these norms, such as *uti possidetis* (acceptance of colonial borders), *convivencia* (peaceful coexistence), *concertación* (consensus seeking), peaceful settlement of international disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and arms control and disarmament, among others. He then proceeds to document their genesis and evolution, the conditions under which they impact the behavior of states, and the actual impact they have had on state behavior in a series of eleven disputes in the region since 1881.

The strengths of this book are many, but I will focus on two in this review. First, the framework for studying international norms is excellent. Kacowicz synthesizes his own pragmatically positivist, neo-Grotian approach to studying norms out of a variety of existing schools of thought and then demonstrates its

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benefits by comparing it to other theoretical traditions in international relations. However, what is particularly innovative in this framework is a careful consideration of the conditions under which norms impact international relations. These conditions include both domestic dimensions, such as the salience of norm entrepreneurs, as well as international dimensions, such as the presence of a hegemon. The argument therefore goes beyond simply stating that norms matter to explain how and when they matter. Second, the case studies are well executed and provide a wealth of valuable information to the reader. In each case, Kacowicz presents the historical and legal background, provides evidence that the relevant norms were discussed and acted upon (or not), describes the aforementioned conditions for the impact of norms, and then evaluates alternative explanations for the outcomes of the cases. The inclusion of these last two features is what makes this work such a valuable contribution to the study of norms.

The main drawback of the book is the lack of attention paid to case selection. First, is South America unique as a region or isn't it? This question is brought up in several places, but not satisfactorily answered. Second, why are the eleven particular cases of South American disputes chosen for analysis, but many other possible cases are not? There is no discussion of this stage of the case selection. Both of these issues are crucial to Kacowicz's (p. 163) goal of inferring patterns and drawing generalizations concerning the impact of norms in Latin America and other regions. While I suspect this may not be such a crucial issue when inferring to the population of South American cases, it may be more problematic when extending the generalization to other regions. In that respect, I think Kacowicz's *Zones of Peace in the Third World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), from which this book draws inspiration, is more adept at cross-regional comparison.

However, setting concerns about cross-regional generalizability aside, scholars of international conflict and Latin American politics will still find much of substantive interest in this book. The book also provides a useful method of studying norms and their impact that could be adapted elsewhere, including other regions or political contexts. Policy makers should also gain a deeper understanding of the normative factors that shape Latin American foreign policy choices. Overall, this is a fine book that deserves serious attention from scholars and policy makers alike.

CAMERON G. THIES
Louisiana State University

Political Movements and Violence in Central America *by Charles D. Brockett. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 408 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $29.99.*

What motivates anyone to participate in a violent rebellion remains one of the toughest problems to account for in the social sciences. Rational actor theories

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based on cost–benefit calculations consistently underpredict participation—no one should be willing to risk life and limb pursuing an essentially public good with little potential payoff to any individual rebel. Structural theories based on inequality or declining resources, and psycho-social theories of relative deprivation, both tend to overpredict participation—more people experience absolute or relative deprivation than ever actually rebel. Resource and political mobilization theories attempt to address this puzzle by exploring how organizations mobilize individual grievances and resources to get particular individuals to engage in collective action.

Charles Brockett's fine book approaches the collective action conundrum with a careful comparative case study of political mobilization of participation in the social movements that challenged the regimes of El Salvador and Guatemala during the 1970s and 1980s. He theorizes that the process that leads to a contentious social movement originates in citizens' grievances. Grievances arise from socioeconomic conditions and prospects, and are shaped by individuals' rational and emotional responses to their problems. Beyond that, the aggrieved must be mobilized or organized into movements that press for political change. The capacity for mobilization of the aggrieved, Brockett argues, is strongly conditioned by political opportunity—the openness or closure of institutions, the stability of elite coalitions around a regime, the presence of allies, and the government's ability and willingness to repress its critics and opponents.

The book's introduction reviews the literature on contentious politics and introduces the Guatemalan and Salvadoran cases. Part I devotes a chapter to the "social construction of grievances." Three chapters then examine this process among urban and rural groups in these two countries. The organizations that "drove the Salvadoran protest cycle of the late 1970s ... were not based on aggregating previously inactive individuals. Instead they drew together already existing groups ... " (p. 95). Brockett shows how activists motivated by religious and political ideology encouraged those being mobilized to attain additional motivation and understanding and to persevere through the discouragement of massive repression.

Part II draws upon events data from primary and regional journalistic sources to track cycles of strikes, demonstrations, occupations, and violent actions from the 1950s through 1980 in each country, as well as acts of state repression. Two chapters then link these cycles to the evolving political opportunity structures of each country and show that political opening expands protest mobilization. Two further chapters map state repression onto these contentious cycles. Brockett reports that the application of massive repression against a widespread and determined contentious movement sometimes demobilizes opponents, but it "does not automatically deter protest. Instead, repression [may become] an additional grievance, one ... powered by very strong emotions of anger on the one hand and solidarity on the other" (p. 291).

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Political Movements and Violence in Central America contributes importantly to our understanding of how citizens, organizations, and activists solved the collective action paradox in the immensely coercive political contexts of Guatemala and El Salvador. Quoting activists about what motivated them, as well as analyzing data, this excellent study persuades on multiple levels. This volume should be accessible to experts and undergraduates alike. Brockett here advances both the theory of contentious movements and our particular knowledge of the details of these two cases.

JOHN A. BOOTH
University of North Texas

Globalization and the International Financial System: What's Wrong and What Can Be Done *by Peter Isard. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 384 pp. Cloth, $70.00; paper, $26.99.*

Peter Isard diligently and skillfully tackles the two major economic concerns of globalization—financial crises and growth failures—in a thorough but highly readable book that will appeal to both scholars and a broader audience. Isard provides a thoughtful account of what causes international financial crises and their frequency and severity, what fosters sudden stops in capital flows, what influences crisis contagion, and how these each affect development and poverty (negatively). He also provides an objective and balanced discussion of International Monetary Fund (IMF) organization and activities and the factors that limit its effectiveness in preventing the two main economic problems of globalization.

One unique aspect of this book is that it proposes some answers to the problems it analyzes. Using a list of five broad types of country-specific problems that contribute to the incidence and intensity of financial crises or inhibit growth and poverty reduction, Isard defines a corresponding five-part agenda of broad challenges for countries to pursue. In addition to systemic reform, Isard also proposes some avenues that states can take individually and in real time, rather than waiting for a broad overhaul of the international monetary system, which most call for but, in reality, few expect. [As Isard himself notes, "Revolutionary change is not in the cards" (p. 244).] He looks, for example, for lessons from the adjustment policies pursued by Korea, which engineered a relatively successful recovery from financial crisis, and dedicates a chapter to exploring various options, from sustainable exchange rates to debt discipline. One important point emphasized by Isard is that countries should move expeditiously to strengthen their financial sectors and prudential frameworks. "This is not a task that should be postponed until a late stage of development" (p. 278).

His proposals for systemic reform provide interesting ideas, such as introducing new hedging mechanisms and creating a market for contingent

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securities that emerging market countries could use to better insure against adverse macroeconomic shocks beyond their control. He also presents controversial ideas, such as strengthening IMF surveillance through ex-ante conditionality. Ex-ante conditionality would link a country's degree of prospective access to Fund credit in the future to their policy track records in the past. This, of course, would mean that weak and poor countries (along with richer profligate countries) faced with a crisis would be denied funds at the time they needed them most. It is similar to a consumer credit score mechanism that may make sense for the very long term but can wreak havoc in the meantime, and perhaps lock out forever the weakest and the poorest. Isard also suggests that development aid should be subject to considerations of prequalification through a demonstrated track record in policy implementation and institution building, in effect making aid a merit-based system, not an entitlement. This suggestion is worth careful consideration. Again, however, it would hurt the weakest and the poorest, or exclude precisely those countries it is meant to help. Still, as Isard argues, the effectiveness of such prequalification for loans and aid could change the incentives for policy makers to pursue short-term policies that are costly in the medium and long term, and thus positively contribute to reducing corruption and macroeconomic laxity for political purposes.

All this should not be interpreted as another attempt to lay responsibility for financial crises on the shoulders of less-developed countries. On the contrary, in reviewing specific crises of the late twentieth century, Isard notes that a large share of the blame stems from deficiencies in the functioning of the international financial markets dominated by financial institutions and other investors from the major industrial countries. However, macroeconomic policies do play a role, and policies that delay financial development contribute to problems of globalization, crises, and poverty. In this context, his proposals for ex-ante conditionality for loans and aid, and for new market mechanisms and financial products, can be viewed as methods for ultimately improving the functioning of the system by forcing a change in the systemic incentive structure of all players, and promoting the financial development necessary for economic development.

His chapter on IMF operations is a must-read for students of international monetary relations. The depth and clarity of his descriptions of these operations are difficult to find anywhere else, and indeed were sorely lacking in the international political economy literature. The chapter emphasizes the multiple constraints on the IMF's actions and effectiveness, such as legal authority, the views of major shareholders, the behavior of member countries and their willingness to heed IMF advice, its limited financial resources, and the state of economists' knowledge. He quite convincingly responds to eleven major criticisms of the IMF. One point here that deserves some thought among academics is that the Fund does not generate policy advice in a vacuum. Rather, it reflects accepted macroeconomic thought and stakeholder preferences. The

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implication (although not stated) is that if IMF policies cause or exacerbate crises and poverty, perhaps we are all to blame, at least in part. All this may not make many observers more sympathetic to the IMF, but it will enhance understanding of its shortcomings, and perhaps pinpoint and sharpen criticisms in a way that could more effectively lead to reforms.

ANASTASIA XENIAS
Columbia University

The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of Global Order *by Nicolas Guilhot. New York, Columbia University Press, 2005. 288 pp. $45.00.*

Nicolas Guilhot, a research associate at the Centre de Sociologie Europeenne, offers an impressive scholarly investigation of the tangled web of relationships emerging from the use of democratization theory to rationalize the pursuit of U.S. national interests abroad. In examining the academic theories behind the verbal haze enshrouding U.S. policy, Guilhot shows how those who generate democratization theory have been institutionally related to the government. The title of the book, which focuses on the growth of the competitive and profitable niche market around globalizing democracy, might better have been *The Collaboration of Universities, Think Tanks, Foundations, and NGOs with the United States Government in Exporting Democracy.*

Despite the nature of its findings, this is not a polemic. Indeed, some readers may be relieved to learn that those who have been most attentive to the study of democratization, freedom, and human rights now sit at every official U.S. foreign policy table. Others may be stunned by what appears to be a collusive system that funds scholars to generate theories that clothe U.S. foreign policy in the latest ethical fashion. For this reviewer, the patron–client relationship between the U.S. government and the "non-governmental" sectors sounds eerily similar to the much-decried role of government-supported social scientists in Chinese universities and the Academy of Social Sciences in developing theories to rationalize China's policy choices.

Guilhot has a thorough grasp of the intellectual and institutional development of democratization theory and U.S. foreign policy. He examines the major shifts in democracy theory—a successive rethinking (not simply a fine-tuning) necessitated by the failure of each theory in turn to help countries both democratize and develop. Although the hypocrisies, hidden agendas, internecine struggles, and linkages to Washington policy makers, including international organizations such as the World Bank, are striking, so is the government's desire to understand *how* democratization happens by consulting (and creating) expertise in the field of democratization studies.

Guilhot examines democracy-promoting NGOs, which began as grassroots organizations led by volunteers and motivated by ideals opposed to U.S.

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foreign policy. In the name of "freedom and democracy" and fighting communism, the U.S. government supported ruthless despots (the intellectual rationalization for which was provided by political scientists); but once the Cold War's anticommunism was no longer the hegemonic discourse shaping foreign policy—and scholarship—the government realized that the NGOs' agenda of globalizing human rights and democracy perfectly fit the pursuit of America's national interests. As they joined forces with the government, NGOs shed voluntarism and idealism. Well-paid professionals took over managing their organizations in ways that would attract funding to support their staff, publications, and international activities. Because so much of that funding now comes from the government, or foundations that themselves receive government funding, it is a misnomer to label most of them "non-governmental" organizations. Indeed, some of the major democracy-making NGOs and think tanks have actually been established *by* the government. As key actors in the Washington foreign policy power nexus, and in the name of defending human rights in countries considered adversaries of the U.S., they support policies that include "regime change" and the covert funding of dissidents in their own countries.

Guilhot's book does not offer a conclusion, and readers are left to ponder whether this patron–client relationship is a healthy one for our own democracy, much less for the states at the receiving end of America's good works, or whether this relationship is a far better outcome than the alternative. Would America's democracy, and the non-democratic world, have been better off had the American government simply ignored the groups that emerged out of civil society and had it not encouraged scholarship about democratization and development in universities? Guilhot has written an important book to help us ponder these questions. It should form the centerpiece in the discussion about America's efforts to export democracy.

SUZANNE OGDEN
Northeastern University

Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies *by Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2005. 194 pp. $55.00.*

In an ambitious and creative effort that addresses conflict reduction in societies divided by ethnic and national identities, Neal Jesse and Kristen Williams contend that transnational or "cross-border institutions can affect deeply held attitudes by promoting overlapping identities and pooling sovereignty" (p. 20). Essentially, this is an institutional model that transcends state sovereignty, a model that can build confidence in ethnic minorities who may have unequal access to the economic, social, and political benefits within traditional state structures but who can derive these benefits in new cross-border arrangements.

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The authors contend that their argument is "constructivist: institutions can promote identity formation, identities are malleable, and individuals can possess multiple identities" (p. 43). This institutional theory questions the usefulness of federal and consociational arrangements for managing identity conflicts. Arend Lijphart's theory of consociationalism (*Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980) comes under withering criticism as an approach with definitional problems and questionable validity in cases such as the Netherlands and even Switzerland. In the examination of two case studies, Spain and Northern Ireland, and in the presentation of the European Union (EU) as the prime contemporary example of a cross-border institution, federalism is also challenged, and the authors posit that in the case of Spain, federalism and regional autonomy promote greater inter-ethnic mistrust and potential separatism.

It is the EU itself, the authors point out, that has stabilized Spanish politics, because Catalonia and the Basque region can now access economic, social, and political goods by bypassing Madrid and interacting with Brussels. This theory clearly has implications for the future role of the nation-state in Europe as state sovereignty is reconceptualized within an evolving EU. In the case if Northern Ireland, the authors strongly imply that the Good Friday Peace Agreement between Protestants and Catholics has begun the construction of a new "Northern Irish" (p. 93) identity. Moreover, it is inferred that the reference in the Agreement to the eventual increased role of the EU has been critical in the process of mutual confidence building. The authors readily concede that at this point, their theory and cases are Eurocentric and that in the evolution of the international system, it is the EU that stands alone in the creation of cross-border institutions such as the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliament. Utilizing data from the Eurobarometer Survey over the past two decades, a strong case is made that sovereignty is being pooled and that a European identity is well along in the construction process (p. 81).

The critical assumption in this volume is that identities that are closely held are malleable via social construction as carried out by a benevolent neo-Hobbesian sovereign such as the EU. And despite the history of violence in Northern Ireland and the ravages of the Spanish Civil War, the authors have made a strong case that cross-border external institutions have begun to ameliorate inter-ethnic conflicts, unlike the internal state-centric approaches of federalism and consociationalism. This assumption is, of course, dependent upon the notion that a decentered, postmodern identity is being created in the EU member states. It should be suggested that perhaps this process of identity shift has its limits and may face challenges from minorities that may not want to reconstruct their loyalties. The Muslims in France and Germany, for example, come to mind. It may be that a rigorous test of the authors' theory will be how the EU comes to grips with the impasse between the Serbs and Albanians over the province of Kosovo. Pooling sovereignty and effecting a greater

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European identity in the Balkans would clearly be a strong validation of the constructivist approach. For scholars of identity politics and conflict resolution, this is certainly a worthy addition to the literature.

STEVEN MAJSTOROVIC
University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire

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

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

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

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

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
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PREVENTIVE WAR, IRAQ, AND IMPOSING DEMOCRACY

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

CONTENTS

Editor's Foreword: Some Early Lessons
Demetrios James Caraley,
Barnard College and Columbia University

Introduction
Walter LaFeber, Cornell University

PART I: THE RATIONALE FOR PREVENTIVE WAR

Understanding the Bush Doctrine
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Nation-Building

Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq

edited by Francis Fukuyama



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George H. Quester



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

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"[Chinese] migrants have been associated with threats to group and national security precisely where they are much needed to offset the decline of [Russia's] working-age population and to revitalize local economies. Moreover, hostility emerged despite the widely recognized willingness of migrants to work harder and for longer hours in lower-paid jobs than host populations do and to move where workers are scarcest. . . . At the Security Council meeting in February 2003, the governor of Khabarovskii Krai, Viktor Ishaev, once again told Putin that Chinese migration amounted to 'a quiet conquest of Russian territory.'"

Mikhail A. Alexseev and C. Richard Hofstetter, San Diego State University

". . . evidence strongly suggests that U.S. intelligence agencies failed to prevent the September 11 attacks not because failure was inevitable or because individuals could not conceive of the threat or how to combat it, but because of politics. . . . The intelligence community was so fragmented before September 11 that even Tenet's 1998 declaration of war against bin Laden and al Qaeda did not seem to have gotten much beyond the CIA's walls."

Amy B. Zegart, UCLA

"The image of the U.S. President coercing the British government into the peace process against its will appears to be far from accurate. The dynamics of the peace process were already under way long before Clinton's presidency. Although U.S. influence may have exerted some pressure on the British, particularly over Adams's first visa application, its effect has been deliberately exaggerated."

Paul Dixon, Kingston University

". . . a practice that was initiated in the interest of recognizing and enhancing congressional authority has ironically contributed to the growth of presidential power at the expense of Congress. . . . Bush I's road to war was that of a president on the 'defensive' politically, whereas Bush II's ability to co-opt the Democratic Party leadership underlined a president enjoying a degree of influence reminiscent of the 'imperial presidency.'"

Gary R. Hess, Bowling Green State University

"Because the current backlash [in Latin America] against technocratic reforms . . . is unlikely to eliminate them in the near term, understanding the externalities that reform projects can create—and leveraging them to support democratic governance—seems a wise path to follow."

Mark Eric Williams, Middlebury College

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